Centripetalism, Consociationalism and Cyprus: The “Adoptability” Question
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Author | John McGarry |
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716666293 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032321716666293
Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(2) 512 –529
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321716666293
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Centripetalism,
Consociationalism and Cyprus:
The “Adoptability” Question
John McGarry
Abstract
Most assessments of power-sharing institutions focus on their functionality, that is, on their
prospects for delivering peace, stability, and prosperity. This article focuses instead on the
prior question of “adoptability,” that is, on whether particular power-sharing institutions can be
accepted (agreed to) in the first place. While the adoptability question is scarcely touched on in
the academic literature, it is just as important as the functionality question, as it hardly matters
whether an institution is functional if it is not adoptable. The article examines the adoptability
question through a close-up look at the negotiations in Cyprus. The evidence from there suggests
that consociational power sharing is more likely to be adoptable than centripetal power sharing in
contexts where agreement is needed.
Keywords
Cyprus, centripetalism, consociationalism, peace negotiations, divided polities
Accepted: 23 June 2016
Cyprus has been partitioned since 1974, and a political settlement there requires agree-
ment between its two communities, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as is
acknowledged in the explicit understanding of both communities’ leaders, and the United
Nations. Any settlement must initially be agreed between the respective leaders and then
ratified by both communities’ voters in separate and simultaneous referendums (Joint
Declaration, 2014). This equality of veto power over a settlement exists although the
Turkish Cypriots are around only 20% of the island’s population, with the rest Greek
Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots’ negotiating clout is owed to Turkey’s backing of the
Turkish Cypriots and has existed since 1974, when Turkey partitioned the island, carved
out a self-governing zone for the Turkish Cypriots in the north, and stationed over 40,000
troops there.1
Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada
Corresponding author:
John McGarry, Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada.
Email: john.mcgarry@queensu.ca
666293PSX0010.1177/0032321716666293Political StudiesMcGarry
research-article2016
Article
McGarry 513
The paper is concerned with the relative adoptability of two alternative models of
power sharing in Cyprus, based on centripetalism and consociationalism, respectively.
The former aims to promote a politics that strengthens political moderates, seen as likely
to compromise with ethnic rivals, over political hardliners, seen as likely to be intransi-
gent, and is associated with three particular institutional forms. The first of these forms
involves a presidential executive system, which centripetalists think can produce a leader
who transcends ethnicity or at least can exercise moderation on ethnic issues. The second
is a “vote-pooling” electoral system that gives moderate candidates for office an edge
over their hardline rivals. The third is a particular form of federalism that seeks to “frag-
ment” ethnic identities while promoting a more fluid form of cross-cutting politics that
softens divisions (Horowitz, 1990: 163–226, 2007). Consociationalism, in contrast, focuses
on collegial executives that are built around the existing leadership of ethnic communi-
ties. It champions electoral systems that permit the election of elites representing the
salient political cleavages, and it supports segmental autonomy, that is, self-government
for those communities that seek it. According to one leading authority, centripetalism
and consociationalism are the two main forms of power sharing, and the choice
between them constitutes the “most fundamental” decision in institutional negotiations
in deeply divided places (Horowitz, 2002: 213).
“Adoptability” refers to the prospects of centripetal or consociational institutions
being acceptable to both parties and communities in Cyprus, rather than the prospects of
these institutions being “adopted,” that is, put in place. For power-sharing institutions to
be adopted, a settlement is needed which might require agreement on additional matters
not directly related to power-sharing institutions (in Cyprus’ case, agreement on security
and property matters). Settlements also require motivational elements that are distinct
from their substantive content, such as may arise from external pressures, demographic
change, economic opportunities, or hurting stalemates. As has often been said of the
Palestine/Israel conflict, it is possible to have a reasonable consensus on what is adopta-
ble, but not the circumstances in which it can be adopted. But clearly adoptability is a
pre-requisite for being adopted.
Two important caveats are necessary at the outset. First, this is a single case-study, an
“N” of one. It lacks the breadth that large-N quantitative analyses or multiple case-study
qualitative analyses can provide. On the other hand, it provides a reasonably in-depth
study of the adoptability question in a setting where two sides need to agree. While
Donald Horowitz (2002, 2008, 2014) stands out as one of the very few political scientists
to have broached the adoptability question, his treatment is general in nature, and there
is as yet no focused case-study on the subject. This article also makes arguments that
are generalizable from Cyprus to all deeply conflicted places where settlements require
agreement. Quantitative and other comparative scholars are invited to examine these
arguments and test them in other cases.
Second, Cyprus is a partitioned polity, which currently lacks any common power-
sharing institutions. Indeed, no functioning common institutions have existed in
Cyprus since its consociational arrangements collapsed in December 1963, 11 years
before Turkey’s partition in 1974. Cyprus, in fact, is a clear example of the “primacy”
of the functionality question in academic writings: whenever Cyprus is mentioned, it
is generally to illustrate the failings of consociational power sharing once imple-
mented (e.g. Horowitz, 2014: 13; Polyviou, 1975: 26). Nonetheless, there is a signifi-
cant body of agreement between the two communities, and between them and the
United Nations, on the sort of institutions that are adoptable in a re-united Cyprus.
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