Bureaucratic respectful equality
| Published date | 01 October 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885116660028 |
| Date | 01 October 2019 |
| Author | Christopher Nathan |
| Subject Matter | Commentaries |
EJPT
Commentary
Bureaucratic respectful
equality
Christopher Nathan
Department of Politics and International Studies, University
of Warwick, UK
Abstract
Ian Carter has recently argued in a series of articles that a certain form of respect, called
‘opacity respect’, gives a moral grounding to people’s equality. This type of respect
involves abstaining from making or acting on judgements about others. Aside from
arguing for its justificatory role, Carter also argues that, in this role, it has a series of
implications for our thinking about liberal politics. I argue, first, that the theoretical
implications of the view that opacity respect grounds equality are narrower than they
first appear. This is because, in order to put the view into action, one must make a
certain kind of empirical claim. Second, I show that this point reveals an important
structural aspect of Carter’s view, concerning the way that principles can be limited in
practice. Third, I argue that the practical implications of the view are potentially much
broader than they first appear, threatening absurdity. This is because the position’s
repercussions naturally extend into day-to-day transactions.
Keywords
Equality, egalitarianism, respect, Ian Carter, liberalism
Introduction
Ian Carter’s (2011b) article does three things. It lays out a problem, which has not
yet been solved. It offers a solution. And then it discusses some of the implications
of this solution.
1
I am going to focus on the third of these things, though I shall
begin by sketching the first two.
The problem that the article discusses arises because, while egalitarian theories
prescribe equality, people vary on almost any measure. We need to find a feature
in virtue of which persons are to be treated equally. If we can’t find such a fea-
ture, then our theories about equality seem more arbitrary and less justified.
The feature we are seeking is one that persons possess equally: if people possess
European Journal of Political Theory
2019, Vol. 18(4) 529–540
!The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885116660028
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Corresponding author:
Christopher Nathan, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry,
CV4 7AL, UK.
Email: c.m.j.nathan@warwick.ac.uk
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