Business Routes of Influence in Brussels: Exploring the Choice of Direct Representation
| Author | Robert J. Bennett |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00198 |
| Published date | 01 June 1999 |
| Date | 01 June 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Business Routes of In¯uence in Brussels:
Exploring the Choice of Direct
Representation
ROBERT J. BENNETT*
University of Cambridge
This paper presents one of the ®rst statistical analyses of the factors that determine
the extent to which direct in¯uence strategies are used by companies. New survey
evidence and multivariate analysis is used to assess seven hypotheses to explaindirect
in¯uence strategies. The factor of greatest signi®cance is company size since direct
in¯uence is open only to large companies. But the extent to which direct in¯uence is
followed by large companies depends on their sector, its extent of organization, the
sector's size and `weight', and the form of the business association relevant to the
sector. Direct in¯uence is more likely where associations cover large corporate
businesses (rather than owner-managers, professionals,federations or mixed associa-
tions), in sectors with a high degree of market concentration within largecompanies,
and where their associations are relatively small. These ®ndings are related to the
logic of collective action suggesting that in sectors where there is the least chance to
opt out of an association, there is a greaterchance of a business also directly lobbying
in order to assure itself that its interests are not being diluted and so that it can gain
direct speci®c information or in¯uence bene®ts.
This paper gives a ®rst systematic assessment of the causes of variation in the
choice by businesses of whether to seek direct in¯uence in Brussels. The
importance of Brussels as a focus for business attention has grown rapidly with
the development of the single market and growth of the political institutions
of the EU. This has increased the need for businesses to be informed about
European policy. But it has also opened new opportunities for in¯uence by
businesses. In part business in¯uence is also a response to the relative openness
of European institutions where, partly because of bureaucratic overload,
ocials need to receive technical inputs and advice from businesses. In part it is
also the outcome of a formal means of doing business since business groups and
other interests are formally involved in consultation and policy development.1
Despite the growing importance of business in¯uence in Brussels, there have
been few systematic attempts to explain why dierent businesses, dierent
sectors, or dierent types of business use dierent routes of in¯uence. This
paper seeks to ®ll that gap using new survey evidence on the form of Brussels
#Political Studies Association 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 CowleyRoad, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
Political Studies (1999), XLVII, 240±257
* This paper has been supported in part by a Leverhulme Personal Research Professorship. I am
also grateful to the respondents to the surveyof sector associations, and to David Joy and Katuska
Fara who helped with data keying.
1Commission of the European Communities, An Open and Structured Dialogue between the
Commission and Special Interest Groups (Brussels, 1992) SEC (92) 2272.
in¯uence among business associations and their members. The paper ®rst
outlines the underlying hypotheses which are expected to aect business in¯u-
ence strategies. This leads to a set of speci®c hypotheses which are tested using
multivariate methods. The use of a large scale sample survey allows statistical
generalizations to be drawn across a range of business sectors and types of
associations. The conclusions drawn from this analysis emphasize the import-
ance on choices of in¯uence routes of: the size of the business, the size and nature
of the association(s) representing that business sector, and the characteristics of
that sector in terms of market power and organization. Some of these features
have been used in previous case study assessments of business lobbying in
Brussels, but the analysis here is the ®rst to demonstrate how these features
systematically and statistically interrelate to determine a given business's or
sector's in¯uence strategy.
Routes of In¯uence
There are generally three main routes by which businesses seek to in¯uence
European regulations. First (i) a direct route developing their own `Brussels
Strategy' is an option for some companies. For example Greenwood et al.,
Mazey and Richardson and Pedler and van Schendelen2have demonstrated the
increasing role of direct lobbying by individual companies in Brussels. In
addition, many companies and organizations make use of the facilities of other
bodies, such as the CBI Brussels oce or Brussels-based British Business
Bureau, or launch `missions', brie®ng sessions or other initiatives in Brussels
whilst not actually maintaining an oce there. Indeed, Mazey and Richardson3
claim that a European strategy is now `essential' to big businesses.
Previous assessments suggest that it is only large, particularly transnational
companies (which may include ones that are not based in the EU) that seek to
negotiate directly with European institutions.4More commonly associations
have to be the chosen vehicle since most ®rms cannot individually aord, or
cannot gain, direct and eective access to national governments or the EC. This
process can occur through: (ii) a national association route, whereby national
business associations either lobby European institutions directly as a `Brussels
strategy'5or lobby their national governments in order to in¯uence the response
within European technical committees by national civil service ocials and
ministers. The use of nationally-based associations to lobby in Brussels is
recognized as common where a sector has little internationalization, where
domestic protections play a major role, where an industry is more concentrated
in one country than other parts of Europe, or where there are clear `national
2J. Greenwood, J. R. Grote and K. Ronit, Organised Interests and the European Community,
(London, Sage, 1992); S. Mazey and J. Richardson (eds), Lobbying in the European Community
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993); R. H. Pedler and M. P. C. M. van Schendelen (eds),
Lobbying in the European Union: Companies, Trade Associations and Issue Groups (Aldershot,
Dartmouth, 1994).
3Mazey and Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community.
4See e.g. J. Greenwood and K. Ronit, `Interest groups in the European Community',
West European Politics, 71, 1 (1994), 31±52; J. Greenwood (ed.), European Casebook on Business
Alliances (London, Prentice Hall, 1995); Pedler and van Schendelen, Lobbying in the European
Union; W. Grant, `Pressure Groups and the European Community: an Overview', in Mazey and
Richardson, Lobbying in the European Community, pp. 27± 46.
5Greenwood and Ronit, `Interest groups in the European Community'.
ROBERT J. BENNETT 241
#Political Studies Association, 1999
To continue reading
Request your trial