Changing Patterns in Government Business
| Date | 01 March 1994 |
| Published date | 01 March 1994 |
| DOI | 10.1177/095207679400900105 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Changing Patterns in Government Business
Sir Michael Quinlan
The years following the Conservative return in 1979 are perceived within the
Civil Service and beyond as having seen the broadest changes in the conduct of
central government business since immediately after World War II - some would
say for still further back - even though the amount of boundary re-shaping
between Departments has been modest. It is early days yet for a comprehensive
accounting. Much of what has been done was intended to shape ethos and
culture, for the Service country-wide and not just the Whitehall minority, in new
ways which - like the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms - will show their full effects
only over the long haul, across a. range of parliaments and through Civil Service
career spans. This essay makes no claim to predict the eventual balance-sheet,
nor even to identify all the elements; it merely offers impressions and reflections
formed by duty as Permanent Secretary, in two very different Departments, from
1983 until early 1992.
Parliament
It is not easy to discuss the effects in neat compartments. The workings of central
,government involve complex interactions, not always recognised by crusaders for
change (perhaps fortunately, for the reform of deep-rooted systems often springs
most confidently and successfully from robust simplicity of diagnosis without
over-much concern or delay for the finer shades of analysis). One illustration of
this, to the Civil Service eye, is that commentators habitually underrate the extent
to which the patterns and styles of Parliamentary behaviour shape how
Departments do their business. I start, then, with the Parliamentary aspect, and
in particular the House of Commons.
The most notable structural change in that change-resistant institution has
been the establishment of permanent Select Committees to &dquo;mark&dquo; each of the
main Departments. They have varied in attitude, energy and expertise.
Conventions are still developing about their relationships with the executive,
amid occasional skirmishings over (in shorthand) how far they should or could
27
take on, in the British environment, the activism of a US Congressional
Committee. Should they have access to the internal workings and papers of
Government? Have ready power to compel the attendance of witnesses of their
own choice? Have stronger staff support for research and briefing? Involve
themselves as participants &dquo;on stage&dquo; in policy formation, not just as subsequent
critics in the stalls? Settled answers to these contested questions have yet to
emerge. Given however that there always is (and ought to be) an adversarial
element in Committee dealings with Departments, the answers will influence both
the scale of the effort imposed upon Departments and the patterns of responsive
behaviour which emerge. They will affect, for example, the extent to which
officials, in their dealings with the Committees, find themselves under close
instructions from Ministers concerned with political handling in the Chamber and
the media. So far, however, the main consequences for working patterns within
Government (I do not here seek to evaluate the substantive contribution of the
Committees) have been to hone the presentational skills of officials - especially
now that microphone heightens the dividends of good and the penalties of bad
performance - and to increase workloads in some key areas. This last is a
consequence which officials should not, and mostly do not, present or regard as a
diversion of effort; it is a proper and important aspect of public business. But the
fact of extra demand upon resources, often naturally in areas already stretched by
the same topicality that attracts a Committee, should be recognised.
The Public Accounts Committee holds a distinctive place in officialdom’s
cosmology/demonology, with its combination of support from a large
investigative arm (the National Audit Office) having special rights of access to
papers, and a pattern that the witness to be grilled is usually a Department’s most
senior official, the Permanent Secretary. The shadow of the PAC looms large
throughout Departmental business, and changes in its activity or style matter
correspondingly. The early 1980s saw a statutory broadening of the NAO’s remit
(and so of the PAC’s effective purview) to cover any &dquo;value-for-money&dquo; issue.
As with the Departmental Select Committees, other sides had learning to do.
VFM
audit requires its own skills, and shrewd judgement about what sort and size
of subject to take on - reasonable ingenuity can attach a VFM label to almost any
question. The NAO made a mistake or two in building its experience.
Departments for their part took time to learn how best - for example by avoiding
narrowly-defensive behaviour - to reap the benefits in identification of weakness
and stimulus towards remedy. The temptation towards defensiveness depends not
only upon the NAO’s approach to writing reports but also upon the PAC’s
approach to examination on them. In this regard the TV camera made an
occasional difference, given the temptations it can place before MPs; but the
impact was mostly less than I had expected. There had however increasingly
emerged a more basic issue - certain to loom larger in the future - on which PAC
practice, because of its leverage over Departmental business, may materially
affect...
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