Breaking the epistemic pornography habit. Cognitive biases, digital discourse environments, and moral exemplars
| Date | 23 November 2019 |
| Published date | 23 November 2019 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-10-2019-0117 |
| Pages | 83-104 |
| Author | Andrew D. Spear |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management,Information management & governance,Information & communications technology |
Breaking the epistemic
pornography habit
Cognitive biases, digital discourse
environments, and moral exemplars
Andrew D. Spear
Department of Philosophy, Grand Valley State University,
Allendale, Michigan, USA
Abstract
Purpose –This paper aims to analyzesome of the epistemically pernicious effects of the use of the internet
and social media. In light of this analysis,it introduces the concept of epistemic pornography and argues that
epistemicagents both can and should avoid consumingand sharing epistemic pornography.
Design/methodology/approach –The paper draws on research on epistemic virtue, cognitive biases, social
media use and its epistemic consequences, fake news, paternalistic nudging, pornography, moral philosophy, moral
elevation and moral exemplar theory to analyze the epistemically pernicious effects of the internet and social media.
Findings –There is a growing consensus that the internet and social media activate and enable human
cognitive biases leading to what are herecalled “failures of epistemic virtue.”Common formulations of this
problem involve the concept of “fake news,”andstrategies for responding to the problem often have much in
common with paternalistic “nudging.”While fake news is a problem and the nudging approach holds out
promise, the paper concludes that both place insufficientemphasis on the agency and responsibility of users
on the internetand social media, and that nudging representsa necessary but not sufficient response.
Originality/value –The essay offers the concept of epistemic pornography as a concept distinct from but
related to “fake news”–distinct precisely because it placesgreater emphasis on personal agency and responsibility,
and following recent literature on moral elevation and moral exemplars, as a heuristic that agents might use to
economize their efforts at resistingirrational cognitive biases and attempting to live up to their epistemic duties.
Keywords Nudge, Fake news, Cognitive bias, Epistemic virtue, Moral elevation, Moral exemplar,
Epistemic pornography, Pornography
Paper type Conceptual paper
“[...] do not send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”(John Donne, Meditation 17)
1. Introduction: the paradox of the internet and social media
The internet and social media make possible unprecedented access to information, analysis,
alternative points of view, and even to new forms of social and political organization
Special thanks for conversation, comments and criticism are due to Stephanie Adair, Patrick
Anderson, Jeffrey Byrnes and Michael DeWilde. In addition, the essay was considerably improved by
comments from two anonymous reviewers for the journal. Earlier versions of this essay were
presented at the Institute for Philosophical Studies in Green Bay, WI, the GVSU Student Philosophy
Club, the GVSU Philosophy Summer Research Group, and at the 9th International Conference on
Information Law and Ethics: Psychological and socio-political dynamics within the Web held in Rome,
Italy in July of 2019. I am grateful for helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms from
participants at all of these meetings.
Breaking the
epistemic
pornography
habit
83
Received23 October 2019
Revised23 October 2019
Accepted23 October 2019
Journalof Information,
Communicationand Ethics in
Society
Vol.18 No. 1, 2020
pp. 83-104
© Emerald Publishing Limited
1477-996X
DOI 10.1108/JICES-10-2019-0117
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/1477-996X.htm
(McIntyre, 2015;Sunstein, 2018). At the same time, they appeal to, enable and even
encourage human cognitive biases thus leadingto both proliferation of false and misleading
information, and to degradationof the quality and efficacy of public discourse(Polage, 2012;
Lazer et al., 2018;McIntyre,2015, 2019;Sunstein, 2018;Vosoughi et al.,2018). From the
standpoint of their most prominent impact on discourse[1], it seems clear that the internet
and social media currentlyplay this latter epistemically pernicious role more frequentlyand
more forcefullythan they do the former epistemically positive one.
This paper analyzes and proposes a partial solution to the epistemically pernicious
effects of the internet and social media. In what follows, a basic set of epistemic virtues is
first introduced. Having subjects instantiate these or similar virtues is desirable, probably
necessary, for achieving the goals of objectivity and the likelihood of truth in the formation
of beliefs. They are plausibly seen as independent of and so underlying more specific
scientific, political, cultural or moral disagreements[2]. They thus represent an ideal or
image, if a partial one, of epistemic agents as they might be, and of the sorts of epistemic
practices we might hope for from epistemic agents as they engage with internet and social
media, as well as in belief formation and discourse generally. In response to this image of
epistemic virtue, some results of current research and theorizing in social and evolutionary
psychology are considered. The image of human cognition these results suggest not only
raises doubts about the extent to which we are able to live up to the epistemic virtues
outlined but also helps to explain why the internet and social media are so epistemically
pernicious[3]. The concept of “fake news”and the so-called nudge approach to dealing with
the pernicious epistemic effects of the internet and social media are then considered. While
fake news is a problem and the nudging approach holds out promise, it is argued that both
place insufficient emphasis on the agency and responsibility of users of the internet and
social media. What is needed inaddition is a more agent-centered approach that emphasizes
individual responsibilityand at least the aspiration to instantiate intellectualvirtues.
In light of this discussion, the concept of “epistemic pornography”is introduced to
identify a particularlypernicious unit of discourse that flourishes in on-line and social media
environments. While the concept of fake news primarily suggests passive deception of its
victims, epistemic pornographyemphasizes how information presented in certain ways can
enlist the active engagement of epistemic agents by appealing to their unguarded
psychological needs and cognitive biases. There is a close analogy between epistemic
pornography and traditionalpornography, and recognizing this helps to highlight epistemic
pornography’s harmful effects. In light of these harmful effects, all three major moral
theories in philosophy can be seen to imply that we have moral duties not to consume or
share epistemic pornography.
Finally, the possibility of a more agent- and personal-responsibility-centered approach is
defended by way of a review of empirical literature that suggests cognitive biases can be
resisted and diminished through awareness, intentional effort and training. In particular,
recent work on moral elevation and moral exemplar theory in psychology and philosophy
provide reason to thinkthat the concept of “epistemic pornography”may itself offer a useful
heuristic for overcomingour cognitive limitations and living up to our epistemic duties.
2. Human beings as we would have them: some intellectual virtues
Contemporary virtue epistemologists have developed the notionsof epistemic character and
virtue in the context of accounts of justified or warranted belief (DePaul and Zagzebski,
2003)[4]. On such accounts to be, e.g. justified in holding a belief is for that belief to have
been formed because of some truth-directed and conscientiously exercised intellectual
virtue. One way of understanding the ideal intellectual conduct it would be desirable for a
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