Can a Person Recalled to Prison under a Life Sentence Pose a Risk of Harm Justifying Imprisonment for Public Protection?

AuthorLaura Madhloom
Published date01 December 2011
Date01 December 2011
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2011.75.6.733
Subject MatterSupreme Court
Supreme Court
Can a Person Recalled to Prison under a Life Sentence
Pose a Risk of Harm Justifying Imprisonment for Public
Protection?
Rv Smith (Nicholas) [2011] UKSC 37
Keywords Imprisonment for public protection; Life imprisonment;
Recall; Significant risk of harm; Parole board
On 2 September 2008 in the Crown Court at Harrow the appellant, S,
pleaded guilty to eight offences of robbery contrary to s. 8 of the Theft
Act 1968 and eight linked offences of possession of a firearm contrary to
s. 17 of the Firearms Act 1968. S had numerous previous convictions for
robbery-related offences and had, in 2000, been sentenced to life impris-
onment for robbery, the minimum term being set at four years. S was
sentenced on 10 October 2008 to a sentence of imprisonment for public
protection (IPP). The judge specified that the minimum term to be
served was six years.
S appealed against sentence on an alternative basis. The primary
submission was that the imposition of an IPP sentence was unlawful
because the requirement under s. 225(1)(b) Criminal Justice Act 2003
(‘the 2003 Act’) was not satisfied as he could not present a significant
risk to the public, given that he had been recalled to prison under his life
sentence. He would not be released unless and until the Parole Board
was satisfied that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the
public that he should be confined, and thus the judge could not be
satisfied that he would pose a significant risk of harm. The secondary,
and alternative, submission was that the judge should not have exer-
cised his discretion under s. 225 of the 2003 Act as nothing was achieved
by the additional sentence of IPP and it was wrong to impose one.
H
ELD
,
DISMISSING THE APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE
, the imposition of
the sentence of IPP was lawful. Section 225(1)(b) of the 2003 Act
required a judge to consider whether a defendant posed a significant risk
of causing serious harm at the time of sentencing and not at the end of
the minimum term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court confirmed
that it was not sensible to impose a sentence of IPP in circumstances
where it will achieve no benefit, but it did not condemn the sentence
imposed in this case. A determinate sentence would not have contained
within its terms the finding of the sentencing judge that S did satisfy the
dangerousness provisions of the 2003 Act as at 10 October 2008. The
Parole Board had previously released S on licence, having been per-
suaded that he did not pose a risk of serious harm to the public, and
therefore the judge could not be criticised for imposing a sentence that
demonstrated that the contrary was the case.
468 The Journal of Criminal Law (2011) 75 JCL 468–472
doi:10.1350/jcla.2011.75.6.733

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT