Canada's Functional Isolationism
| Author | Douglas Alan Ross |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209905400109 |
| Date | 01 March 1999 |
| Published date | 01 March 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Essay |
DOUGLAS
ALAN
ROSS
Canada's
functional
isolationism
And
the
future
of
weapons
of
mass
destruction
HELPING
TO CONTAIN
AND
TO
REVERSE
THE
PROCESS
OF 'HORIZONTAL'
proliferation
of
weapons
of
mass
destruction
(WMD)
is
the most
impor-
tant
security challenge facing
Canada
and
the world
community.
Twen-
ty-first
century
international
security
relations
should
comprise
four
elements:
international
security
community-building
through
redis-
tributive
assistance;
and
the
widespread
inhibition
and
elimination
of
military
capabilities
for
aggressive
warfare
under
an
ever-widening
regime
of
verified
self-restraint;
ever
more
reliable
arms
control
and
dis-
armament
verification
that
leads
quickly towards disassembled
'virtual'
nuclear
arsenals;
and,
finally,
broadly
collaborative,
collective
security
enforcement
of
the world's emerging
anti-WMD
norms.
The
threat
of
WMD
can
be
tamed
only
through
co-operative
interna-
tional
measures.
A
closer,
more
intimate
security
relationship
with
the
United
States
is
inescapable
-
but
that
alone may
deter
responsible,
out-
ward-looking
military
reform
in
Ottawa.
A
Canadian
retreat
into
hemi-
spheric isolation
militarily
would
only
support
those
conservative
forces
in
the
United
States
who
argue
for
American
strategic
disengagement
from
the world's
troubles. Deciding
to
try
to
do
something
useful
and
responsible
about
proliferation and
the
rising
risk
of
the
use
of
nuclear,
chemical,
and
biological
weapons
would
be
a
large
and
innovative
step
for any
Canadian
government.
It
would
require
farsighted political
Professor
of
Political
Science,
Simon
Fraser
University
Burnab)y
British
Columbia
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
1998-9
Canada's
functional
isolationism
leadership
able
to
develop
a
national
consensus on
political
and
strate-
gic
objectives.
Clear
goals
for
stability
enhancement
would
have
to
be
related
to
plausible
and
collectively affordable foreign
aid
and
military
capability.
The
temptation
to
yield
to
domestic
political
inertia
and
short-term
economic
self-interest
is
powerful.
Without
skilled,
strate-
gically
sensitive
leadership
to
explain
how
an active
Canadian
role
might
help to
achieve
radically
improved
international
security,
public
support
for
military
spending
will
remain
low.'
Canada's
population
is
half
that
of
Britain,
France,
or
Italy,
and
more
than
one
and one-half
that of
Australia. It
is
almost
three times
that
of
Belgium,
and
more
than
20 per
cent
larger
than
that
of
the
four
Scan-
dinavian
countries
combined.
In
1996
Canada's
gross
domestic
prod-
uct
(GDP)
was
still larger
than
China's
and
India's
and
over
half
the
size
of
faltering
Russia's.
Per-capita
income
is
among
the
highest
in
the
world.
Thus,
an
easily
accessible
tax base has
long
been
available
for
spending
much
more
on
international
security
than
recent
govern-
ments
have
been
willing
to
contemplate. Negotiating
the
landmines
ban,
discouraging
trade
in
small arms,
promoting
the
United Nations
arms register
are
all
worthwhile,
popular
activities
that
polish the
national
self-image.
But they
should
all
be
supplements
to,
not
substi-
tutes
for,
a
proportionately
equitable
commitment
of
resources to
the
management and
prevention
of
international
conflict
-
and
thus
the
containment
of
the
WMD
threat.
Future
American
governments
will
not
'police
the
world'
alone.
For
almost
fifty
years
the
Soviet
threat
compelled
disproportionate
mili-
tary
expenditures and
sacrifice
by
the
United
States.
That
world
is
gone.
Only
by
enmeshing
the
capabilities
of
the
United
States
and
other
leading
powers
in
a
co-operative
security
management
regime
where the
burdens
are
widely
shared
does
the
world
community
have
any
plausible
hope
of
avoiding
warfare
involving
nuclear
or
other
WMD.
Canadian international
security
policy
does
not
require
much
inno-
vation
to
justify
force
expansion and
improvement.
Over
the
past
i
In
a
Globe
and
Mail/Angus
Reid
poll
of
early
February
1998,
increased
transfers
to
the
provinces
(730),
youth employment
measures
(66%),
health-care
spending
(64%),
family
support
(64%),
educational
scholarships
(55%),
federal
debt
reduc-
tion
(55%),
income tax
reduction
(52%),
and
spending
on
highways
(36%),
all
ranked far
ahead
of
equipment
purchases
for
the
Canadian
Forces
(W6%).
Edward
Greenspon,
'How we'd spend
our
federal
surplus,'
Globe
and
Mail
(Toronto),
14
Feb-
ruary
1998.
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Winter
1998-9
121
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