British Think-Tanks and Their Collaborative and Communicative Networks
| Published date | 01 December 2014 |
| Date | 01 December 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.12056 |
| Author | Hartwig Pautz |
| Subject Matter | Research Article |
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P O L I T I C S : 2 0 1 4 V O L 3 4 ( 4 ) , 3 4 5 – 3 6 1
doi: 10.1111/1467-9256.12056
Research Article
British Think-Tanks and Their Collaborative
and Communicative Networks
Hartwig Pautz
University of the West of Scotland
This article looks at UK-based think-tanks and their communicative and cooperative networks with other actors
in Britain and beyond. Which institutions and people do British think-tanks talk to most to exert influence on
domestic public policy? What forms do such communications take? What are British think-tanks’ objectives for
cooperation with non-UK organisations? This article is based on a survey with analysts at British think-tanks
that was conducted in 2012. The data suggests that while British think-tanks communicate and co-operate
intensively with some actors within Britain, contacts and cooperation with organisations outside the UK are
rather lacklustre. Particular actors are more important for advocacy think-tanks than they are for academic
think-tanks; some actors have very little importance for either type.
Keywords: think-tanks; networks; policy advice; UK
Introduction and research questions
Think-tanks are ubiquitous political players in the United Kingdom. Think-tank staff perform
the roles of analyst, researcher, media commentator, policy advisor and public relations expert
(Medvetz, 2010). Sometimes think-tank analysts carve out a future career in politics, business
or, less frequently, in the civil service and academia. What think-tanks do is inherently
political – regardless of their own claims that they are ‘objective’ and independent from other
political actors – and therefore bound to attract attention by media and researchers. In
particular, openly partisan think-tanks are vulnerable to criticism by political observers, for
example, on the grounds of clientelism, lack of independence or conflicts of interest. Think-
tanks are deemed to be elite production mechanisms (e.g. Pautz, 2012a) and their influence
on politics and policy has been often criticised as unaccountable and nontransparent
(Biermann and Klönne, 2008; Blank, 2003; Denham and Garnett, 1999; Plehwe, 2010).
Think-tanks have been credited for significantly influencing policy discourses (Bache and
Reardon, 2013; Dakowska, 2009; Gagatek and van Hecke, 2011; Katwala, 2009; McKewon,
2012), but they have also been deemed responsible for the displacement of academic ‘public
intellectuals’ by think-tank public intellectuals (Misztal, 2012) in policy discourses. Last but
not least, the close relationship between think-tanks, business and interest groups has been
repeatedly analysed and criticised (Baldwin, 2001a; Miller, 2010; Pollock et al., 2001; Ruane,
2010; the Guardian 2001; Waugh, 2000; also see the Think Tank Network Initiative, 2013).
Therefore, think-tanks constitute an important field for scholars wishing to better understand
how policies – and politics – develop and ‘happen’. In order to do so, one must know more
about the extent to which think-tanks seek to communicate and co-operate with actors from
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H A R T W I G P A U T Z
politics, media, academia, labour and capital. Such knowledge will allow further and more
focused studies of think-tank influence and the strategies they pursue to attain that influence.
This article contributes answers to the specific question of who think-tanks communicate and
co-operate with most or least frequently by presenting and analysing quantitative data about
British think-tanks that focus on British domestic policy and politics. This article discusses
case-specific data as well as presenting an approach to producing empirical data for research
on think-tanks as actors in ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1989), ‘advocacy coalitions’
(Sabatier, 1987), ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer, 1993) and in ‘policy transfer networks’
(Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000) by highlighting a facet of the relationships within these net-
works, coalitions and communities. The approach presented can build foundations for further
research about where think-tanks are most active in the policy process as actors that ‘recog-
nise’ a problem, search for an ‘idea’, establish contacts between various actors, ‘persuade’
decision makers and evaluate policy (Ladi, 2000; Sanders, 2008; Stone, 1996).
