Center-Right Parties in Peace Processes: ‘Slow Learning’ or Punctuated Peace Socialization?
| Author | Neophytos Loizides,Nukhet Sandal |
| Published date | 01 June 2013 |
| Date | 01 June 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00971.x |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
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P O L I T I C A L S T U D I E S : 2 0 1 3 VO L 6 1 , 4 0 1 – 4 2 1
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2012.00971.x
Center-Right Parties in Peace Processes: ‘Slow
Learning’ or Punctuated Peace Socialization?post_971401..421
Nukhet Sandal
Neophytos Loizides
Brown University
University of Kent
This article examines why center-right parties that have partly built their image around ethnic or religious identities
reverse their positions to support peace arrangements. Political settlements in divided societies frequently run counter
to the values of these parties and are also potentially damaging to their internal party cohesion.We argue that political
learning through sustained interaction with external pro-peace allies transforms the positions of center-right parties
by socializing them when it comes to their international agenda, yet the same effect is not observed in party actions
within the sphere of domestic intra-communal politics. Drawing from the Cypriot and Northern Irish peace
processes, we show that once these parties embrace peace agreements, they do so by balancing international and local
considerations, choosing to compensate domestic constituencies on symbolic issues of less importance for the peace
process yet of major significance to conservative constituencies. The study of center-right and conservative peace
actors has important implications for research on mediation and international conflict since it suggests mechanisms
through which policy makers can better engage with ethnic or religious parties in fragile peace processes.
Keywords: peace processes; nationalism; center-right; conservative; political parties
Why and how do political parties with conservative constituencies risk their unity as well
as their political prospects by taking a pro-peace stance?1 Within the context of peace
processes, much of the literature has focused on the extreme right and spoilers (see Ellinas,
2010; Haklai, 2007; Stedman, 1997) or on the role of outside parties in conflict transfor-
mation (Diez et al., 2008). Little attention has been paid to domestic political forces and
their interaction with outside actors. Most notably, the center-right and its potential for a
constructive role in peace processes have been left out of the picture. This article explores
the role of such parties and their outside partners in conflict transformation, emphasizing
the processes that enable individuals or parties to take major political and personal risks to
put forward a peace agenda.
Looking at the cases of the Ulster Unionist party (UUP) within the context of the Good
Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, and Democratic Rally (Demokratikos Sinagermos
(DISY) – Dhmokratiko´ς Sunagermo´ς) within the context of the abortive 2002–4 Annan
Plan for Cyprus, we explore the mechanisms of pro-peace transformations in divided
societies. There are multiple potential explanations for this constructive but often unex-
pected behavior of center-right parties. Charismatic leadership, inter-party or intra-elite
competition and prior civil society transformation can be counted among the main
hypotheses. We argue that the positions of these parties vis-à-vis peace agreements do not
result from only one of these hypotheses but from a systematic peace socialization process
that affects primarily the transnational agendas of center-right parties.
The findings from the two cases – UUP and DISY – indicate that regular interactions
with pro-peace international elites or a trusted ally transform a decision maker’s perspective
when it comes to political issues with international implications. Yet the same adaptation
© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
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N U K H E T S A N DA L A N D N E O P H Y TO S L O I Z I D E S
does not apply to local issues, where leaders usually maintain their conservative stance.
Evidence shows that when center-right parties embrace peace agreements, they do so by
balancing international and local considerations, choosing to preserve a conservative image
on local and symbolic issues of less importance for the peace process yet of major
significance to their constituencies. The cases also demonstrate that it is usually this local
conservative image that reassures center-right parties that their moderate position in the
peace agreements will be compensated for.
