Chief Inspector F. B. Nolan v Patricia Marion Cooper and Samuel Ernest Cooper
| Jurisdiction | Northern Ireland |
| Judge | District Judge (MC) Meehan |
| Judgment Date | 30 June 2003 |
| Neutral Citation | [2003] NIMag 1 |
| Court | Magistrates' Court (Northern Ireland) |
| Date | 30 June 2003 |
1
Mag 25
Application for Stay by reason of breach of reasonable time requirement under Art 6(1) of the
Convention on Human Rights; whether the relevant period commenced only upon service of the
summonses; whether a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy.
F. B. NOLAN
CHIEF INSPECTOR
Complainant
PATRICIA MARION COOPER
Defendant
F. B. NOLAN
CHIEF INSPECTOR
Complainant
SAMUEL ERNEST COOPER
Defendant
Petty Sessions District of
Newry and Mourne
County Court Division of
Armagh and South Down
Ruling on Defendants' Applications;
To Stay Proceedings on grounds of breach of Ri ght to Trial Within a
Reasonable Time
On 10th December 2002 I handed down my written reasons for dismissing
the applications by both defendants for a stay of these proceedings on the
grounds of abuse of process at common law. In summary, I had
determined that there was such abuse of process, in the sense that there had
been a manipulation of the process, more particularly by delaying the issue
and service of the summons against each defendant. However, this could
not be treated, in law, as an abuse arising from an antecedent act, so that
the remedy of a stay for an abuse occasioning delay was not available where
it was not contended that the prospect of a fair trial had thereby been
prejudiced.
In accordance with the agreement previously reached between the parties,
one was then to move on, in those circumstances, to consider separately the
further application by each defendant that there had been a breach of the
right to a hearing within a reasonable time, pursuant to Article 6(1) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as now incorporated into our domestic law under
The Human Rights Act 1998, and which warranted a stay.
2
The proper approach to such an enquiry was enunciated at para. 52 of
Bingham, L’s judgment in Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow v Watson and
Burrows; H.M. Advocate v JK Privy Council1, delivered on 29th January
2002. I do not propose to reiterate it at length here.2 For present purposes
I restate the preliminary ruling contained in my written reasons of 10th
December 20023 in this matter;
Given that, in addition, these prosecutions have yet to come to trial,
getting on for 3 years since detection, there is, on the face of it, and
without detailed enquiry, a real cause for concern that the right of each
Defendant to a trial within a reasonable time may have been abrogated.
It was not conceded by the prosecution that the relevant period, the subject
of this enquiry, constituted a breach of the reasonable time requirement.
To echo the words of Campbell, LJ in R v Fegan & Ors. (unreported
judgment of 26th June 2001)4,
Before I make any decision as to the reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings against Mr Fegan and Mr Rooney I shall give the Crown an
opportunity to provide such further information as may be advised on
the progress of the investigation.
It was also contended on behalf of the prosecution that the relevant period,
for the purposes of the reasonable-time enquiry, was the service of the
summons on each defendant, on or about 16th August 2001. In R v Murphy
(unreported judgment of 20th December 2001), Gillen, J reasoned5;
I am not persuaded that the reasoning in this regard in Attorney General’s
Reference (No 2)6 is flawed. Each case will depend upon its own facts and
whilst it is easy to envisage a not insubstantial number of exceptions to
the general rule, I believe that in the ordinary way interrogation or
interview of a suspect by itself will not amount to a charging of that
suspect for the purpose of the reasonable time requirement in art 6(1). In
the present case the defendant was interviewed in the Republic of
Ireland with reference to offences which that jurisdiction might wish to
prefer against him. In the event he was not charged in the Republic of
Ireland arising out of these matters. I see nothing in these circumstances
that would bring these interviews within the definition of an official
notification that he had committed a criminal offence at least within
Northern Ireland. In my view the logical time in this instance when that
1 Procurator Fiscal, Linlithgow v Watson and Burrows; H.M. Advocate v JK Privy Council
DRA No. 1 of 2001
2 In part because I have already done so in the written reasons I gave in a case of Police v
Caskey at Bangor Magistrates’ Court on 22nd August 2002, at p.p. 2 and 3.
3 At p. 2.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
5 At p. 4
6 The Attorney’s General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2001), (2001) 1WLR 1869 at paras. 10, 11 and
13
3
definition could arise was when he was charged in March 1998 shortly
after his interviews in February 1998. In the event that I am correct in
this conclusion, the relevant period to be considered therefore is that
between March 1998 and February 2001, which is a period of 2 years and
11 months.
Campbell, LJ also considered the issue in R v Fegan & Ors. (2001). His
treatment7 makes it even more apparent that the point falls to be
determined upon the facts of each particular case. The learned Judge
agreed that Fegan and Rooney were “charged” when their homes and
business premises were searched. Likewise, McCullough was to be treated
as “charged” when he knew he was being investigated when Crown counsel
so informed a judge, not when he was subsequently arrested for the first
time. On the other hand, Patricia McCullough was not “charged” when her
husband was arrested, since, on the facts, there was no implication that she
was also being investigated for commission of a serious criminal offence.
In her case (alone), that only happened when she was arrested on 23rd
March 1999.
In the instant case, police attended at Crieve House, Monkshill on 15th
March 2000. In light of what they saw there, and acting on information
that Mrs Patricia Cooper was the registered herd keeper, Const. Dougan
attended at her residence on the evening of that same day. He introduced
himself and made her aware of the nature of his enquiries and the
discussion at that point seemed to focus upon the need to dispose of the
carcasses. Nonetheless, it is apparent from his tendered Statement dated
27th July 20008 that the “… nature of my enquiries…” must have included
intimation to Mrs. Copper that she was suspected of having committed
criminal offences in relation to the presence of animal carcasses on the land
at Crieve House, since he went on to record that he pointed out to Mrs.
Cooper that she was under an obligation to dispose of the carcasses
forthwith “… and that failure to do so was a further offence” (my emphasis).
In any event, on 16th June 2000, he instigated a formal interview of Mrs.
Copper, in the presence of her solicitor, at Bangor RUC Station (as it then
was), for the purposes of which he administered a formal caution to her, in
accordance with Art. 3 of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order
1998.
7 At pp. 5 et sequi.
8 It will be recalled that all parties were in agreement that I was free to address the written
documents tendered with the summonses for the purposes of my enquiries, disregarding the fact
that the defendants had objected to such documents being tendered in evidence at any trial on
the charges without need of formal proof.
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