Canada's Policy on the Financing of U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations

Published date01 December 1965
AuthorPeter V. Bishop
DOI10.1177/002070206502000402
Date01 December 1965
Subject MatterArticle
Canada's
Policy
on
the
Financing
of
U.N.
Peace-keeping
Operations
Peter
V.
Bishop*
Strict
adherence
to
sound
international
law
can
lead
to
risky
international
politics when
it
comes
to
the
financing
of
U.N.
peace-keeping
operations.
This
was
the
reluctant
1
conclusion
of
the
Canadian
government,
announced
by
the
Secretary
of
State
for
External
Affairs, Paul Martin,
on
21
June
1965.2
He
said
Can-
ada
would
no
longer
insist
that
all
U.N.
members
pay
their
full
share
of
the
assessed
cost
of
the
operations
in
Egypt
(UNEF)
and
in
the
Congo
(oNuc).
Moreover,
the
government
would
donate
$4
million3
to
help
liquidate
the
U.N.'s
deficit,
accumulated
largely
because
the
U.S.S.R.
4
and
France
5
refuse
to
honor
their
legal
obligation
to
participate
in
the
financing
of
these opera-
tions.
It
is
fitting
that
this
generous
gesture
was
made
by Canada
just
five
days before
the
20th
anniversary
of
the
signing
of
the
U.N.
Charter.
With
a
few
words
Martin
reversed
a
policy
which
Canada
had
followed
for
nearly
ten
years.
He
left
no
doubt
that
the
reason
for
this
"retreat
'
"6
was
Canada's
fear
that
the
rigorous
application
of
the
principle
of
compulsory
payment
for
these
two
operations
might
cause
the
Soviet
Union,
her
allies
and
France
to
leave
the
*Lecturer,
Department
of
Political
Economy,
University
of
Toronto.
A
part
of
this study was
undertaken
with
the
assistance
of
a
Humanities
Research Fellowship
from the
University
of
Toronto, and
a
Study
Grant
from
the
Canadian
Institute
of
International
Affairs
under
a
pro-
gramme
sponsored
by
the
Ford
Foundation.
The
author
gratefully
acknowledges
this
valuable
help.
1
Canada,
House
of
Commons,
Standing
Committee
on
External
Affairs,
Minutes of
Proceedings
and
Evidence,
No.
3,
21
June
1965,
p.
155.
2
Canada,
House of
Commons
Debates
(Daily
edition),
Vol.
110,
No.
47,
21
June
1965,
p.
2659.
3
Canada,
House
of
Commons,
Standing
Committee
on
External
Affairs,
Minutes
of
Proceedings
and
Evidence,
No.
3, 21
June
1965,
p.
160.
4
The
U.S.S.R.
and
her
allies
pay
no
assessed
costs
for either
UNEF
or
oNuc.
5
France
does
not
pay
her
assessed
share
for
oNuc.
6
Canada,
House
of
Commons,
Standing
Committee
on
External
Aff
airs,
Minutes of
Proceedings
and
Evidence,
No.
3,
21
June
1965,
p.
154.
464
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
U.N.
Nonetheless,
Martin
emphasized
that
despite
its
flexibility
in
the
application
of
this
principle,
Canada
would
not
abandon
the
principle
itself.
7
This
is
the
story
of
a
constitutional debate
in
financial
dis-
guise-a
debate
which concerns
the
fundamental
purposes
of
the
United
Nations.
By
a
very
crude
division
these
purposes
fall
into
two
broad
groups:
political and
security
activities
on
the
one
hand,
and
economic
and
social
programmes
on
the
other.
Each
of
these
groups
has
specific
financial
characteristics.
The
eco-
nomic,
social
and
humanitarian
purposes
have absorbed
nearly
two-thirds
of
all
U.N.
expenditures
to date,
and were
financed,
for
the
most
part,
through
voluntary contributions.
The
political
and
security
operations
show
a more
complicated
pattern
of
finance,
mainly
because
of
the
continuing
controversy
surround-
ing
the
financial
obligation
of
members
for
such
operations.
There
are
at
least
three
phases
in
the
history
of
this
con-
troversy.
The
first
of
these
covers
the
years
from
1946
to
1955.
During
this
time
all peace-keeping
operations
(a
term
which
did
not
come
into
common
usage
until
the
late
1950's)
were
paid
for
on
the
basis
of
a
compulsory
assessment
of
all
U.N.
members,
although
some
countries
objected
to
this
practice. The
U.N.'s
single
enforcement
action-the
Korean
War-was
financed
com-
pletely
through
voluntary
contributions. The
second
period
is
one
of
almost
permanent
trouble.
It
begins
with
the
challenge
of
the
principle
of
compulsory
payment
by
a
number
of
states
in
December
1956;
it
ends
in
December
1962
with
the
formal
accep-
tance by
the
General
Assembly of
an
advisory
opinion by
the
International
Court
of
Justice
which
upheld
the
defenders
of
the
principle
against
its
opponents.
The
last,
and
present,
period
is
dominated
by
attempts to
apply
this
principle
to
the
financing
of
future
peace-keeping
operations.
So
far,
there
is
no
agreement
on
a
solution.
The main
emphasis
of
this
study
will
fall,
therefore,
on
the
financial aspects
of
Canada's
peace-keeping
policy
during
the
critical years
between
1956
and
1962.
From the
start,
two
principles have
guided
all
Canadian
financial
policy
at
the
U.N.
These
might
be
called
the frugality
principle,
according to
which
the
U.N.
should
spend
moderately,
and
the
fair
share
principle,
by
which
the
Canadian
government
means
that
Canada's
share
of
U.N.
expenses
must
be
fair
in
the
7
Canada,
House
of Commons
Debates
(Daily
edition),
Vol.
110,
No.
47,
21
June
1965,
p.
2659.

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