The objective of the article is to present and interpret data from a survey designed to produce
new knowledge about the involvement of UK-based think-tanks with a domestic policy focus
in communicative and collaborative networks. The extent and intensity of these networks are
at the centre of the article. The following key questions were at the heart of the survey
presented to respondents located at think-tanks:
1 Who do think-tanks aim to influence?
2 Do think-tanks communicate or collaborate with organisations inside and outside the UK?
If so, what are the motivations for them to seek such communicative and collaborative
relationships?
3 Which countries are the most important for respondents to study in order to inform their
own work?
The article is structured as follows: the next section presents a definition of ‘think-tank’ and
a well-established typology used for data analysis and comparison for the purposes of this
article. The methodological approach taken for data generation is then discussed and the data
is presented and interpreted. A conclusion rounds off the article and posits further directions
for research.
Defining the ‘think-tank’
For the purpose of this study, think-tanks are defined as being organisationally independent
from government, political parties or organised interests (Weaver and McGann, 2000). They
want to influence policy, but have no formal decision-making power; they lay claim to
political neutrality while not making a secret of their ideological standpoints (Ladi, 2000).
Some think-tanks carry out little research themselves and commission external experts or
recycle existing research, while others have considerable internal research capacities. They
can inform decision makers about policy developments in other countries, may play a role in
the development of a ‘legitimising discourse’ for a new policy paradigm (Schmidt, 2000) or in
transnational policy transfer networks by facilitating policy learning (Dolowitz and Marsh,
2000; Stone 2004). Often think-tanks are defined as not-for-profit organisations. This cri-
terion implies that only financial profit motives can compromise the independence of a
think-tank. However, other motives to engage with decision makers and policy makers, such
as wanting to gain access to valuable government data, seeking (in)formal positions within
the client organisation or stimulating government’s interest in commissioning policy evalu-
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ation, also have a potential impact on the intellectual independence of a think-tank. Instead
of the not-for-profit criterion, the term ‘financial autonomy’ is preferable if defined as being
not dependent on a single benefactor (Pautz, 2011a).
Generally, the literature makes out three distinct think-tank types that emerged in particular
historical circumstances. The first type, labelled ‘university without students’ or ‘academic
think-tank’ (Weaver, 1989), is characterised by heavy reliance on academics as researchers
and by book-length studies with a long-term policy outlook as the primary research output.
Think-tanks in this category have stressed their objectivity and non-partisanship. They often
evolved with the increasing need of governments for expertise or were set up by reform-
minded individuals or groups. Examples for this type included in the sample are the Centre
for the Analysis of Social Exclusion, the Centre for Economic Performance or the National
Institute for Economic and Social Research. Second, there is the ‘contract research organisa-
tion’. Mostly commissioned by government departments, it seldom executes its ‘own’
research in the same way as the academic think-tank. This type emerged, in Britain but also
elsewhere, with the construction of the Keynesian welfare state, which required governments
to build up policy research and analysis capacity both inside and outside government. These
institutes tend to be ‘technocratic in style and non-partisan’ (Stone and Ullrich, 2003, p. 11);
one British example was the Policy and Economic Planning Institute, which later became the
Policy Studies Institute. Third, the ‘advocacy think-tank’ combines a strong ideological bent
with ‘aggressive salesmanship and efforts to influence current policy debates’ (Weaver, 1989,
p. 567). Its output is less academic and often consists of repackaged and synthesised existing
material made palatable for the time-pressed decision maker and journalist. The activity of
think-tanks of this type may resemble that of pressure groups employing expertise to achieve
their aims. However, advocacy think-tanks appeal ‘to as large a segment of the electorate as
possible; they do not, like interest groups, speak on behalf of a particular constituency’
(Abelson, 2002, p. 11). These ‘new partisan’ think-tanks (Stone, 1996, p. 17) rose to promi-
nence in the 1970s as the producers of a counter-discourse to the Keynesian consensus
(Denham, 1996). The British centre-left caught up with this development in the late 1980s
with its own advocacy think-tanks...
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