Book Reviews : A Life in Peace and War by Brian Urquhart. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987. 379pp. £15.95
| Author | Nigel Clive |
| Date | 01 May 1989 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788900900508 |
| Published date | 01 May 1989 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
451
was
so
broadly
based
that
they
could
no
longer
stand
in
its
way.
After
the
revolution
a
counterweight
to
the
regular
armed
forces
was
created
in
the
form
of
the
Revolutionary
Guards
and
an
uneasy
relationship
between
the
two
forces
has
persisted
to
this
day.
One
of
the
most
fascinating
passages
in
the
book
is
the
account
of
how,
after
the
purges
and
executions,
the
religious
leadership
set
about
’Islamising’
the
regular
forces
through
systematic
indoctrination
including
the
attachment
of
mul-
lahs
to
units
(reminiscent
of
Stalin’s
Political
Commissars).
The
author
also
evokes
the
astonishing
resilience
and
resourcefulness
of
the
Iranians
under
the
fresh
inspiration
of
Islamic
leadership.
When
Iraq
invaded
in
1980,
the
Armed
Forces
and
Revolutionary
Guards
were
engaged
in
putting
down
ethnic
revolts
throughout
the
country.
This
was
the
chaos
of
which
Iraq
evidently
hoped
to
take
advantage.
But
the
new-style
warriors
for
the
faith
managed
to
check
the
Iraqi
thrust
and
to
sustain
a
costly
war
for
eight
years
in
the
teeth
of
a
virtual
arms
embargo
imposed
by
the
industrialised
world.
The
casualties
were
appalling
and
the
book
contains
har-
rowing
descriptions
of
school-age
volunteers
clearing
minefields
with
their
bodies.
Would
they
have
gone
to
their
deaths
so
willingly
for
’king
and
country’
as
they
did
in
quest
of
Paradise? ’
SIR
ANTHONY
PARSONS
A
Life
in
Peace
and
War
by
Brian
Urquhart.
London:
Weidenfeld
and
Nicolson,
1987.
379pp. £15.95.
Brian
Urquhart
was
in
at
the
birth
of
the
United
Nations
and
spent
the
next
forty
years
between
the
relative
peace
of
his
office
in
New
York
and
countless
visits
to
the
bellicose
conflicts
of
the
world’s
principal
trouble
spots.
Now
in
retirement
as
Scholar
in
Resi-
dence
at
the
Ford
Foundation,
he
is
in
a
unique
position
to
survey
the
progress,
or
more
often
the
lack
of
it,
of
the
work
of
the
United
Nations
in
achieving
its
objectives,
and
to
reflect
on
the
different
performances
of
the
five
Secretaries-General
under
whom
he
served.
After
Westminster
and
Christ
Church,
he
had
an
active
war
service,
ending
as
Chief
Intelligence
Officer
at
the
headquarters
of
the
British
Airborne
Corps,
which
put
him
in
a
position
to
argue
against
the
Arnhem
operation
and,
with
foresight
not
hind-
sight,
to
foretell
what
became
a
disaster.
It
was
a
taste
of
things
to
come.
Family
connections
with
Arnold
Toynbee
enabled
him
to
jump
the
demobilization
queue
and
join
the
Foreign
Office
Research
Department
for
a
brief
spell
before
being
recruited
by
Gladwyn Jebb,
who
had
been
appointed
Executive
Secretary
of
the
Pre-
paratory
Commission
of
the
United
Nations.
From
there
it
was
a
short
step
to
become
a
personal
assistant
to
’the
undistinguished
choice’
of Trygvie
Lie
(it
might
have been
Spaak)
as
the
first
Secretary-General
of
the
United
Nations,
who
was
out
of
his
depth
from
start
to
finish.
Urquhart
soon
began
to
shed
some
of
his
early
idealism
and
to
foresee
that
those
at
the
steering
wheel
would
be
constrained
to
sidestep
the
fundamental
differences
of
the
great
powers
and
to
find
substitutes
for
great
power
unanimity
which
had
originally
been
intended
to
be
the
driving
force
of
the
United
Nations.
Urquhart’s
enthusiasm
was
rekindled
in
1953
by
the
arrival
of Dag
Hammarskj6ld,
who
appointed
him
Chief
Assistant
to
the
Assistant
Secretary-General
Ralph
Bunche.
This
soon
brought
his
first
contact
with
Peacekeeping
when
the
United
Nations
Emer-
gency
Force
(UNEF)
was
devised
in
the
immediate
aftermath
of
the
Suez
crisis,
where
Urquhart
shared
Hammarskj6ld’s
revulsion
at
the
conduct
of
the
Western
powers.
At
the
same
time,
he
admired
his
Secretary-General’s
tact
and
skill
in
helping
Britain
and
France
to
withdraw,
save
face
and
reknit the
web
of
Western
solidarity
after
the
Suez/
Hungarian
tragedies.
This
was
the
first
piece
of
glaring
evidence,
quickly
grasped
by
Hammarskj6ld,
that
a
great
power
veto
in
the
Security
Council
would
always
prevent
the
United
Nations
from
becoming
a
supra
government
and
make
it
in
fact
a
treaty
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