Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath CG 11331 1995
| Jurisdiction | UK Non-devolved |
| Judge | Mr M. J. Goodman |
| Judgment Date | 21 October 1999 |
| Court | Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) |
| Subject Matter | Marriage, civil partnerships and living together |
| Docket Number | CG 11331 1995 |
| Appellant | Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath |
R(G) 1/00
(Chief Adjudication Officer v. Bath)
Mr. M. J. Goodman CG/11331/1995
7.5.98
CA (Evans, Schiemann and Walker LJJ)
21.10.99
Validity of marriage - marriage ceremony not carried out in accordance with the statutory requirements - whether presumption of marriage from long cohabitation
The claimant and her husband went through a formal ceremony of marriage at a Sikh Temple in West London on 27 June 1956. There had been no other marriage ceremony and there was no marriage certificate. The claimant and her husband thereafter lived together in a monogamous relationship bringing up their children, until the husband’s death in 1994. The Temple was registered for marriages in 1983. The claimant’s claim for widow’s benefit was refused on the ground that she had not been validly married as the Temple had not been registered at the time of her marriage. The tribunal upheld that decision. The claimant appealed to a Commissioner who held that, as there had been a bona fide ceremony of marriage followed by a long monogamous cohabitation, marriage should be presumed. The Chief Adjudication Officer appealed to the Court of Appeal
Held, dismissing the appeal, that
- there was no statutory provision in the Marriage Act 1949 or elsewhere expressly rendering void a marriage in an unregistered building and it would be wrong not to extend to the parties to an irregular ceremony followed by long cohabitation the benefit of a presumption which would have applied if there had been no evidence of any ceremony at all
- R(G) 2/70 was distinguishable on its facts but (per Evans LJ) in so far as it decided that a marriage was void by reason of non-compliance with the relevant statutory requirements, even in the absence of express statutory provision to that effect, then it was not correct.
DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
1. I allow the claimant’s appeal from the decision of the social security appeal tribunal dated 3 May 1995 as that decision is erroneous in law and I set it aside. My decision is that, for the purpose of the claim made on 7 February 1994 for widow’s benefit, it has been established that the claimant is “a woman who has been widowed” within the meaning of section 38(1) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992. Accordingly, provided the other requirements (e.g. contribution conditions) of that section are satisfied, the claimant is entitled to widow’s pension in respect of the death of her husband on 23 January 1994 and the adjudication officer should forthwith make the appropriate award: Social Security Administration Act 1992, section 23.
2. This is an appeal to the Commissioner by the claimant, a woman born on 4 August 1939, from the unanimous decision of a social security appeal tribunal dated 3 May 1995 which dismissed her appeal from a decision of an adjudication officer issued on 12 August 1994, the relevant terms of which were, “It has not been established and cannot be presumed that there is a valid marriage between [the claimant] and [ZSB]. This is because there is no evidence of a valid ceremony in accordance with the Marriage Act 1949. Therefore it is not valid for social security purposes.”
3. This case has, because of its complexity, been the subject of three oral hearings before me. At the conclusion of the first two hearings, on 28 August 1997 and 28 October 1997 respectively, I issued Directions requiring further written submissions and information. The last hearing, on 30 April 1998, was a joint hearing of this and another case (on Commissioners file CG/6957/1995) involving the same point, on which however a decision was deferred because in that case (unlike this one) there was a question whether or not there had been a marriage in India as well as any marriage in England. At the hearing on 30 April 1998, the claimant was present with her son but was not otherwise represented. On a previous occasion she had been represented by her daughter, who is a Solicitor. Detailed written representations have been made by her children on her behalf. I am grateful for them. At the hearing on 30 April 1998 Mr. Gurdial Singh, of Counsel, appeared for the claimant in the other case. He addressed me on the general issues which are common to both cases. I am much indebted to him for his researches and for his submissions. At all three hearings the adjudication officer was represented by Mr. Sriskandarajah, of the Office of the Solicitor to the Departments of Health and Social Security. I am also much indebted to him for his researches and submissions.
4. The claimant’s husband died on 23 January 1994. A copy of his death certificate has been made part of the appeal papers in this case (No T23). Shortly thereafter, on 7 February 1994, the claimant made a claim for widow’s benefit, stating that she had married her husband on 27 June 1956. The ceremony on which she relies as being a marriage ceremony in England (there being no marriage in any other country) took place on 27 June 1956 at a Sikh Temple in West London. A letter from the General Register Office for England and Wales dated 25 June 1997 indicates that that Temple was not registered for marriages until 28 September 1983.
5. Registration of buildings for marriages in England is provided for by the Marriage Act 1949 (which is still the principal Act), sections 41‑52. It is clear from those sections that registration of a building for marriage purposes can operate only as from the date of registration and is not retrospective.
6. The position is therefore that when the claimant went through a formal ceremony of marriage according to Sikh religious rites (with witnesses, members of the family, etc, present) in the Temple in question on 27 June 1956, that Temple was not a building registered for marriages. A letter dated 19 September 1997 to Mr. Sriskandarajah from the Vice President and Authorised Person of the Temple in question states,
“It is a common knowledge that religious marriages are being performed in the Sikh Gurdwaras [i.e. Temples] all over the world. Although such marriages called “Anand Karj” are recognised in India but [sic] in U.K. these are treated as only blessings in the place of worship and I believe that the people undergoing such marriages are told about this.”
7. In response to that, a written submission on the claimant’s behalf states,
“I would also like to bring to the Commissioner’s attention that the last paragraph of the letter from the Central Gurdwara, .. cannot be construed to reach [a conclusion adverse to the claimant]. A Sikh marriage, performed according to religious customs and rites, for any Sikh, is a marriage in itself and not merely blessings.”
8. Whatever is the correct position, no doubt it would be possible after such a ceremony in an unregistered Sikh Temple for the parties to have gone thereafter to e.g. a Registrar’s Office for a civil wedding ceremony. That however did not occur in the present case. It should also be noted that there is no certificate of marriage in this case. It has also been confirmed that there appears to be no Act of Parliament, Public or Private, relating to marriages in Sikh Temples.
9. After the ceremony in the Sikh Temple on 27 June 1956 the claimant and her “husband” lived together in what was clearly a “monogamous” relationship for some 37 years, bringing up the children of the “marriage”. The husband’s income tax and social security contributions were assessed on the basis that he was a married man.
10. The adjudication officer’s written submission to the tribunal appears to have been on the basis that the ceremony at the Sikh Temple on 27 June 1956 was not a valid marriage (a) because the building was not registered for marriages and (b) because in any event the ceremony was not apt to create a marriage. Point (b) has not been pursued at the stage of appeal to the Commissioner in either of these two cases. I consider that to be a correct course of action. The real issue is whether or not what was undoubtedly according to Sikh religious rites a marriage ceremony was invalidated by its taking place in a building, the Temple, which was not registered for marriages at the time, though it became registered subsequently. I have dealt with the case on that basis. In any event, in so far as there is any question mark over the actual nature of the ceremony, that is in my view answered by the presumption from cohabitation to which I refer below.
11. The tribunal of 3 May 1995, while saying that they had “enormous sympathy with the appellant’s predicament”, gave as their reasons for dismissing the appeal, “Unfortunately, at the time of her marriage ceremony the Sikh Temple was not registered...
To continue reading
Request your trial