The article further demonstrates that political actors are identity retainers as much as
adaptors to change. In the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, both UUP and DISY took
bold steps for the pro-settlement arrangements while retaining traditional and conservative
elements in their domestic policies. It is fair to say that both parties have gone through
remarkable transformations, and their decisions of support were milestones in the respective
peace processes. Yet one cannot say that the transformation has been unchallenged,
unilinear or consistent. In order to capture this uneven trajectory, we come up with a
theoretical model, the Punctuated Peace Socialization Model (PPSM), which breaks down
the traditional elite socialization process into episodes with significant yet partial socializa-
tion elements. The approach is parsimonious yet novel; it does not treat socialization as a
monolithic process and brings the ‘compensation’ aspect into the picture. Socialization can
be defined as behaving in accordance with the norms of a community and even internal-
izing the interests of another political actor. Checkel (2005, p. 805) reminds us that
socialization constitutes a shift from ‘logic of consequences’ to ‘logic of appropriateness’; the
socialized actor behaves in a certain way not necessarily because he or she will benefit from
the situation politically (logic of consequences), but because he or she thinks that the action
is the most appropriate according to the norms of socializing community. The literature on
socialization so far has mostly focused on the change aspect, leaving the identity-retaining
part out of the picture. PPSM provides a mechanism of socialization different from this
binary categorization of socialized/non-socialized, by separating the domestic and trans-
national spheres of policy making.
In principle, PPSM can be seen as an adaptation of political learning and punctuated
equilibrium models which have traditionally focused on public policy making. The studies
that have employed the punctuated equilibrium label share the common aim of accounting
for stasis and drastic change. Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl (2001), for example, applied the
punctuated equilibrium model within the context of enduring rivalries, international
norms and institutions. The model we employ in this article shares the same goal with the
punctuated equilibrium studies; it explores the dynamics of continuity and change, this time
within center-right political parties and with an emphasis on peace processes.We argue that
political learning is not only slow in manifesting itself but it is frequently associated with
‘sound-bottomed contradictions’ (O’Leary, 1997, p. 663). Our model aims to address these
gaps in the literature as well as the broader questions of who learns what and when,
highlighting the interaction between political learning and sustained socialization with
external peace actors.
UUP and DISY have been selected as cases from the political party universe of divided
societies because they serve as prime models of party transformation under comparable yet
sufficiently distinct conditions. Although not wholeheartedly, both parties endorsed a
© 2012 The Authors. Political Studies © 2012 Political Studies Association
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difficult compromise which additionally required them to face directly their electoral
consistencies in a referendum. As Table 1 suggests, peace treaties and referendums are
defining moments of positive political transformation and statesmanship; however, they are
also potentially conducive to conflict escalation and internal fragmentation. In divided
societies political parties across the political spectrum might choose to reject such settle-
ments once confronted with electorally risky processes. Public referendums often make
conservative peacemaking more difficult by confronting liberal party elites with conserva-
tive grassroots. As Table 1 suggests, opposing peace agreements is often common among
conservative parties such as South Africa’s Conservative party (CP) and the Reform Party
of Canada and less likely with leftist parties such as the Republican Turkish party (CTP)
which led the pro-peace campaign among the Turkish Cypriots or the Socialist party
(PSOE) in post-Franco Spain.
In essence, both UUP and DISY are ‘least likely’2 peacemakers with significant conser-
vative constituencies that have traditionally opposed reconciliation or compromise with the
Table 1: Center-Right and Left-Wing Political Parties in Peace Processes
Voted ‘Yes’ in Peace Accord Plan
Voted ‘No’ in Peace Accord Plan
Center-right and
Spain (1978) – Democratic Center
South Africa (1992) – Conservative
conservative
(UCD)
party (CP)
parties
South Africa (1992) – National party
Canada (1992) – Reform Party of
(NP)
Canada
Canada (1992) – Progressive Party of
Northern Ireland (1998) – Democratic
Canada (PC)
Unionist party (DUP)
Northern Ireland (1998) – Ulster
Cyprus (2004) – Democratic party (DP)
Unionist party (UUP)
– Greek Cypriot
Cyprus...
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