Central bank independence: It is protected, but is it clearly delineated?
| Author | Phedon Nicolaides |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X221134906 |
| Published date | 01 October 2022 |
| Date | 01 October 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Editorial |
Central bank independence: It is
protected, but is it clearly
delineated?
Phedon Nicolaides*, **
On 13 September 2022, the Court of Justice, in its Grand Chamber formation, ruled in Banka Slovenije
1
that Slovenian legislation that required the Central Bank of Slovenia to compensate certain holders of
financial instruments was incompatible with EU law and in particular Article 123 TFEU. Although the
judgment was about preventing a central bank from monetizing government debt, it indirectly strength-
ened the defences of central banks’independence from political interference.
Commentary and analysis on the extent of independence and the nature of accountability of the
European Central Bank have filled hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pages of scholarly journals and
books.
Article 130 TFEU stipulates that ‘neither the European Central Bank, nor a national central bank,
nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions’, while Article
282(3) provides that the ECB ‘shall be independent in the exercise of its powers and in the man-
agement of its finances’.
These are powerful statements that have raised important questions about the purpose and scope
of the ECB’s independence in democratic political systems such as those of the EU and its Member
States. Such questions have spawned a voluminous literature.
2
The Court of Justice has also given
us some rather surprising answers.
*
University of Maastricht, Maastricht, Netherlands
**
University of Nicosia, Nicosia, Cyprus
Corresponding author:
Phedon Nicolaides, Maastricht University Faculteit der Rechtsgeleerdheid, Bouillonstraat, Maastricht, 6200 MD,
Netherlands
E-mail: phedon.nicolaides@maastrichtuniversity.nl
2. See C. Buch, ‘Central Bank Independence: Mandates, Mechanisms, and Modifications’,Bank of International
Settlements (2021), https://www.bis.org/review/r211021b.pdf; F. Amtenbrink and C. Herrmann, EU Law of Economic
& Monetary Union (Oxford University Press, 2020); F. Amtenbrink and M. Markakis, ‘The Evolving Accountability
of the European Central Bank’,ICON.S Conference on The Future of Public Law (2021), https://pure.eur.nl/en/
publications/the-evolving-accountability-of-the-european-central-bank. See also a research project currently supported
by Horizon 2020 titled ‘Europe and Its Central Banks: Lessons from History’. More information on this project can
be accessed at: https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/898910.
Editorial
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2022, Vol. 29(5) 523–526
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/1023263X221134906
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