Chiang Kai-Shek's Intervention in Indian Politics
| DOI | 10.1177/004711787700500504 |
| Date | 01 April 1977 |
| Published date | 01 April 1977 |
| Author | J.E. Williams |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
49
CHIANG
KAI-SHEK’S
INTERVENTION
IN
INDIAN
POLITICS
AN
EPISODE
IN
SINO-BRITISH
RELATIONS
FEBRUARY -
SEPTEMBER
1942
By
J.
E.
WILLIAMS
As
the
Japanese
armies
advanced
relentlessly
across
South-East
Asia
towards
the
frontiers
of
India,
Britain’s
major
allies
in
Asia
became
increasingly
anxious
about
the
political
scene
in
the
sub-
continent.
To
the
Chinese
and
the
Americans,
India’s
contribution
to
the
war
effort
appeared
to
be
somewhat
half-hearted
and
this
they
attributed
to
Britain’s
refusal
to
grant
immediate
political
concessions
to
the
Congress
Party.
It
seemed
abundantly
clear
to
Washington
and
Chunking
that
the
Indians
could
not
be
expected
to
fight
with
spirit
and
resolution
unless
they
had
something
to
fight
for.
The
deteriorating
military
situation
in
the
spring
and
summer
of
1942
prompted
the
United
States
to
press
this
view
on
London,
while
Chiang
Kai-shek
went
a
step
further
and
intervened
on
two
occasions
in
Indian
politics.
Roosevelt’s
unsolicited
advice
was
certainly
not
well
received
in
London,
and
it
is
not
an
exaggeration
to
say
that
Winston
Churchill
and
his
ministers
thought
it
an
impertinence
for
the
Chinese
leader
to
tell
them
how
to
run
the
British
Empire.
Never-
theless,
these
two
instances
of
Chinese
meddling
in
Indian
politics
and
the
British
response
are
an
interesting
episode
in
themselves
and
they
throw
a
flood
of
light
on
Sino-British
relations
in
general.
CHINESE
DISILLUSIONMENT
WITH
BRITAIN
Britain’s
relations
with
the
Chinese
government
early
in
1942
were
not
particularly
cordial.
Despite
their
common
concern
to
defeat the
Japanese,
the
war
actually
reinforced
old
prejudices
and
suspicions
on
both
sides
and
brought
into
sharper
focus
their
conflicting
long
term
interests
in
Asia.
From
the
very
beginning
it
was
evident
that
they
had
conflicting
views
on
the
kind
of
Asia
that
should
emerge
after
the
cessation
of
hostilities.
50
In
the
first
few
months
of
1942,
reports
from
British
diplomats
in
Chungking
constantly
referred
to
China’s
low
morale
and
to
Chinese
recriminations
against
Britain’s
conduct
of
the
war.
Ambassador
Sir
Clark
Kerr
on
28th
January
described
the
Chinese
as
being
’down
in
the
dumps.
More
so
indeed,
than
I
have
ever
known
them.’
They
had,
of
course,
good
reason
to
be
despondent;
the
war
was
going
badly
for
the
Allies,
Malaya
was
rapidly
being
overrun;
Singapore
was
in
dire
peril
and
the
invasion
of
Burma
had
already
begun
thereby
posing
a
threat
to
land
communications
between
India
and
China.
The
deep
shock
that
these
major
reverses
produced
in
Chungking
was
described
by
Major
!v1il1ar,
the
British
Assitant
Military
Attach6,
in
a
report
to
London:
The
Chinese
firmly
believed
that
as
soon
as
the
Japanese
were
faced
with
a
first
class
power
they
would
be
defeated.
The
Japanese
successes
have
come
as
a
rude
shock ...
Our
prestige,
which
from
a
military
point
of
view
has
always
stood
very
low
in
China,
has
suffered
considerably ...
The
bubble
of
British
superiority,
on
which
we
have
floated
along
so
comfort-
ably
since
the
last
war,
has
collapsed,
at
least
as
far
as
the
Chinese
are
concerned.
That
Britain’s
prestige
was
sinking
fast
was
confirmed
by
Sir
Clark
Kerr’s
successor.
Soon
after
taking
up
his
appointment,
Sir
Horace
Seymour
warned
the
Foreign
Oice
on
26
March
that
’Criticism
of
British
efforts
in
the
Pacific
war
is
practically
universal.
Coupled
with
this,
feeling
is
growing
that
one
result
of
the
war
may
well
be
the
disappearance,
or
at
any
rate
great
re-
duction,
of
European
and
American
domination
in
Far
Eastern
affairs
and
that
the
new
China
may
hope
to
take
her
place
as
leader
of
Asia.’
A
Counsellor
at
Rangoon,
R.
M.
MacDougall,
who
had
just
returned
from
Chungking,
reported
on
how
deep-seated
and
perverse
was
the
anti-British
feeling,
and
how
it
was
promoted
by
Americans
in
the
Chinese
capital:
According
to
informed
British
non-official
opinion
anti-
British
feeling
in
Chungking
is
more
acute
than
at
any
other
time
or
place
in
China
within
recent
years.
They
ascribe
it
firstly
to
the
strong
pro-German
elements
in
China,
particularly
in
Military
circles ...
Another
element
is
the
attitude
till
recently
of
a
pretty
large
fraction
of
the
American
community
though
they
are
now
less
vocal
on
the
subject ...
The
third
element
is
the
continuous
stream
of
Japanese
and
Wang-Ching-
Wei
propaganda.
Most
important
of
all
was
the
feeble
way
in
which
we
had
allowed
Hong
Kong
to
fall
and
allowed
the
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