Book Reviews : The Onset of World War by Manus I. Midlarsky. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988. 268pp.£30.00
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788900900516 |
| Published date | 01 May 1989 |
| Author | Dan Hiester |
| Date | 01 May 1989 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
465
The
Onset
of
World
War
by
Manus
I.
Midlarsky.
London:
Unwin
Hyman,
1988.
268pp.£30.00.
The
first
sentence
of
this
book
makes
clear
the
author’s
purpose:
to
contribute
to
the
literature
on
international
conflict
concerned
with
avoiding
the
cataclysmic
conse-
quences
of
nuclear
war.
The
book
is
not,
however,
about
nuclear
war
or
nuclear
deterrence,
which
are
sparingly
discussed,
but
the
antecedents
of
systemic
war
in
general,
which
in
contemporary
terms
would
involve
the
use
of
nuclear
weapons.
Professor
Midlarsky
is
primarily
concerned
with
international
structure,
because ’...
in
regard
to
the
outbreak
of
systemic
war,
international
structure
is
a
decisive
element.’
This
is
a
most
ambitious
book
since
its
aim
is
nothing
less
than
an
attempt
‘ ..
to
discover
the
patterns
associated
with
the
origins
of
systemic
war
precisely
to
ensure
our
continued
existence
as
a
species’.
A
systemic
war ‘...
is
a
war
entailing
the
breakdown
of
the international
system
as
it
existed
prior
to
the
outbreak
of
the
war.’
This
occurs
as
the
result
of
the
failure
to
maintain
hierarchical
equilibrium,
which
is
the
central
theoretical
perspective
of
the
book
and
is
related
to,
but
significantly
different
from,
balance-of-power
theory
(Morgenthau)
and
system
hierarchy
(Organski).
Midlarsky
is
quite
clear
that
he
is
dealing
with
causation
and
his
mathematically
derived
conclusions
are
stated
in
probabilistic
terms,
’...
seeking
to
ascertain
the
increasing
or
decreasing
probability
of
the
occurrence
of
a
systemic
war’.
The
data
is
based
on
extensive
histori-
cal
research
and,
for
more
recent
disputes,
the
Correlates
of
War
Project.
This
book
is
bound
to
be
controversial,
not
only
because
it
is
so
ambitious
(although
it
could
be
argued
that
the
literature
of
international
relations
could
use
a
bit
more
ambition)
but
also
because
of
its
uncompromising
adherence
to
the
concept
of
international
structure
as
the
key
to
understanding
the
onset
of
systemic
war.
Some
will
also
want
to
challenge
the
appropriateness
of
mathematical
modeling
as
the
core
of
the
analytic
approach,
although
space
does
not
allow
a
discussion
of
this
here.
Nor
does
the
book
shy
away
from
stating
in
concrete
terms
important
normative
and
policy
implica-
tions
which
some
may
find
disturbing
or
unwelcome.
One
of
the
major
problems
of
the
book
relates
to
how
data
has
been
compiled
and
used,
especially
the
non-quantitative
data.
A
minor
example
will
suffice
to
demonstrate
this.
In
a
discussion
of
hierarchy,
Midlarsky
introduces
the
ideas
of
minimum
entropy
and
absence
of
memory
as
aspects
which
will
maintain
equilibrium.
The
Cuban
Missile
Crisis
is
used
as
an
example.
The
assumption,
based
on
the
numerous
descriptions
of
the
crisis,
is
that
Cuban
concerns
and
influence
were
quickly
eliminated
from
the
unfolding
of
the
crisis
which
became
a
straightforward
Superpower
confrontation
con-
firming
the
idea of
minimum
entropy.
Evidence
emerging
from
a
conference
held
recently
in
Moscow
of
the
actual
participants
in
the
crisis,
itself
a
unique
event,
suggests
a
quite
genuine
Cuban
belief
that
the
United
States
was
about
to
invade
the
island
and
that
this
had
a
major
impact
on
Soviet
behaviour
and
created
a
substantial
stumbling-
block
to
a
resolution
of
the
crisis.
If
this
is
correct,
it
would
lead
to
the
opposite
conclusion
reached
in
the
book
and
demonstrates
that
if
you
do
not
get
the
description
right,
even
the
best
probability
theory
will
yield
misleading
results.
Since
the
research
goes
as
far
back
as
the
Peloponnesian
War,
this
is
a
serious
matter.
An
example
of
clear-cut
policy
implications
flowing
from
this
analysis
relates
to
the
Strategic
Defense
Initiative
(SDI).
Major
technological
breakthroughs
can
upset
the
balance
in
international
structure
and
clearly
SDI
could be
a
case
in
point.
According
to
Midlarsky,
a
systemic
war
between
the
United
States
and
the
Soviet
Union
becomes
likely
during
the
window
of
vulnerability
before
the
system
becomes
operational
because
of
the
threat
it
represents
to
the
balance
of
power
from
the
perspective
of
the
disadvanthged
power,
the
Soviet
Union.
As
a
result,
he
recommends
that
introduction
of
SDI
should
be
approached
with
extreme
caution.
The
fact
that
it
would
probably
never
work
is
another
matter.
Moving
to
offensive
arms,
Midlarsky
must
unfortunately
be
added
to
the
list
of
those
in
the
literature
who
use
the
popular
but
inaccurate
term
‘arms
race’
to
describe
Soviet
and
US
arms
acquisitions.
Nonetheless,
his
policy
conclusions
are
of
great
interest.
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