China’s foreign and security policy institutions and decision-making under Xi Jinping
| Date | 01 May 2021 |
| Published date | 01 May 2021 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1369148120974881 |
| Author | Jean-Pierre Cabestan |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue: Chinese foreign policy: A Xi change? |
https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120974881
The British Journal of Politics and
International Relations
2021, Vol. 23(2) 319 –336
© The Author(s) 2020
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1369148120974881
journals.sagepub.com/home/bpi
China’s foreign and security
policy institutions and decision-
making under Xi Jinping
Jean-Pierre Cabestan
Abstract
Power concentration in the hands of Xi Jinping, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary, can
be interpreted not only as a reaction to the power fragmentation and the intra-party factionalism
that developed under his predecessor, but also as a way to strengthen and stabilise China’s
authoritarian polity. In the realm of foreign and security policy, it can also be understood as the
result of China’s awareness of both the growing transnational security risks that it is facing and the
need to better address the new international tasks and responsibilities it needs to fulfil as a great
power. Since 2012, Xi has embarked on sweeping institutional reforms that have contributed to
centralising and better coordinating foreign and security decision-making. Yet, although more
integrated, China’s authoritarian system has remained fragmented, including in the realm of foreign
and security policy, an area where decision-making processes are still highly opaque.
Keywords
authoritarian polity, China, Chinese Communist Party, decision-making, foreign policy, integrated
fragmentation, leading small groups, security policy, Xi Jinping
Introduction
Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2012 has resulted in a greater concentration of power at
the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership (Heilmann and Stepan, 2016).
Xi has also created new institutions that have taken away responsibilities from existing
ones, moving more decision-making processes from the government to the Party appara-
tus or to his own hands. These changes have also significantly affected agencies dealing
with foreign and security policy.
Kenneth Lieberthal famously coined the term ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ to
describe the competition and, as a resulting lack of coordination, among bureaucracies
which all report to and are controlled by the CCP leadership (Lieberthal, 1992). Andrew
Nathan (1973) and Lowell Dittmer (1995) among others have explored how factionalism
and patron-client relations can affect decision-making. In other words, although it is
Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon, Hong Kong
Corresponding author:
Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
Email: cabestan@hkbu.edu.hk
974881BPI0010.1177/1369148120974881The British Journal of Politics and International RelationsCabestan
research-article2020
Special Issue Article
320 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23(2)
obsessed with speaking with one voice and covering up its own divisions, the CCP has
never been a monolith.
In order to keep under control the risks of fragmentation, the CCP has set up under the
Central Committee (CC) leading small groups (LSGs, Zhonggong zhongyang lingdao
xiaozu). These LSGs are designed to better coordinate and regulate the actions of all the
bureaucracies which are represented in them, usually by their top leader (Tsai and Zhou,
2019). Although under Mao Zedong Party LSGs already existed, since the late 1970s
their number and their role have increased (Miller, 2008; Zhou, 2010). Xi’s institutional
reforms have consolidated this trend.
To better comprehend the rationale of Xi’s reforms in the realm of foreign and security,
this article operationalises the concept of ‘integrated fragmentation’ developed by Kjeld
Erik Brødsgaard and applied to the relationship between China’s large state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) and the Party (2012, 2017). For him, the CCP Nomenklatura (or leaders’
appointment) system and the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) have contributed to mitigating, up to a point, the
risks of fragmentation between the Party and the SOEs. There are obvious differences
with Brødsgaard’s case study since in the area of foreign and security policy, nearly all
institutions involved are part of what I will call the ‘Party-state apparatus’, including the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Nonetheless, this concept helps better understanding
the instruments of, as well as the obstacles to, organisational integration in China’s
authoritarian polity.
It is today rather easy to identify the Party and state institutions involved in foreign and
security decision-making. The difficulty in the Chinese case is to evaluate the respective
weight of these various power loci and their leading officials as well as the nature of the
debates that they hold and the relationship that they entertain among each other. Do they
follow the same objectives and policies? Are there tensions among them and even contra-
dictions between their respective actions? Do personal relations among leaders matter?
The very opacity of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) political system forbids any
researcher to apply the methods developed for example by Graham Allison (1999) to
comprehend the ‘essence of decision’ in the United States government at the time of the
Cuban missile crisis. Yet, as in democracies and open societies, in authoritarian and rather
closed political systems, it remains possible, on the basis of a careful reading of primary
sources, leaked information, and interviews, to identify bureaucratic interests and ten-
sions and, as a result, propose an institutional analysis of decision-making processes
(Barnett, 1985; Goldgeier, 2018).
While remaining modest about what we know, particularly regarding the role of LSGs
and personal relations among leaders, this task can help open the Party-state’s ‘black box’
and better comprehend China’s foreign and security policy decision-making processes
(Halperin, 2006). It can also help with evaluating the influence of fragmentation and even
factionalism on these processes. In other words, in order to understand Xi’s reforms in the
context of authoritarian politics, this article combines institutional analysis and evalua-
tion of leaders’ behaviours and inter-personal relations. More specifically, it articulates
the changes that have occurred among Party, state and military institutions to leading
personnel’s reshuffles and promotions.
In this article, I attempt to assess the major changes introduced by Xi Jinping. I will
first explain the rationale behind the power concentration that has taken place since 2012.
Then, for clarity, I will present the major institutional and personnel changes affecting the
various agencies involved in foreign and security decision-making. While this article
To continue reading
Request your trial