Cambodia’s hegemonic-party system: How and why the CPP became dominant
| Author | Sorpong Peou |
| DOI | 10.1177/2057891118788199 |
| Published date | 01 March 2019 |
| Date | 01 March 2019 |
| Subject Matter | Research articles |
Research article
Cambodia’s hegemonic-party
system: How and why the CPP
became dominant
Sorpong Peou
Ryerson University, Canada
Abstract
This article seeks to shed light on how and why the Cambodian People’s Party (the CPP) emerged
and became dominant in the multi-party system formally introduced to Cambodia when the United
Nations intervened in the early 1990s. Historical factors, relative power, leadership, and tactics
matter a great deal. Hun Sen has been in power for more than 30 years and his effectiveness can be
attributed to three tactics: coercion, co-option, and control. The post-Cold War environment also
made it possible for the CPP government to use these tactics successfully, as major powers
preferred to work with Hun Sen or did little to undermine him.
Keywords
Cambodia, hegemonic-party system, political leadership, political tactics
Introduction
This article seeks to shed light on how and why the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) emerged and
then became dominant in the multi-party system formally introduced to Cambodia when the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) intervened early in the 1990s. The
party began as a ‘liberation’ movement (backed by Vietnamese troops aiming to overthrow the
murderous Pol Pot leadership) and succeeded quickly in that. After its victory in 1979, the
movement established a new government known as the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK),
which subsequently waged war against a Cambodian government-in-exile known as the Coalition
Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) – made up of three armed factions, the royalists
(known as FUNCINPEC), the Khmer National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the Khmer Rouge.
In 1989, the PRK was renamed the State of Cambodia (SOC). On October 23, 1991, the SOC
signed a peace agreement with the other three armed factions and the four signatories agreed to
Corresponding author:
Sorpong Peou, Ryerson University, Toronto, Ontario, M5B 2K3, Canada.
Email: speou@politics.ryerson.ca
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2019, Vol. 4(1) 42–60
ªThe Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891118788199
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turn their battlefield into a ballot-box (Doyle, 1995; Heder and Ledgerwood, 1996; Peou, 1997).
But the CPP’s power, not democracy, has been consolidated. Hun Sen became prime minister in
1985 and has in the last two decades consolidated his dominant position in Cambodian politics.
The CPP’s political success requires a systematic explanation. Much has been written about
Cambodian polit ical culture as the b road variable e xplaining polit ical authoritaria nism, defined in
terms of traditionalism, patronage, competingnationalisms, and nationalimaginings (Nore´n-Nilsson,
2016; Roberts,2001), but little analytical attention has been paidto the question of how and why the
CPP led by Hun Sen succeeded in turning itself into a hegemonic party. While they help shedsome
light on Cambodian politics (such as authoritarianism or anti-democratic behavior), cultural, reli-
gious, and othernonmaterial factors are analytically imprecise.No scholars would describe HunSen
of the CPP as a democrat at heart, but the persistence of his authoritarian behavior cannot be fully
explained by Cambodian culture or his nationalist imaginings. His effectiveness must be studied
systematically and an empirical analysis shows that it can be attributed to his strategy based on at
least three identifiable tactics for political domination: control, coercion, and co-option. Although
these tacticswere not employed separately from eachother, a clear pattern can be discerned:the CPP
leaders relied onforce to topple the Pol Pot regime, immediately built a statestructure based on one
party, and then work to control state institutions throughout the 1980s and after. Hun Sen’s attempts
at tightening political control over state institutions has proved to be more successful than other
leaders within and outside his party, largely because he did not hesitate to rely on both ‘sticks’
(violent means to crush any potential threat to his power) and ‘carrots’ (to co-opt anyone anywhere
willing to jump on his political bandwagon) as a way to tighten his grip on power and enhance his
own security. This article contends that institutional factors, power relations, security dynamics,
leadership, and political tactics matter significantly.
The CPP within the political party system
Although Cambodia formally adopted a multiparty system, as evident in the 1991 Paris Peace
Agreements, the CPP has now emerged as the dominant party. After 1997, the multiparty system
was transformed into what may be characterized as a hegemonic-party system, in which the CPP is
the center of power whereas the opposition struggles for survival.
Hegemonic-party and dominant-party systems are similar and the terms can be used inter-
changeably, although they are classified as varieties of the single-part y system (Johari, 1982:
332). The hegemonic-party system is defined as one “in which a relatively institutionalized ruling
party monopolizes the political arena, using coercion, patronage, media control, and other means to
deny formally legal opposition parties any real chance of competing for power” (Diamond, 2002:
25). “Other parties are permitted to exist, but as second class, licensed parties ...not permitted to
complete with the hegemonic power in antagonistic terms or on an equal basis” (Johari, 1982:
332). Thus, the hegemonic-party system is not one characterized as a one-party system in dictator-
ships or communist states where only one party is allowed to exist. In this sense, the hegemonic-
party system is one somewhat similar to what others call the dominant-party system. Matlosa and
Karume define the dominant party system as a system:
in which despite the multi-party situation, only one party is so dominant that it directs the political
system and is firmly in control of state power over a fairly long duration of time that even opposition
parties make little if any dent on the political hegemony of a dominant ruling party. (Matlosa and
Karume, cited in Brooks, 2004: 2)
Peou 43
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