Bound to Lead: US-Taiwan Relations, Security Networks, and The Future of AUKUS
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020231197761 |
| Author | Christina Lai |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essays |
Bound to Lead: US-Taiwan
Relations, Security Networks,
and The Future of AUKUS
Christina Lai
Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei,Taiwan, Republic
of China
Abstract
In 2021 the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partnership known
as AUKUS. This new security arrangement carries strategic implications for Taiwan’s
national security and prospects for regional order in Asia. It also leads to empirical
puzzles: how will members of multiple alliances respond to rising threats? Under
what conditions can a patron state avoid unwanted entrapment and imperial over-
stretch?
This article contributes to existing scholarship in US foreign policy and alliance
management in Asia. It offers concrete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clar-
ity toward Taiwan and its contingency would enhance AUKUS’s resilience, while US
allies in Asia and Europe could maintain a collective stance of strategic ambiguity that
would lessen internal tensions among the member states. Such an arrangement could
not only help stabilize Asia’s regional order, but also secure Taiwan’s autonomy against
Beijing’s forced reunification.
Keywords
Taiwan, US, AUKUS, alliance management, trilateral security partnership
Corresponding author:
Christina Lai, Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, 128 Academia Rd., Sec.2, Nankang, 115 Taipei,
Taiwan, ROC.
Email: clai@gate.sinica.edu.tw
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2023, Vol. 78(3) 417–434
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020231197761
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
Introduction
In September 2021, the US, UK, and Australia established a trilateral security partner-
ship called AUKUS, which aims to uphold rule-based order and deepen diplomatic and
defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
1
Recently, several other multilateral
institutions have emerged across Asia, including the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad), Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and Five Eyes (FVEY), which
together signal a reconfiguration of the Asian security order.
2
AUKUS carries strategic implications for Taiwan’s national security, US foreign
policy in the Indo-Pacific, and the prospects of Asian regional order.
3
The combination
of US security networks and Asian partnerships leads to questions: how will members
of multiple alliances respond to rising threats? And under what conditions will a patron
state avoid unwanted entrapment and imperial overreach? Answering these questions
not only contributes to a better understanding of alliance formation and threat percep-
tions, but also sheds light on current US-China relations and Asian security.
Within this context, this article
4
contributes to existing scholarship in US
foreign policy in Asia and alliance management in two ways. First, it offers con-
crete thoughts on how a US policy of strategic clarity toward Taiwan could
enhance AUKUS’s resilience. Meanwhile, US allies in Asia and Europe collec-
tively could maintain a stance of strategic ambiguity that would lessen internal ten-
sions among the member states. Such an arrangement not only could help to deter
China’s dominance in Asia but could also secure Taiwan’s autonomy in response to
Beijing’s threats of forced reunification.
Second, while Taiwan plays a crucial role for AUKUS in deterring China’s asser-
tive behaviour, the US faces other foreign policy challenges, among them China’s
expansionist ambitions, Taiwan’s quest for autonomy, and the emerging security part-
nership in Asia.
5
More specifically, the disconnect between the long-held US policy of
strategic ambiguity and China’s rapid military modernization has to be resolved, and it
should start with a recalibration of US-led security networks in Asia. It is time for the
US to declare strategic clarity toward Taiwan through an official statement that it will
1. “Joint leaders statements on AUKUS,”The White House, 15 September 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/ (accessed 10 June 2023).
2. FVEY is now more than an intelligence alliance. See Srdjan Vucetic, “More than a ‘spy alliance’? The
Five Eyes today,”CIPS Working Paper no. 14, April 2021, https://www.cepi-cips.ca/more-than-a-spy-
alliance-the-five-eyes-today/ (accessed 10 June 2023).
3. William Chih-Tung Chung, “Strategic implications of AUKUS for Taiwan’s national security,”Institute
for National Defense and Security Research, vol. 10, 2021, https://indsr.org.tw/en/respublicationcon?
uid=15&resid=43&pid=1616 (accessed 10 June 2023); “The Indo-Pacific strategy of the United
States,”The White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/
US-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf (accessed 10 June 2023).
4. An earlier draft of this article was presented at “AUKUS Among Democracies: One Year Later,”a
workshop held at the University of Ottawa on 3 October 2022.
5. “Biden says China won’t surpass US as global leader on his watch,”Reuters, 26 March 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-china-idUSKBN2BH2ZE (accessed 10 June 2023).
418 International Journal 78(3)
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