Bridging Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321717730297 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321717730297
Political Studies
2018, Vol. 66(4) 887 –902
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321717730297
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Bridging Ideal and Non-Ideal
Theory
Alexandru Volacu
Abstract
Many of the recent methodological debates within political theory have focused on the ideal/
non-ideal theory distinction. While ideal theorists recognise the need to develop an account
of the transition between the two levels of theorising, no general proposal has been advanced
thus far. In this article, I aim to bridge this conceptual gap. Towards this end, I first reconstruct
the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction within a simplified two-dimensional framework, which
captures the primary meanings usually attributed to it. Subsequently, I use this framework to
provide an algorithm for the bidirectional transition between ideal and non-ideal theory, based on
the incremental derivation of normative models. The approach outlined illuminates the various
ways in which principles derived under highly idealised assumptions might be distorted by the
circumstances of our current world and illustrates the various paths which we can pursue in
moving from our current state of the world to an ideal one.
Keywords
desirability, feasiblity, ideal theory, non-ideal theory, normative model
Accepted: 16 August 2017
Introduction
Discussions on the methodology of political philosophy have in recent years been primar-
ily focused on the ideal/non-ideal theory debate, which encompasses a variety of ques-
tions related to the degree to which normative theories are built on the basis of actual
empirical facts rather than counterfactuals, the feasibility of implementing normative
principles derived from such theories and, more generally, the overall goal of normative
theorising. While the debate may extend to the full range of values considered desirable
in political philosophy, it has, for the most part, specifically addressed the value of justice,
a practice to which I will also adhere in this article. The positions adopted by various
philosophers in this debate are much too numerous to be discussed in this introductory
section, but they can be broadly grouped in two camps. On one hand, authors such as
Mills (2005), Farrelly (2007), Sen (2009) or Anderson (2010) are deeply critical of ideal
theory and claim that normative theorising should exclusively take place at the level of
non-ideal theory, with a focus on the mitigation of severe present injustices. On the other
1Research Institute of the University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania
2Faculty of Public Administration, SNSPA Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania
Corresponding author:
Alexandru Volacu Bd. Mihail Kogalniceanu, no.36-46, Room 209 (ICUB Office), 050107, Sector 5, Bucharest,
Romania.
Email: volacu@gmail.com
730297PSX0010.1177/0032321717730297Political StudiesVolacu
research-article2017
Article
888 Political Studies 66(4)
hand, defenders of ideal theory, such as Robeyns (2008), Stemplowska (2008), Swift
(2008), Valentini (2009) or Simmons (2010), do not take a fully opposite position, which
would be to claim that normative theories should be exclusively built at the level of ideal
theory, but instead support the claim that both ideal and non-ideal theory are important for
pursuing inquiries in political philosophy. In this article, I will support the latter position,
seeking to outline a methodological approach for bridging ideal and non-ideal theory,
which emphasises the importance of both levels of theorising, neutralises some of their
shortcomings and offers key insights into the transition between ideal and non-ideal the-
ory, in both directions.
The article is structured as follows: in section ‘Institutional Design and the Structure
of Normative Models’, I describe the structure of normative models built at what Hamlin
and Stemplowska (2012) have termed the level of institutional design and I argue in
favour of a particular evaluative space for such models. In section ‘On the Ideal/Non-
Ideal Theory Distinction. A Two-Dimensional Reconstruction’, I discuss the main issues
in contention in the ideal/non-ideal theory debate and argue that they are reducible to a
two-dimensional framework, which takes into account idealisations in inputs and outputs.
I then discuss some of the drawbacks of normative models with a high level of idealisa-
tion in inputs/outputs and of normative models with a low level of idealisation in inputs/
outputs. Finally, in section ‘A Framework for the Transition between Ideal and Non-Ideal
Theory’, I describe a method for operationalising the bidirectional transition between
ideal and non-ideal theory and illustrate its usefulness in mitigating the problems raised
by theorising exclusively at the ideal or the non-ideal level.
Institutional Design and the Structure of Normative Models
Hamlin and Stemplowska (2012) delineate two different ways of engaging in normative
theorising: (1) working at the level of the theory of ideals, which seeks to identify and
specify the content of values and study their interplay, and (2) working at the level of
institutional design, which seeks to identify and specify the content of social arrange-
ments (in a wide sense, which also includes guiding individual behaviour, not just institu-
tions). Call any fully developed proposal built at the level of institutional design a
normative model.1 A normative model seeks to bring about a specific state of the world by
prescribing normative principles2 that guide the action of the individual or collective
agents in order to reach that state of the world. In order to describe the structure of a nor-
mative model, we can appeal to Stemplowska’s (2008) distinction between inputs
(assumptions), rules of derivation and outputs (normative principles). Normative model-
building therefore consists of three steps: (1) selecting assumptions, (2) constructing rules
of derivation and/or deciding on what values the model seeks to instantiate3 and (3) for-
mulating normative principles. Consider the theory of justice as fairness as an illustrative
example. Among the set of inputs (assumptions) employed, we find (1) moderate scarcity,
(2) strict compliance, (3) favourable conditions, (4) maximising rationality, (5) mutual
disinterest and so forth. The rule of derivation consists in parties unanimously choosing
principles of justice behind the veil of ignorance. The outputs generated are the two prin-
ciples of justice as fairness, arranged in serial order.
The strength of a normative model can be assessed in several ways. One of the most
common methods employed in contemporary political philosophy is to examine specific
aspects of the state of the world to which normative principles give rise to and contrasting
these implications with one’s own moral intuitions. A second way of assessing a normative
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