China’s diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East: the quest for a great-power role in the region
| Published date | 01 June 2017 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117815619664 |
| Author | Yoram Evron |
| Date | 01 June 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815619664
International Relations
2017, Vol. 31(2) 125 –144
© The Author(s) 2015
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117815619664
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China’s diplomatic initiatives
in the Middle East: the quest
for a great-power role in the
region
Yoram Evron
University of Haifa
Abstract
Since the early 2010s, there have been mounting calls in China to intensify its role in the Middle
East. But seeing the region as highly turbulent, Beijing seems to restrain its political involvement
there. So what role does China actually strive for in the Middle East? To answer this question,
the article first presents China’s discourse on its future role in the region; next, it analyzes
China’s involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three
diplomatic initiatives it has made concerning these issues. The argument here is that China strives
to be part of major processes in the Middle East and attempts to advance its values and interests
there, but in a unique pattern of big-power involvement in the region, it tries to achieve this
without intensive investment of political, economic, and military resources.
Keywords
China, China foreign policy, Israel, Middle East, Palestine, Syria
Introduction
Following the outburst of the Arab Spring events in 2010, a vibrant discussion erupted in
China about the need for a policy change on the Middle East.1 The general argument was
that considering its growing dependence on Middle Eastern energy sources, and in view
of the tectonic political changes in the region, China should abandon its hitherto passive
approach to the Middle East. Instead, it should start acting vigorously to secure its inter-
ests there – not only the economic domain, but in the political and strategic areas too.2
Corresponding author:
Yoram Evron, Department of Asian Studies, University of Haifa, 199 Aba Khoushy Ave. Mount Carmel,
Haifa 3498838, Israel.
Email: yoramevr@netvision.net.il
619664IRE0010.1177/0047117815619664International RelationsEvron
research-article2015
Article
126 International Relations 31(2)
These calls came after a decade of expanding interactions between China and the
Middle East and a growing sense that China’s economic development and national secu-
rity were coming to depend on that region. Since 1993, the Middle East has become a
crucial source of China’s imported energy, hence for its economic development. With the
growth of its oil consumption, the share of imported oil has increased as well, and as of
2015, it constitutes up to 60 percent of the country’s consumption. The Middle East is by
far China’s largest source of imported oil: in 2013, it amounted to 52 percent of its
imported oil, and it is expected to remain over 50 percent in the foreseeable future.3
Securing the oil supply from Middle East, as well as the region’s political and military
stability, has become a matter of vital interest for China. The expansion of radical Islamic
groups in the region following the Arab Spring events and their impact on separatist
Uyghur movements in China have added another dimension of strategic importance to
the region, as has the concentration of multiple non-aligned states there.4 Beijing’s deci-
sion in 2009 to start playing a world power role led it to expand its activity among devel-
oping countries – its natural allies (or followers) as it sees them.5 The Middle East, a
central stage of collision between developed and developing countries, obviously
required its attention.
And indeed, during the first decade of the twenty-first century, China started to expand
its political connections with the Middle East, including evident efforts to strengthen its
network of bilateral relations there. It exchanged more high-level visits with the region’s
states, established the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, and formed various mili-
tary links such as joint exercises, high-level exchange visits, and naval visits.6 It also
became involved in major crises in the region. Through its permanent membership of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), it participated in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear
activities and the Syrian civil war. And, as a possible indication of its intention to enhance
its political role in the region, it initiated various diplomatic proposals for the settlement
of the region’s conflicts, including the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, the Syrian civil war,
and the South Sudan crisis.7
Nevertheless, viewing Middle Eastern politics as turbulent, violent, and highly influ-
enced by religious sentiment,8 China seems to be attempting to circumscribe its political
involvement there. It has not taken a leading role in settling or mediating in the above
conflicts, and its diplomatic initiatives have largely been passed over. Above all, China
continues to adhere to its claim that being a developing country, it cannot allocate signifi-
cant resources to address the Middle East’s problems.9
In view of the inconsistency between China’s discourse and deeds concerning its
involvement in the Middle East, the question to be addressed here is the degree to which
China actually intends to bolster its political role in the region. More specifically, does it
intend to invest significant economic, political, or military resources to shape regional
developments or acquire political assets? And by extension, what regional role does it
assign itself? To address these questions, this article first presents the major themes of
China’s discourse on its future role in the Middle East; next, it analyzes China’s involve-
ment in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the Syrian civil war, focusing on three diplo-
matic initiatives it has made since the early 2010s: the 2013 four-point proposal for
settlement of the Palestinian question, the 2014 five-point proposal on a ceasefire in
Gaza, and the 2012 four-point proposal for resolving the civil war in Syria.
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