Choice, Responsibility and Equality
| Author | Alexander Kaufman |
| Published date | 01 December 2004 |
| Date | 01 December 2004 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00510.x |
| Subject Matter | Original Article |
Choice, Responsibility and Equality
Alexander Kaufman
University of Georgia
Should responsibility for disadvantage constitute a matter of fundamental concern for egalitari-
ans? An important strand of contemporary egalitarian thought – a strand that Elizabeth Ander-
son calls ‘luck equality’ – argues that responsibility for disadvantage should constitute a decisive
concern for any acceptable egalitarian theory. Luck equality therefore requires a defensible account
of responsibility; and disagreements regarding the nature and extent of responsibility for disad-
vantage have become central in the egalitarian literature. Anderson argues that luck equality’s
focus on responsibility reflects a misunderstanding of the point of equality. If persuasive, her argu-
ment would establish that egalitarian thought may do without a defensible account of responsi-
bility. Although she fails to establish this claim, she does argue persuasively that luck equality
employs the notion of responsibility overly strenuously. Her critique suggests that egalitarians must
qualify their acceptance of the precept that ‘genuine choice excuses otherwise unacceptable
inequalities’.
Should responsibility for disadvantage constitute a matter of fundamental concern
for egalitarians? An important strand of contemporary egalitarian thought – a
strand that Elizabeth Anderson calls ‘luck equality’ – argues that responsibility for
disadvantage should constitute a decisive concern for any acceptable egalitarian
theory. In particular, theories of luck equality argue that ‘genuine choice excuses
otherwise unacceptable inequalities’ (Cohen, 1989, p. 931, emphasis added).
Luck equality’s treatment of responsibility is, in fact, a strand of a more general
strategy designed to implement the egalitarian intuition that the distribution of
social goods should not be determined by factors that are ‘arbitrary from a moral
perspective’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 64). In order to implement this intuition, luck equal-
ity distinguishes between inequalities that result from persons’ circumstances – and
are therefore determined by arbitrary influences – and inequalities that result from
persons’ choices. Luck equality argues that it is reasonable to hold persons respon-
sible for inequalities that result from their choices, but not for those that result
from their circumstances. Ronald Dworkin’s argument that a just distribution of
goods should be endowment-insensitive, but ambition-sensitive, offers an inter-
pretation of this line of reasoning; he describes the auction device that constitutes
his theory’s principal analytic tool as designed to ‘attack two distinct foci of arbi-
trariness and possible unfairness’ (2000, p. 68).1G. A. Cohen’s argument that
egalitarianism should aim primarily to compensate for disadvantage that does not
flow from persons’ choices is developed in the context of an ‘immanent
critique’ of Dworkin’s argument (1989, p. 906).
A philosophical position that places such weight on the distinction between chance
and choice, however, requires a defensible account of genuine choice; and dis-
agreements regarding the nature of such an account have become central in the
POLITICAL STUDIES: 2004 VOL 52, 819–836
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
820 ALEXANDER KAUFMAN
egalitarian literature, particularly in the ongoing controversy between Dworkin
and Cohen. Dworkin argues that persons should be held responsible for inequali-
ties that flow from voluntary choices, whereas Cohen asserts that egalitarian theory
must distinguish between choices grounded in preferences that are acquired vol-
untarily and those that reflect the influence of habituation or other non-voluntary
processes. The question is clearly fundamental to the luck egalitarian agenda; but
as Matt Matravers observes, political philosophy will ‘be on hold for some time’ if
we must wait for a defensible account of genuine choice before addressing the basic
questions of egalitarian justice (2002, p. 560).
Anderson (1999a) has offered a devastating and an influential critique of luck
equality, a critique that presents an apparently plausible approach to resolving egal-
itarian quandaries relating to the issue of genuine choice. The point of equality,
she argues, is to create social conditions within which persons stand in relations
of equality, not to require paternalistic or patronizing judgments regarding the rela-
tion between genuine choice and responsibility for disadvantage. Her approach
suggests, therefore, that the need to specify a defensible account of genuine choice
need not land egalitarian philosophy ‘in the morass of the free will problem’
(Cohen, 1989, p. 934).
I argue that Anderson’s approach is only partially successful. Her arguments do
not establish that an acceptable conception of equality may do without a
defensible account of genuine choice. Nor does she demonstrate that a focus on
responsibility distorts fundamental egalitarian intuitions. She does, however, offer
a persuasive case for reconsidering the status of responsibility among egalitarian
concerns. Although her arguments do not establish that a central concern with
responsibility is inappropriate for an egalitarian theory, they do suggest that the
proper range of this concern in an egalitarian theory is limited.
I first evaluate Anderson’s argument that luck equality’s concern with responsibil-
ity distorts basic egalitarian intuitions. After rejecting this argument, I argue that
she does justify the more modest claim that luck equality’s account of responsi-
bility exaggerates both the force of that concern and its range of application.
This conclusion has significant implications for the current political debate con-
cerning the standard of responsibility to which public policy should hold the
disadvantaged.
Luck Equality, Option Luck and Brute Luck
Theories of luck equality argue that persons are responsible for the foreseeable con-
sequences of free choices grounded in genuine preferences. If persons have chosen
the conditions that have caused their disadvantage on the basis of preferences that
can reasonably be viewed as genuine, the luck egalitarian views the disadvantage
as the product of bad option luck and recognizes no basis for compensatory inter-
vention. If, however, disadvantage is not the product of free choices grounded in
genuine preferences, luck equality views the case as one of bad brute luck and
recognizes a basis for compensatory redress. Thus, the two categories of brute luck
and option luck orient the luck egalitarian analysis.
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