Chadwick v Broadwood
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 20 March 1841 |
| Date | 20 March 1841 |
| Court | High Court of Chancery |
English Reports Citation: 49 E.R. 121
ROLLS COURT
S. C. 10 L. J. Ch. 242; 5 Jur. 359. See Real Property Limitation Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Viet. c. 57.
[308] chadwick v. broadwood. Nov. 9, 1840. [S. C. 10 L. J. Ch. 242 ; 5 Jur. 359. See Eeal Property Limitation Act, 1874, 37 & 38 Viet. c. 57.] Where property is under lease, adverse possession runs against the reversioner from the expiration of the lease, or from the time when the tenant pays rent to one claiming wrongfully to be entitled in immediate reversion. A bill of discovery in aid of an action of ejectment, filed in 1840, stated that in 1776 A. B., being seised in fee, granted leases of the property which expired in 1825, and that the Plaintiff, as heir of A. B., was now entitled to the property, for the recovery of which he was about to bring an action of ejectment. The Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27), and averred that the Plaintiff had not been in possession or received rents for more than twenty years before the bill was filed : that the Defendant had entered into possession as purchaser in fee-simple in 1819, and had ever since remained in peaceable possession as tenant in fee. Held, that this plea could not, in law, be sustained ; for there being no allegation that the rent had been paid to anyone wrongfully claiming to be entitled in reversion immediately expectant on the determination of the lease, the Plaintiffs right did not accrue until the expiration of the lease in 1825, or within twenty years from the filing of the bill. This case came before the Court upon a plea to a bill of discovery, in aid of an action at law intended to be commenced by the Plaintiff. The bill stated certain conveyances of December 1717 and July 1720, under which Sir Andrew Chadwick became seised in fee of certain premises in Broad Street, St. James's; that by indenture of lease, which was supposed to bear date the 2d day of June 1776, he demised a specified part of the property to F. Johnstone for sixty years, at a rent of 40 a year ; and that he " executed clivers other leases in writing, of such of the same premises respectively as were not comprized in the lease of the 2d June 1766, at and under divers yearly rents, each such rent exceeding 40s. by the year, and for long terms of years, commensurate or nearly commensurate with the number of years, which, at the respective elates of such other leases, was then to come in [309] the said term of sixty years granted by the lease of the 2d of June 1766; or at least the term of years, granted by such other leases respectively, were granted in such manner as that they would respectively expire at or about the time when the term of sixty years, granted by the lease of 2d of June 1766, would expire, or within one or two years prior or subsequent to that time." That the Plaintiff was unable to set forth with precision the date of such indenture of lease, supposed to bear date the 2cl of June 1766, or the dates of the other leases granted by the said Sir Andrew Chadwick, or the terms of years for which such other leases were granted, or the rents thereby respectively reserved; or the particular dimensions, boundaries, &c., of the pieces or parcels of ground thereinbefore described, as comprized in the indentures of bargain and sale and release of the 31st of December 1717 and the 22d of July 1720 respectively, or in the leases respectively, or of the messuages or tenements and buildings thereon, by reason of the Plaintiff not having in his possession or power the thereinbefore-mentioned leases, or any of them, or any counterparts or counterpart thereof." The bill stated, that Sir Andrew Chadwiek died in March 1768, intestate and without issue; and it then proceeded to state the pedigree of the Plaintiff, and to 122 CHADWICK V. BROADWOOD 3 BEAV. 310. shew that he was the heir at law of Sir Andrew Chadwick; and stated, " That the said term of sixty years expired on the 24th of June 1825, or about that time; and that the other terms of years, granted by said Sir Andrew Chadwick as aforesaid, respectively expired at some time or times within two years, either prior or subsequent to the 24th of June 1825." It also stated that the property had become vested in the Defendants for the residue of the said term; and [310] that the term having expired, the Plaintiff was seised and entitled thereto in fee, as the heir at law of Sir Andrew Chadwick. The bill further stated that the Plaintiff was about to bring an action of ejectment against the Defendants to recover possession, but that he was unable to proceed without a discovery. It charged that the Defendants had the leases and other documents in their possession, and prayed a discovery. To this bill the Defendant pleaded the Statute of Limitations of the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, whereby, after setting forth the second, third, seventeenth, and twenty-fourth sections of the statute,(l) the Defendant by his plea [311] averred as follows; that the Complainant or any person under whom he claims, or any other person or persons for his or their or any of their use; or in trust for him or them or any of them, was not, nor were within twenty years next before the filing of the said Complainant's bill, in the possession, or in the receipt of the rents or other profits of the brewhouse, messuages, tenements, lands, grounds, and hereditaments, or other the premises in (1) The second section of this Act is as follows:-"And be it further enacted, that after the 31st day of December 1833, no person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within twenty years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims ; or if such right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then within twenty years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the same." The third section enacts, " That in the construction of this Act the right to make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, shall be deemed to have first accrued at such time as hereinafter is mentioned ; (that is to say) when the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, shall, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, have been in possession or in receipt of the profits of such land, or in receipt of such rent, and shall, while entitled thereto, have been dispossessed, or have discontinued such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of such dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were or was so received;" (this section, after providing for the case of a person claiming under a deceased person, and of one claiming under an instrument unaccompanied by possession, proceeds) "and when the estate or interest claimed shall have been an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or other future estate or interest, and no person shall have obtained the possession or receipt of the profits of such land, or the receipt of such rent in respect of such estate or interest, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such estate or interest became an estate or interest in possession." The ninth section enacts, " that when any person shall be in possession or in receipt of the profits of any land, or in receipt of any rent, by virtue of a lease in writing, by which a rent amounting to the yearly sum of 20s. or upwards shall be reserved, and the rent reserved by such lease shall have been received by some person wrongfully claiming to be entitled to such land or rent in reversion, immediately expectant on the determination of such lease, and no payment in respect of the rent reserved by such lease shall afterwards...
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