Bringing Social Identities Back In: The Social Anchors of Left-Right Orientation in Western Europe
| Published date | 01 October 2006 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512106067358 |
| Date | 01 October 2006 |
| Author | André Freire |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Bringing Social Identities Back In:
The Social Anchors of Left–Right Orientation
in Western Europe
ANDRÉ FREIRE
ABSTRACT. This article seeks to show that the relative weight of social
factors in explaining individual left–right self-placement, vis-a-vis values
and partisan loyalties, is very important, contrary to the poor results
shown by prior studies. The bias in previous literature was due to the fact
that the models used for social factors were underspecified: they included
only structural and organizational dimensions and ignored social identity.
However, when the model was correctly specified by adding indicators of
social identity, it was possible to reach an opposite conclusion. The cases
studied were 12 western European countries (Portugal, Spain, France,
Great Britain, Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Belgium, Sweden, and Ireland) in 1990 and 1999.
Keywords: • Europe • Left–right orientation • Social identities
The Importance and Meaning of the Left–Right Divide in Mass Politics
Since the French Revolution, the idea of a left–right divide has gained great
importance in modern mass politics. Indeed, Jean Laponce (1981: 56) views it as a
type of “political Esperanto” (see also Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 205).
Since the 1950s, various authors have argued that we are witnessing “the end of
ideology” (Bell, 2000; Lipset, 1987) or, more recently, “the end of history”
(Fukuyama, 1989). However, it has been argued that these theses are themselves
ideological and, more importantly, have been at least partly falsified by the
emergence of the “new left” and “new right” since the 1960s and, more recently,
by the revival of fundamentalism and nationalism (Eatwell, 2003: 279–90;
Heywood, 2003: 319–23).
Applying a more philosophical approach, Giddens (1996, 2000) has contended
that in recent times the major differences between left and right have been
International Political Science Review (2006), Vol 27, No. 4, 359–378
DOI: 10.1177/0192512106067358 © 2006 International Political Science Association
SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi)
overcome. On the other hand, Norberto Bobbio (1995: 95–101) has argued that
social inequalities remain a very important political issue, although now more at a
world level (separating the North and the South), thus providing a renewed base
for the left–right factor to maintain its prominence.
At an empirical level, Peter Mair (1998: 131–6) has demonstrated the decline of
ideological polarization between the major political parties in the western
European democracies during the 1980s and the 1990s. However, studies with a
longer time perspective have shown that, in many countries, the decline in
ideological polarization is not a linear phenomenon (Budge and Klingemann,
2001: 19–50; Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 187, 191–3).
Finally, studies of electoral behavior have shown that individuals’ left–right self-
placement is a major predictor of their voting choices, and that its importance has
been increasing in many countries over recent decades (Franklin et al., 1992;
Gunther and Montero, 2001). Consequently, there is considerable evidence to
suggest that there is little empirical support for the “end of ideology” thesis, and
that, particularly at the individual level, the left–right divide is still a very
important information-economizing device, enabling electors to cope with
political complexities, at least in western Europe.
Ever since Inglehart and Klingemann’s seminal work (1976), there has been a
consensus that individuals’ self-placement on the left–right axis has three major
components: social, value, and partisan. The social component refers to the
connections between citizens’ locations in the social structure, plus their
corresponding social identities, and their left–right orientation (Inglehart and
Klingemann, 1976: 245). The value or ideological component refers to the link
between an individual’s left–right self-placement and his attitude toward the major
value conflicts in western democratic mass politics, be they socioeconomic,
religious, or the “new politics” (Huber, 1989; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976:
244; Knutsen, 1995, 1997). Finally, the partisan component of left–right self-
placement refers to the part of any individual’s ideological orientation reflecting
mainly partisan loyalties (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990: 207; Huber, 1989;
Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 244; Knutsen, 1997).
Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 264–9) argue that the impact of the social
component is rather small, especially when compared to the partisan dimension.
Perhaps it is because of Inglehart and Klingemann’s poor results for the impact of
social factors on individuals’ left–right self-placement that that dimension has
been largely neglected (Borre, 2001: 83–98; Huber, 1989; Knutsen, 1995, 1997,
2002) or only marginally considered since (Inglehart, 1984, 1990, 1991). This
article seeks to show that the relative weight of social factors in explaining
individual left–right self-placement is very important (both per se and vis-à-vis
values and partisan loyalties) and that the poor results of prior studies are due
largely to problems in model specification. Additionally, it will be shown that,
when correctly specified, the impact of social factors on left–right orientation is
greater among the younger generation in many countries than among their
elders. For both these reasons, this article will argue that the social anchors of left
and right are elements that should no longer be ignored by future studies. The
countries under consideration (Portugal, Spain, France, Great Britain, Germany,
Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, and Ireland) are
those western European states that fielded both the World Values Survey 1990
(WVS 1990) and the European Value Study 1999 (EVS 1999). We will return to
this subject later.
360 International Political Science Review 27(4)
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