Cheap talk or costly commitment? Leader statements and the implementation of civil war peace agreements
| Author | Deniz Cil,Alyssa K Prorok |
| DOI | 10.1177/00223433211037130 |
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Cheap talk or costly commitment? Leader
statements and the implementation
of civil war peace agreements
Alyssa K Prorok
1
Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Deniz Cil
Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland
Abstract
This article examines how leaders affect the implementation of peace agreements. It argues that implementation is
more likely when leaders have publicly committed to peace because public commitments tie leaders’ hands, making it
costly to back down from peaceful promises. This effect is hypothesized to hold even under conditions that make
implementation costly: when implementing difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when implementation
is unreciprocated. These expectations are tested using novel data from the IPAD dataset on the implementation of
peace agreements between 1989 and 2014 and on public statements by state and rebel leaders. Results show that
governments and rebel groups whose leaders have publicly committed to peace are significantly more likely to make
progress toward implementation. This effect holds for difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high, and when
implementation is unreciprocated. These findings highlight the importance of leaders’ political will for successful
implementation of peace agreements and sustainable peace.
Keywords
civil war, implementation, leaders, peace agreement
Introduction
The 1994 Lusaka Protocol was designed to end civil war
between government forces and UNITA rebels in
Angola. Months after the signing, however, uncertainty
over the rebels’ commitment to peace remained. US
special representative Paul Hare repeatedly urged
UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi to make a public statement
committing to Lusaka. In January 1995, Hare urged
Savimbi to ‘speak publicly in support of the Lusaka Pro-
tocol’ (Hare, 1998: 75). A month later, Hare argued that
a ‘clear cut endorsement [ ...] was still needed to remove
any lingering doubts [ ...] about UNITA’s commitment
to the peace process’ (Hare, 1998: 77). Even after
UNITA took steps to improve peacekeepers’ access to
UNITA-held territory in late March, Hare continued to
stress the importance of a public commitment. Hare
recounts: ‘I asked Savimbi to make a clear public state-
ment in support of the Lusaka Protocol. [ ...] I said
these steps would go a long way toward removing uncer-
tainties about UNITA’s commitment to the peace pro-
cess’ (Hare, 1998: 80–81).
Hare’s repeated efforts to extract a public commit-
ment from Savimbi are, at first glance, puzzling. UNITA
issued an official communique
´endorsing Lusaka after its
February party congress and granted peacekeepers access
to UNITA territory in March. Both actions, arguably,
are more costly signals of UNITA’s commitment to
peace than a simple statement by the leader. Yet
1
Authors listed reverse-alphabetically. Equal authorship implied.
Corresponding author:
aprorok@illinois.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(3) 409–424
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211037130
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extracting a public endorsement remained a top priority
for actors involved in Lusaka’s implementation.
Why should leaders’ statements matter, given that
they could simply be ‘cheap talk’? We argue leaders’
public statements adopting a pro-peace stance generate
costly commitments that influence the success of peace
agreement implementation. Public pro-peace statements
tie leaders’ hands, generating audience costs that incen-
tivize implementation. As a result, groups whose leaders
have publicly committed to peace are more likely to
make progress on implementation, even when imple-
menting difficult provisions, when spoiler risk is high,
and when implementation is unreciprocated.
We test these expectations using original data on rebel
and state leaders and implementation of peace agree-
ments between 1989 and 2014. Empirical results show
that governments and re bels are more likely to ma ke
progress on implementation when leaders have publicly
committed to peace. This effect holds across multiple
measures, while addressing the potential endogeneity
of leaders’ statements, and for implementation of diffi-
cult provisions and in risky environments.
This article makes several contributions to existing
literature. While scholars recognize that implementation
is critical to sustainable peace, few quantitative studies
have examined determinants of implementation. Those
that have, furthermore, tend to focus on structural con-
ditions or characteristics of the implementation process,
treating combatants as unitary actors and ignoring the
role played by leaders. This study advances quantitative
research by demonstrating that leaders’ public commit-
ments can help ameliorate commitment problems dur-
ing implementation. It also helps bridge the gap between
quantitative and qualitative research, the latter of which
focuses more on the role leaders play in implementation.
This study also advances quantitative work by disag-
gregating implementation by actor. Conceptualizing
implementation in this way brings quantitativework more
in line with the realities of how peace processes unfold.
Empirically, we introduce the Implementation of Peace
Agreements Dataset (IPAD), which provides actor-
specific, disaggregated information on implementation.
Finally, while leaders’ statements might appear to be
cheap talk, they receive considerable attention from third
parties, the media, and domestic audiences. This study
advances our understanding of the politics surrounding
implementation by examining how leaders’ public state-
ments matter, and providing an explanation for why
mediators and other international actors so commonly
fixate on them. Leaders’ commitments are a political tool
that can facilitate (or undermine ) progress, with clear
policy implications. Hare’s repeated pleas for Savimbi
to publicly commit to Lusaka in early 1995 make sense
when viewed in this light. Public commitments are an
important indicator of political will, and, all else equal,
political will matters.
Literature
Researchers have shown that implementation is key to
preventing conflict recurrence and achieving sustainable
peace (Cil, 2016; Hoddie & Hartzell, 2003; Jarstad &
Nilsson, 2008; Joshi & Quinn, 2017; Joshi, Melander &
Quinn, 2017).
Relatively few quantitative studies examine how and
why implementation proceeds, though qualitative
research offers insights into the process. For example,
more flexible implementation processes offer opportuni-
ties to strengthen weak agreements (Lyons, 2016), and
state capacity and relative power appear important to
implementation (DeRouen et al., 2010; Kirschner &
von Stein, 2009). Finally, Stedman, Rothchild& Cousens
(2002) suggest that the difficulty of the implementation
environmentand the willingness of third partiesto provide
resources affect implementat ion success.
Much of this literature focuses on structural condi-
tions and conflict-level drivers of implementation. As
such, it overlooks potentially important variation in
implementation that our study captures by accounting
for the role of leaders in facilitating or thwarting imple-
mentation. Qualitative research recognizes that ‘leaders
are crucial to the peacemaking process’ (Rosler, 2016:
64; see also Gormley-Heenan, 2007), but it is limited to
a narrow set of conflicts, and focuses primarily on how
leaders influence followers, rather than the reverse.
We demonstrate that leaders play an important role in
a broad set of cases, highlighting the importance of
accountability. Because leaders are accountable to their
constituents during peace processes, their pro-peace
rhetoric generates audience costs that incentivize imple-
mentation. Leader’s public commitments certainly are
not the only factor driving implementation. They likely
cannot replace structural factors like capacity-building
and past implementation success. However, public com-
mitments are an important indicator of political will,
helping us zero in on the politics of implementation.
We provide a clear logic for why third parties, the media,
and domestic audiences pay attention to leaders’ public
statements and why international mediators often spend
considerable energy trying to elicit public commitments
from leaders.
410 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 59(3)
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