'Capitulation', 'Resistance' and the Framework of 'Normali-zation': The August 1968 Invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Response
| Author | Fred H. Eidlin |
| Date | 01 December 1981 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338101800402 |
| Published date | 01 December 1981 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
’Capitulation’,
’Resistance’
and
the
Framework
of
’Normali-zation’:
The
August
1968
Invasion
of
Czechoslovakia
and
the
Czechoslovak
Response
FRED
H.
EIDLIN
University
of
Guelph,
Ontario
The
Soviet
invasion
of
Czechoslovakia
in
August
1968
and
the
Czechoslovak
response
to
it
resulted
in
a
political
stalemate.
Although
the
invasion
was
a
military
success,
it
was
a
political
failure.
A
nearly
unanimous
response
of
Czechoslovakia’s
population,
rulers,
and
institutions
quickly
took
shape,
rejecting
the
intervention
and
freezing
authority
along
the
lines
of
legitimacy
prevailing
before
the
invasion.
This
article
shows
how
the
outlines
of
a
stalemated
political
situation
sharpened
as
both
the
occupation
and
the
Czechoslovak
response
to
it
became
consolidated.
The
political
framework
codified
in
the
Moscow
Protocol
and
at
the
Central
Committee
Plenum
of
31
August
1968
are
seen
as
formalizing
a
frame-
work
already
established
by
the
end
of
the
first
two
days
of
the
occupation.
This
frame-
work
constituted
the
basic
context
within
which
Czechoslovak
politics
and
Czechoslovak-
Soviet
relations
were
conducted
over
the
ensuing
months.
And
the
constraints
and
pos-
sibilities
it
presented
to
both
sides
help
explain
many
aspects
of
the
post-invasion
political
situation,
even
to
the
present
day.
Despite
the
apparently
complete
success
of
’normalization’
in
the
Soviet
sense,
the
fundamental
political
dilemma
created
by
the intervention
and
the
Czechoslovak
response
to
it
is
unresolved
and
remains
even
now
a
central
problem
of
Czechoslovak
politics.
Introduction:
Elaboration
of
post-interven-
tion
framework
By
the
end
of
the
day
on
21
August
1968,
the
political
situation
in
Czechoslovakia
had
come
to
be
characterized
by
two
conflicting,
albeit
coexisting
realities.
Military
occupa-
tion
of
the
country
had
been
successfully
carried
out
and
was
well
on
the
way
to
consolidation.
And
yet
a
nearly
unanimous
response
of
Czechoslovakia’s
population,
rulers,
and
institutions
had
taken
shape,
freezing
authority
along
the
lines
of
legit-
imacy
prevailing
before
the
invasion
and
systematically
denying
the
legitimacy
and
authority
of
the
foreign
occupation,.’
1
This
article
explores
the
nature
of
these
two
realities.
We
will
note
how
the
outlines
of
a
stalemated
political
situation
sharpened
as
both
the
occupation
and
the
Czecho-
slovak
response
to
it
became
consolidated..
The
political
framework
codified
in
the
Mos-
cow
Protocol
and
at
the
Central
Committee
Plenum
of
31
August
1968
will
be
seen
as
essentially
formalizing a
framework
which
had,
in
large
measure,
already
been
estab-
lished
by
the
end
of
the
first
two
days
of
the
occupation.
This
framework
perpetuated
and
aggra-
vated
a
political
stalemate
which
had
taken
shape
over
several
months
prior
to
the
inter-
vention
and
which
had
come
to
a
head
in
the
conflicting
positions
expressed
in
the
’Letter
of
Five
Communist
and
Workers’
Parties’2
and
the
’Position
of
the
Presidium
of the
CPCz
CC’3
in
response
to
this
letter.
These
were
the
positions
which
produced
the
dead-
lock
in
negotiations
between
the
leaderships
of
the
Soviet
and
Czechoslovak
Communist
Parties
in
Ciema
nad
Tisou.
As
Presidium
member
Vasil
Bilak
put
it:
’The
Soviet
com-
rades
proceeded
from
the
letter
of
the
five
Communist
Parties
and
we
from
our
answer
to
this
letter.’4
And
yet,
after
the
agreement
reached
between
the
Soviet
and
Czechoslovak
leadership
at
Cierna
and
the
subsequent
sign-
ing
of
the
Bratislava
Declaration5
by
top
re-
presentatives
of
the
CPCz
and
of
the
five
Communist
Parties
which
had
signed
the
Warsaw
Letter,
it
appeared
to
many
observers
that
the
political
stalemate
between Czecho-
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