Canada’s cross-pacific relations: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00207020221116777 |
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2022, Vol. 77(1) 89–111
© The Author(s) 2022
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00207020221116777
journals.sagepub.com/home/ijx
Canada’s cross-pacific
relations: From Asia-Pacificto
Indo-Pacific
Jacob Benjamin
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
Abstract
This essay proposes a periodization of Canada’s cross-Pacific relations: from the Asia-
Pacific era beginning in the 1980s to the Indo-Pacific era beginning around 2018. In the
era of the Asia-Pacific, Canada was relatively disengaged on matters other than
economic relations, as Ottawa sought to capitalize on dynamic emerging markets.
Canada’s non-confrontational approach enabled a constructive relationship with
China. The conditions for this functional relationship changed as Xi Jinping’s China
assumed a more overtly revisionist, risk-taking, and confrontational foreign policy. In
light of this, like-minded players in Asian security have adopted the “Indo-Pacific”
nomenclature and concept in order to facilitate more interaction with each other and
maintain maritime security. Midway through the Trudeau government’s tenure, the
“Indo-Pacific”is likewise being adopted, as relations between China have soured while
relations with other Asian partners are increasingly prioritized, notably in the security
domain.
Keywords
Indo-Pacific, international security, international institutions, Canadian foreign policy,
governance
Canada has a Pacific coastline of 27,200 kilometres; in light of this fact, cross-Pacific
relations are naturally in Canada’s geopolitical purview. Still, Canada’sprior itization of
cross-Pacific relations has fluctuated over the years. Hitherto, Canada’s allies and
Corresponding author:
Jacob Benjamin, Global Governance, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada.
Email: j2benjam@uwaterloo.ca
partners have questioned Canada’s level of commitment to upholding the Asian se-
curity architecture.
This essay periodizes Canadian cross-Pacific relations into two respective framings:
the Asia-Pacific framing (the 1980s until the Trudeau government), and the Indo-
Pacific framing (2018 onward). More specifically, under the Trudeau government there
has been an observable change in Ottawa’sofficial lexicon, moving from the use of the
“Asia-Pacific”to the “Indo-Pacific.”
1
This change is not merely one of terminology; it
signals a fundamental shift vis-`
a-vis how Canada ontologically understands and ap-
proaches cross-Pacific relations. This essay puts forth the view that the Asia-Pacific
framing was economic-centric, while the Indo-Pacific is more strategic since it enables
Canada to finally assert itself on traditional security issues. The Asia-Pacific framing
capitalizes on relations with commercial hubs like Hong Kong and Singapore, while the
Indo-Pacific’s maritime centricity—a framing of confluence between two oceans—
prioritizes the maintenance of maritime security. While Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific adoption
is new, there is already evidence that Canada is prioritizing security relations in the
Indo-Pacific. In correlation with the new framing, Canada has denounced China’s
actions in the South China Sea, deployed hard power in order to contain North Korea,
and enhanced its defence relations with key players in Asian security like Japan.
This essay is structured in four parts. Firstly, it provides some background on
Canada’s non-confrontational, economic-oriented approach to cross-Pacific relations in
the Asia-Pacific era; this approach was particularly salient when it came to relations
with China. Next, it explores the Indo-Pacific historically and conceptually. Thirdly, in
correlation with Canada’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific framing, it shows that Canada is
more readily deploying hard power in order to contribute to maintaining Asian security.
Lastly, the essay analyzes Canada’s possible and actual involvements in Indo-Pacific
security governance, assessing that the Trudeau government has made incremental
gains in terms of attaining institutional access.
1. See, for example, GAC’s 2020 press release that announced that Minister of Foreign Affairs François-
Philippe Champagne will attend the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): “These meetings will also be an
opportunity to discuss ways to promote security, good governance, trade and investment, as well as
development partnerships between Canada and the Indo-Pacific region.”Another example is the press
release stating that Minister Harjit Sajjan attended the ASEAN Defence Ministers’Meeting Plus
(ADMM+): “In his remarks, Minister Sajjan highlighted Canada’s contributions to maritime security,
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and military training in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific”;
Government of Canada, “Minister Champagne to attend ASEAN-Canada Post-Ministerial Conference and
ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial,”8 September 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/
2020/09/minister-champagne-to-attend-asean-canada-post-ministerial-conference-and-asean-regional-
forum-minister ial.html (accessed 20 April 2022); Government of Canada, “Speaking notes for the
Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence,”9 December 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/
department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/proactive-dis closure/cacn-national-security-
dimensions-canada-china-relations-12-april-2021/pa-products.html (accessed 7 February 2022).
90 International Journal 77(1)
To continue reading
Request your trial