Boom and bust: Economic voting in Ireland
| Author | Jane Suiter,Michael Breen,Theresa Reidy |
| Published date | 01 May 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0263395716680827 |
| Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Politics
2018, Vol. 38(2) 148 –164
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0263395716680827
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Boom and bust: Economic
voting in Ireland
Theresa Reidy
University College Cork, Ireland
Jane Suiter
Dublin City University, Ireland
Michael Breen
Dublin City University, Ireland
Abstract
The global economic crisis presents new challenges for economic voting models. While there
is a consensus that economic voting exists, even the most ardent supporters agree that it is a
variable force and can only explain a portion of voting behaviour. This article investigates the
impact of positive and negative economic performance on voting patterns. The idea that voters
are more likely to punish governments for poor economic performance, the grievance asymmetry
hypothesis, has found some empirical support, but in their comprehensive review of the economic
voting literature, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier concluded that the evidence of asymmetric economic
voting was, at best, mixed. Ireland presents a clear test of the grievance asymmetric economic
vote with recent elections taking place against backdrops of some of the highest economic growth
rates in the world and then one of the most spectacular economic crashes. We demonstrate
that economic shocks matter a great deal; Irish voters like their counterparts elsewhere in crisis
hit states are unforgiving. Furthermore, the electoral change at the 2011 election in Ireland was
extreme and challenges the consensus that economic voting is a small force.
Keywords
economic crisis, economic voting, Ireland, unemployment
Received: 21st December 2015; Revised version received: 30th September 2016; Accepted: 20th October 2016
Introduction
Economic voting is usually a relatively small force, significant only because it moves
voters in one direction. The essential idea is that a positive economy will encourage float-
ing voters to support the incumbent government, while the converse should also be true.
Corresponding author:
Theresa Reidy, Department of Government, University College Cork, Western Rd, Cork, Ireland.
Email: t.reidy@ucc.ie
680827POL0010.1177/0263395716680827PoliticsReidy et al.
research-article2016
Article
Reidy et al. 149
Accordingly, economic voting can be a decisive force at elections putting parties in and
out of government. Some work has suggested that voters are harsher in an economic
downturn and more likely to punish the incumbent, indicating that there may be a griev-
ance asymmetry in the economic vote; that is, poor economic performance matters more.
Voters at elections in the Republic of Ireland engage in economic voting, and studies
over the years have pointed to the salience of unemployment (Borooah and Borooah,
1990; Harrison and Marsh, 1998). Economic and political developments in Ireland
from 2002 to 2011 include extreme economic conditions, of both boom and bust, and
mean that it presents a fascinating test of the grievance asymmetry hypothesis. This
article begins with the 2002 election when the surge in economic growth in Ireland had
earned it the label Celtic Tiger; it includes the intermediate election of 2007 when eco-
nomic storm clouds were beginning to gather and covers a third election in 2011 which
took place against the backdrop of catastrophic economic contraction and deep political
turmoil. Few country cases offer such diversity of economic experience and can chal-
lenge the explanatory powers of conventional economic voting models. As such, the
article provides an opportunity to investigate how economic voting varies under differ-
ing economic circumstances. But economic conditions in Ireland also offer an opportu-
nity to assess whether economic voting can be more than a small force driving electoral
outcomes.
Economic voting has produced a voluminous literature organised around a series of
core questions: Are voters more likely to make economic evaluations based on national
economic performance or personal financial circumstances, do voters look backward or
forward when they evaluate economic conditions, who specifically is held responsible for
economic performance, are all political parties treated equally in the attribution of reward
or blame within coalition governments and, indeed, do negative economic conditions
matter more than positive ones?
The earliest economic voting models hypothesised that incumbent governments do
better at the polls when the economy is performing well and that voters are generally
retrospective in their evaluations. Drawing on V.O. Key’s argument that voters attribute
responsibility for current economic performance to the government of the day, succes-
sive iterations of economic voting models have assessed this relationship (Fiorina,
1978; Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Peffley, 1984). In a special volume
of Electoral Studies, Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000: 117) collated the evidence from
13 papers and concluded that retrospective economic voting models perform robustly
and were persuasive in explaining voting behaviour at elections. The global economic
crisis presented very different economic conditions and new challenges for economic
voting models. The deteriorating performance of the economy was at the forefront of
discussions which sought to explain electoral changes in many countries (Anderson and
Hecht, 2012; LeDuc and Pammett, 2013). In the face of dramatically altered global
economic circumstances, Electoral Studies presented a special volume on economic
voting in 2013. Lewis-Beck and Whitten (the volume co-editors) summarised the find-
ings of the 26 papers as follows: ‘when the economy prospers voters reward the govern-
ment, but when the economy falters they punish it’ (Lewis-Beck and Whitten, 2013:
393). The research included in the volume is both extensive and persuasive and, as the
co-editors explain, is robust across multiple research design specifications. Economic
voting models have retained their explanatory power in times of economic crisis and
governments in many countries are being held responsible for deteriorating economic
conditions.
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