Brock v Wollams
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1949 |
| Date | 1949 |
| Court | Court of Appeal |
Landlord and tenant - Rent restriction - “Tenant” - Death of tenant holding a statutory tenancy and leaving no widow - Member of tenant's “family,” residing with him at and for six months before tenant's death - “Adopted” child having lived for nearly forty years with adopter - No legal adoption -
W., when a child of five or six years of age was adopted, in fact, by L. in 1912 and had resided with him until his death in 1948, except for about three years after her marriage in 1939. After her husband's death in 1942, W. returned to live with L., her adopter, and had been residing with him for at least six months before he died. W. was not adopted under the provisions of the
Held that, assuming L. was a statutory tenant under the Rent Restriction Acts at the time of his death, W., his adopted daughter, was a member of L.'s family residing with him at the time of his death within the meaning of s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920.
Per Denning L.J.: Members of the tenant's family within the meaning of the sub-section would include step-children and illegitimate children as well as adopted children, whether adopted in due form of law or not.
APPEAL from Uxbridge county court.
Mrs. Wollams, the defendant, when a child of five or six years of age was adopted by a Mr. Lofty In 1912 and went to live with him at 62 Park Lane, Harefield, Middlesex, of which house Mr. Lofty was tenant. She remained living at the house until 1939 when she married and left the house to live with her husband. There had been no legal adoption. In 1942 her husband died and subsequently the defendant returned to live with her adoptive father and she had been living with him for not less than six months before his death in February, 1948. Notice to quit the house was duly given, but the defendant claimed the protection of the Rent Restriction Acts on the ground that Mr. Lofty had died and left no widow, and that she was a member of the tenant's family within the meaning of s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920F1. The plaintiffs were the trustees of the deceased landlord's estate and they claimed possession of the house. Two questions were in issue: (a) whether Mr. Lofty was a contractual or a statutory tenant, since, if he was a contractual tenant s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g) of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 had no application: Thynne v. SalmonF2; and (b) whether the defendant was a member of Mr. Lofty's family within the meaning of the statute. Judge Tudor Rees found that the defendant was not a member of Mr. Lofty's family and without deciding the first question made an order for possession. The defendant appealed.
Sieve for the defendant. Mrs. Wollams, who except for the three years of marriage had resided with Mr. Lofty as his adopted child, from 1912 onwards was a member of Mr. Lofty's family, who had resided with Mr. Lofty for not less than six months before his death within the meaning of s. 12, sub-s.F2 (g) of the Act of 1920. Mr. Loft had stood in loco parentis to her for all these years. The word “family” is only to be found in one other sub-section of the Rent Restriction Acts, viz., in s. 3, sub-s. 3, of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933, dealing with accommodation reasonably suitable “to the needs of the tenant and his family as regards extent and character.” There the word is obviously used with the wide meaning of “household.” Primarily the word “family” in, for instance, a will, means “children.” See Pigg v. ClarkeF3 where Jessel M.R. said: “The word ‘family’ has various meanings. In one sense it means the whole household, including servants and, perhaps, lodgers.” Where a woman statutory tenant dies, her husband is a “member of the tenant's family” within the meaning of s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g) of the Act of 1920. Salter v. LaskF4. In that case, Salter J. said: “It may have to be determined some day what limit is to be put on these words ‘tenant's family’” (in s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g)) “whether they are equivalent to ‘household’ or whether they are limited as meaning blood relations and in either case what members of the class respectively are indicated.” MacKinnon J. said: “The language used in this Act resembles that of popular journalism rather than the terms of the art of conveyancing.” In Price v. GouldF5 Wright J., held that the word “family” in this sub-section included brothers and sisters of the tenant who were living with the tenant at the time of his death. His Lordship pointed out that it had been said in a number of equity cases relating principally to wills or to settlements under powers of appointment that the word “family” was a popular, loose and flexible expression and not a technical term.
[COHEN L.J. By s. 5, sub-s. 2, of the
That sub-section provides that an adoption order is not to confer on an adopted child any right to or interest in property as a child of the adopter. But this statutory right conferred by s. 12, sub-s. 1 (g) of the Act of 1920 is not a right of property. The real question is whether any person — the man on the Clapham omnibus — knowing the facts, would describe Mrs. Wollams as a member of Mr. Lofty's family. To that question there can be only one answer — an affirmative.
Widgery for the plaintiffs. It is...
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