A Case for the Recognition of East Germany
| DOI | 10.1177/002070206001500405 |
| Date | 01 December 1960 |
| Published date | 01 December 1960 |
| Author | Peyton V. Lyon |
| Subject Matter | Notes and Comment |
NOTES
AND
COMMENT
337
of
any
anti-Khrushchev
bloc
in
Russia
is
both
unproven
at
present
and
unlikely
to
amount
to
much
in
the
future.
All
told,
the
recurring
rumours
about
Khrushchev's
domestic
weakness
are not
substantial,
despite
the
importance
of
some
persons
who
disseminate
them.
By
manipulation
of
party
and
state
appointments Khrushchev
seems
to
be
continually
re-
enforcing
his
authority
in
the
U.S.S.R.
And
the
Chinese,
with
whom
Khrushchev's
differences
are
substantial,
have
practically
no
capacity
to
oppose
him
within
the
Soviet Union.
Although
Khrushchev
is
very
likely
to
continue
to rule
more
by
collective
decision-making
than
by
outright
terror,
his
power
has
never
been
greater
within
Russia.
A
CASE
FOR
THE
RECOGNITION
OF
EAST
GERMANY
Peyton
V.
Lyon
University
of
Western
Ontario
The
prospects
for
an
agreement
to
re-unite
Germany
have
never been
less
promising. Nevertheless,
we
dare
not
put
the
German
Problem
out
of
mind.
Steps
could
and
should
be
taken
which, while
not
leading to
full,
formal
reunification,
could
reduce
the
explosiveness of
the
present situation,
facilitate
progress
on
such
problems
as disarmament,
and
improve
the
lot
of
the
17,000,000
Germans
forced
to
live
under
a
communist
regime.
The
first,
most
significant,
and
most
painful of
these
steps
is
the
recognition
of
the
German
Democratic
Republic
(G.D.R.),
the
Soviet
puppet
state
in
East
Germany.
The
West
Germans
now
appear
virtually
united
on
foreign
policy,
and
are
increasingly pessimistic
about
restoring
the
unity
of
their
country.
Even
before
this
year's
abortive
summit
con-
ference,
their
government
had
reversed
its
usual
position
by
asking
that
reunification
and
Berlin
be
left
off
the
agenda.
For
their
part,
the
West
German
Social
Democrats
(S.P.D.)
had
buried
their
controversial
plan
for
reunification
through
disen-
gagement
and confederation
with
the
G.D.R.;
they
now
advocate
a
bipartisan
foreign
policy,
very
largely
on
Chancellor
Adenauer's
terms.
The
West
Germans
may
be
treated
next
year
to
the
novelty
of
federal
elections
fought
on
domestic
issues.
It
would
be
a serious
miscalculation
to
read
indifference
to
national
unity
into
this
new,
pessimistic, realism.
The
Germans
remain an
emotional,
sentimental
people
and
there
is
scant
pros-
pect
that
they
will
become
resigned
to
partition,
especially when
it
means
leaving
one
quarter
of
their
number under Russian
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