Brown v Chapman

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date28 June 1848
Date28 June 1848
CourtCourt of Common Pleas

English Reports Citation: 136 E.R. 1292

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

Brown
and
Chapman

S. C. 17 L. J. C. P. 329; 12 Jur. 799.

brown v. chapman. June 28, 1848. [S. C. 17 L. J. C. P. 329 ò 12 Jur. 799.] If an individual prefers a complaint to a magistrate, and procures a warrant to be granted, upon which the accused is taken into custody, the complainant is riot liable in trespass for that imprisonment; and that even although the magistrate had no jurisdiction.-The plaintiff voluntarily went before a police magistrate, to meet a charge of embezzlement which was there about to be made against him by the defendant: the magistrate declining to entertain the matter, unless a charge were formally made, the defendant said-"Well, then, I charge him with embezzling 30s.:" the plaintiff was then ordered by one of the constables in attendance, to go into the dock, the charge was gone into, and the plaintiff held to bail:-Held, that the act of the defendant amounted to no more than calling upon the magistrate to exercise his jurisdiction, and, consequently, that he was not liable to an action of trespass, for the imprisonment of the plaintiff. Trespass, for an assault and false imprisonment. Plea, not guilty. The cause was tried before Coltman, J., at the sittings in London after Hilary term, 1847. The facts proved are detailed in the judgment. Upon those facts, the learned judge intimated an opinion that what was done in the magistrate's presence must be considered as the act of the magistrate, and that the defendant was not liable for that; and accordingly he nonsuited the plaintiff. [366] Cockburn, in Easter term,-1847, obtained a rule nisi for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection; and, upon that rule coming on for argument in Easter term last, the court called upon 6 C. B.367. BROWN V. CHAPMAN 1293 Cockburn, Bramwell, and Huddlestone to support it. The facts are shortly these : -The parties challenge each other to go before a magistrate to settle a difference between them. The plaintiff, Brown, goes to the police-office voluntarily, without summons or warrant, to meet any charge that Chapman may think fit to prefer against him. When before the magistrate, the latter declined to enter upon the matter until some distinct charge was preferred, or, in other words, until Brown was placed in custody. This being done at the instigation of Chapman, the investigation proceeded. [Wilde, C. J. It may have been a malicious charge; but does that amount to a false imprisonment by the defendant 1] Until the defendant gave the plaintiff into custody, there was nothing to prevent the latter leaving the police-court. His detention clearly was the defendant's act. There clearly was some evidence to go to the jury : Cant v. Parsons (6 C. & P. 504). In Flewster v. Eoyle (1 Campb. 187), it was held, that, if A. states positively to the commander of a press-gang that B. is liable to the impress-service, who in truth is not so, and B., in consequence of this information, Is impressed, A. is liable to an action of trespass and false imprisonment at the suit of B. " This," said Lord Ellenborough, " is not like a malicious prosecution, where the party gets a valid warrant or writ, and gives it to an officer to be executed. There was clearly a trespass here in seizing the plaintiff, and the defendant therefore was a trespasser in procuring it to be done. Nor is any proof of malice [367] necessary. If a person causes another to be impressed, he does it at his own peril, and is liable in damages if that person proves not to have been subject to the impress-service. ' If the defendant in this case had said that she believed the plaintiff was liable to be impressed, leaving it to the officer of the press-gang to make the necessary inquiries, and to act as he should think most advisable,-for such a line of conduct, which a regard for the public service would have induced her to adopt, she would not have been amenable in this action. But she took upon herself positively to aver that he was compellable to serve in a king's ship, and she must therefore answer for the consequences." So, here, the defendant having been actively instrumental in causing the detention of the plaintiff, trespass lies against him. Byles, Serjt., and Prentice, were then called upon to shew cause against the rule. If any trespass was committed at all in this case, it was committed by the magistrate. There is not a scintilla of evidence to charge the defendant. [Wilde, C. J. The argument on the other side seems to amount to this, that the magistrate had no authority to order the plaintiff into custody until the defendant said " I give him into custody."] No information on oath is necessary to create jurisdiction in the magistrate : 1 Kale's Pleas of the Crown, 582, 2 Hale, 110. [V. Williams, J. Can the magistrate order the accused into custody without information on oath 1] Yes (a)1. The form of declaration for a malicious criminal prosecution, given in Chitty on Pleading (7th edit. vol. ii. p. 441), does...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Hassan bin Marsom & 6 Ors v Mohd Hady bin Ya'akop
    • Malaysia
    • Federal Court (Malaysia)
    • Invalid date
  • Connelly v Wallace and Others
    • Ireland
    • Supreme Court
    • 24 Febrero 1938
    ...2 K. B. 1056. (4) 4 Sw. & Tr. 197. (5) Gow, 97. (6) 18 L. J. Ch. 42. (7) 3 M. & G. 853. (8) 3 Wils. 341. (9) L. R. 5 C. P. 534. (10) 6 C. B. 365. (11) 7 Q. B. (12) 14 C. B. (N. S.) 596. (1) [1929] I. R. 351. (2) [1934] I. R. 196. (3) [1937] I. R. 650. (4) 2 Sid. 125. (5) 15 East, 612. (6) 1......
  • Singh v Amoco Trinidad Oil Company et Al
    • Trinidad & Tobago
    • High Court (Trinidad and Tobago)
    • 23 Octubre 2003
    ...a man may indeed be liable in an action of malicious prosecution if he has wrongfully set the law in motion…” 15 In Brown v. Chapman 136 E.R 1292 at pg. 1296 Coltman, J. in dealing with the legality of an arrest effected by warrant procured by the police officer said: “It appears to us that......
  • Freegard v Barnes and Barton
    • United Kingdom
    • Exchequer
    • 3 Junio 1852
    ...is not liable as a, trespassei, although the paiticular case be one in which the magistrate had no authority to act And in Biown v Chapman (6 C B 365), it was held, that wheie a patty sets the law in motion, even wheie there is want of jurisdiction on the pait of the magistiate, the formci ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT