Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue and use CBRN weapons
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211057021 |
| Published date | 01 March 2023 |
| Date | 01 March 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Regular Articles
Breaking taboos: Why insurgents pursue
and use CBRN weapons
Victor Asal
University at Albany, SUNY
Nazli Avdan
University of Kansas
Gary Ackerman
University at Albany, SUNY
Abstract
Much ado has been made about the specter of unconventional weapons in the hands of militant groups. Despite the
alarmism of the policy community, the pursuit of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear capabilities by non-
state actors is rare. What explains why some violent non-state organizations pursue chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear weapons while most do not? Using new data on organizational behaviors and attributes from the Big
Allied and Dangerous 2 Insurgency project, we analyze 140 insurgent actors, from 1998 to 2012. We expand
previous work by Asal, Ackerman & Rethemeyer by studying the phenomenon longitudinally and attending to
organizational behavior rather than only to structural and environmental factors. We find that organizations that
attack cultural sites are more likely to pursue and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. We
interpret the latter as a willingness to transgress upon accepted mores, for the sake of sensationalism and shock value,
which coheres with a willingness to pursue unconventional weapons. Our results reflect that chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear pursuit and use is part of a larger strategy for some violent non-state organizations, one
predicated on generating mass fear and exacting a psychological toll.
Keywords
CBRN weapons, insurgent groups, non-state groups, terrorism, WMD
Introduction
In 2018, the White House released a strategy calling for
‘new aggressive steps to counter the growing threat posed
by WMD terrorism’ (White House, 2018), a concern
that has been echoed in almost all United States national
strategy documents post-911. In fact, all administrations
since Clinton have aimed to dampen the risk of so-called
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) terrorism
(Mauroni, 2018). The specter of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the hands
of terrorists and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs)
also figured in debates and prognostications about the
possible resurgence of ISIS. To some extent, this concern
has been shared internationally, as evidenced by such
multilateral efforts such as United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
The alarmism of the security establishment may,
however, seem puzzling in light of the empirics. On the
nuclear weapons side of things, in the last 25 years, there
have only been around 20 incidents where stolen
weapons-grade nuclear material was seized by terrorist
groups (Bunn & Roth, 2017). Depending on how one
Corresponding author:
navdan@ku.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(2) 193–208
ªThe Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211057021
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measures such phenomena, there have also only ever
been a handful of truly mass-casual ty terrorist attacks
using chemical or biological agents, including the 1984
dissemination of food-borne Salmonella typhimurium,
which sickened 751 people in Oregon (To
¨ro
¨ketal.,
1997; Carus, 2000) and the attack by the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo cult with the nerve agent sarin in 1995 (Dan-
zig et al., 2012). Indeed, of all 181,691 terrorist inci-
dents recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
from 1970 to 2017, only 433 incidents (0.24% of all
incidents) utilize CBRN technology (GTD, 2019).
Yet, while the employment of CBRN technology by
VNSAs is a low-probability event, its consequences
could be so devastating that the scenario arguably justi-
fies hypervigilance on the part of the security community
(Bunn & Roth, 2017). Additionally, the broader pat-
terns displayed in the GTD miss plots to use CBRN
weapons. For example, there are estimates of 40 cases
of radiological materials pursuit by non-state actors
(Campbell & Murdie, 2018; James Martin Center,
2016), more than 60 high-threat attacks or plots against
nuclear facilities (Ackerman & Halverson, 2016), and
several expressions of interest by terrorist groups in
acquiring nuclear weapons. For the period of 1990 to
2017, the POICN Database records a total of 224 uses
and 517 total cases of CBRN pursuit (Binder &
Figure 1. CBRN events, 1990–2017, N ¼517
Figure 2. CBRN uses, 1990–2017, N ¼224
194 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 60(2)
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