BRICS, G20 and global economic governance reform
| Author | Marina Larionova,Andrey Shelepov |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/01925121211035122 |
| Published date | 01 September 2022 |
| Date | 01 September 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/01925121211035122
International Political Science Review
2022, Vol. 43(4) 512 –530
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/01925121211035122
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BRICS, G20 and global economic
governance reform
Marina Larionova
Center for International Institutions Research, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public
Administration, Russian Federation
Andrey Shelepov
Center for International Institutions Research, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public
Administration, Russian Federation
Abstract
The article reviews cooperation between the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)
and their collective efforts to promote reform of international financial institutions, shape global financial
regulation and improve financial cooperation. The authors focus on the BRICS–G20 engagement for global
economic governance reform. To assess the progress so far, the study employs original quantitative data on
the BRICS and G20 commitments and compliance, and qualitative analysis of the BRICS and G20 discourse
and the transformation of the international economic architecture. The results suggest that, contrary to
the common perception of the BRICS as a challenger of the traditional western-dominated international
monetary and financial system, it acts in a cooperative manner, seeking to make the international financial
architecture and global regulation more representative and responsive to emerging markets and developing
economies needs, and strengthen the stability and resilience of international and domestic financial markets.
Keywords
BRICS, G20, international monetary and financial system, financial regulation, reform
Introduction
This article explores intra-BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) cooperation and
engagement with the G20 for the reform of the international monetary and financial system (IMFS)
and financial regulation. It focuses on three questions. Has the BRICS been able to translate into
reality its collective commitment to a more stable, predictable and diversified international
Corresponding author:
Andrey Shelepov, Center for International Institutions Research (CIIR), Russian Presidential Academy of National
Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), 11 Prechistenskaya naberezhnaya, Moscow, 119034, Russian Federation.
Email: shelepov-av@ranepa.ru
1035122IPS0010.1177/01925121211035122International Political Science ReviewLarionova and Shelepov
research-article2021
Special Issue Article
Larionova and Shelepov 513
monetary system? Has it been able to engage with the G20 for change in economic governance?
What is the balance of the BRICS successes and failures in this regard?
Critics have questioned the BRICS’ capacity for global governance (Roberts, 2010), resolve for
collective actions (Wallerstein, 2016), responsibility for creating global public goods (Sharma,
2012) and their power for shaping a new equitable world order (Pant, 2013). Sceptics wrote the
BRICS off as a grouping, arguing that it is incoherent (Alessi, 2012), troubled by internal rivalries
and contradictions (Yardley, 2012) and incapable of developing a collective world order vision
(Nuruzzaman, 2020). At one end of the BRICS narrative is an assessment of the club as a geostra-
tegic challenge to the western-led liberal economic order (Wade, 2011) or an effort of the capitalist
core to define and incorporate centres of accumulation outside the core, as well as locate and iden-
tify new spaces for capitalist investment (Taylor, 2016). At the other end of the discourse is inter-
pretation of the BRICS as a concert of great powers seeking to commit themselves to collective
action, political participation and policy coordination (Skak, 2013) and an agent of change in
global economic governance (Cooper, 2017). Over the past years an important literature has
emerged contemplating BRICS history (Stuenkel, 2016), institutionalization (Kirton, 2015), its
identity (Thies and Nieman, 2017) and the character of cooperation between its members (Jash,
2017), its role in the system of international relations (Roberts et al., 2017) and global governance
(Larionova and Kirton, 2018). The debate on the issue of power contestation tended to conclude
that the BRICS would not contest the global governance order itself but its most liberal features
(Stephen, 2014) and power distribution within the existing institutional structures (Tokhi, 2019).
The article contributes to the literature on the BRICS by seeking to provide empirical evidence on
the BRICS capability to act as a responsible collective actor1 for international economic architec-
ture transformation through policy coordination, engagement and delivery on concerted
decisions.
The BRIC2 committed to advance reform of the global financial and economic architecture at
the first summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009. The leaders supported the G20’s central role in dealing
with the financial crisis and promised to cooperate among themselves and with other partners to
strengthen financial supervision and regulation and reform the global financial institutions’ man-
dates, scope and governance to reflect changes in the world economy and ensure that emerging and
developing economies had greater voice and representation in international financial institutions
(IFIs). In the second decade of the BRICS cooperation, progress is mixed. With regard to IFI
reform, BRICS pressure and its promise to contribute $80b to International Monetary Fund (IMF)
resources accelerated the G20 consensus on a 6% and a 5% shift in the IMF and the World Bank
quota shares respectively to dynamic emerging market and developing economies and a review of
quotas by January 2014. However, the G20 Seoul decision on the quota shift made in 2010 became
effective only in 2016 as the IFIs’ biggest shareholder, the US, resisted it. The review of the quota
formula had been annually delayed, and in October 2019 the International Monetary and Financial
Committee (IMFC) 40th Meeting postponed the reform to the 16th General Review to be carried
out from 2020 to 15 December 2023. The proposal to create an international reserve currency giv-
ing a greater role to Special Drawing Rights (SDR) was firmly opposed by the US and the UK and
sent to languish away in the IMF discussion papers. The BRICS’ institutional innovations, such as
the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement, make a tangible contribution
to the creation of global public goods, though they have a very modest catalytic effect on global
governance
On global financial regulation reform, the BRICS cooperated with the G20 to improve the
soundness of regulation and reform the international financial regulatory system. The five coun-
tries argued for addressing cross-border impacts of the reform taking into account developing
countries’ interests. The BRICS’ position was also crucial in withstanding the efforts of the G7’s
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