Businesses and the Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers) Act 1996
| Pages | 247-250 |
| Published date | 01 January 1997 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb025787 |
| Date | 01 January 1997 |
| Author | Kiron Reid |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime— Vol.4 No. 3 — Terrorism
TERRORISM
Businesses and the Prevention of Terrorism
(Additional Powers) Act 1996
Kiron Reid
The Prevention of Terrorism (Additional Powers)
Act was rushed through Parliament in just 24
hours and 47 minutes, starting on Tuesday 2nd
April. In the House of Commons the allocation of
time for the Bill was debated at 3.43 pm, the
Second Reading took place at 10.10 pm, the Third
Reading at 1.21 am on Wednesday morning, and
the Bill completed its passage through the House
of Lords at 4.30 pm the same day. The Opposition
acquiesced in the Bill being rushed through Parlia-
ment by the Government. The legislation allows
the police to search clothing following the exercise
of random stop and search powers, for which no
reasonable grounds arc required, and provides for
searches of non-residential premises on a warrant
issued by a justice of the peace. It also permits
searches of any goods on accompanied or unac-
companied vehicles entering or leaving Great Brit-
ain or Northern Ireland, and provides a power to
impose a police cordon, and for the application of
parking prohibitions and restrictions. The stop and
search powers were the most controversial feature
of the legislation, as potentially involving the great-
est interference with individual liberty, and the
implications of these powers arc considered else-
where.1 This paper will examine some of the less
publicised provisions contained in the Act, which
have,
possibly unforeseen, implications for busi-
nesses. This is especially likely given that due to
the timetable motion (the guillotine) only cl. 1 of
the Bill, on the stop and search powers, was
actually considered by the House of Commons in
Committee.
POLICE CORDONS
The Act was shown to be unfortunately topical, in
light of the Manchester bomb, in for the first time
providing a clear legal basis for the imposition of
police cordons. Section 5 of the Act gives the
police a power to impose a police cordon (insert-
ing s. 16C into the Prevention of Terrorism (Tem-
porary Provisions) Act 1989") and power to impose
parking prohibitions and restrictions (s. 16D). A
cordon can be imposed if 'expedient to do so in
connection with an investigation into the commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of an act of terror-
ism' (for example to search for a bomb or forensic
evidence), while the parking prohibitions and
restrictions can only be authorised 'in order to
prevent acts of terrorism'.3 The use of
a
cordon in
Manchester played a key part in protecting the
public and avoiding any fatal casualties from the
explosion there on Saturday, 15th June. Over
75,000 people were safely evacuated from the busy
shopping centre of the city.4 Despite some adverse
comment in the media, the
Observer
reported that
'while the police action to clear the area after the
warning was received did not prevent all injury, it
was nonetheless carried out more quickly and
effectively than at Canary
Wharf.
Of course, the
impressive speed of the response was undoubtedly
partly due to the heightened state of alert after the
end of the Provisional IRA ceasefire, but it is wel-
come that the police now have clear powers to take
such action.
A cordon may be authorised by a superinten-
dent, or a lower ranking officer if
a
matter of great
urgency (which must then be either confirmed or
cancelled by a superintendent, Sch. 6A). An oral
authorisation must be confirmed in writing as
soon as reasonably practicable. The period for
which a cordon is in force must not exceed 14
days,
although this may be extended for up to 28
days in total. (The geographical extent of the cor-
dons in Manchester is illustrated in newspaper
reports — sec the
Observer,
above and the Daily
Telegraph,
17th June, 1996, p. 5). By Sch. 6A the
police are given very wide powers to order indi-
viduals to leave and to move vehicles, and a con-
Page 247
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