Choosing tactics: The efficacy of violence and nonviolence in self-determination disputes
| Author | Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433221145961 |
| Published date | 01 January 2023 |
| Date | 01 January 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Choosing tactics: The efficacy of violence
and nonviolence in self-determination disputes
Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham
Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland and Peace Research Institute Oslo
Abstract
Disputes over self-determination (SD) have led to many civil wars, and a primary alternative, nonviolent campaign, is
rarely successful in this context. Yet, while secession is rare, these movements often achieve more limited successes in the
form of concessions from the state. This article provides a new assessment of the efficacy of different tactics – violent,
nonviolent and conventional political action. It advances an argument that nonviolent tactics can help SD movements to
generate indirect pressure on states that contributes to movement success, including greater autonomy. Nonviolence is
used to garner attention from international actors using a human rights frame for their cause. International actors that are
receptive to these human rights narratives then incentivize concessions for the SD movements and dis-incentivize
repression. This happens through a variety of means, such as public shaming of the host state and withholding inter-
governmental organization membership. Statistical analysis of violent and nonviolent tactics in SD movements shows that
nonviolence can be effective in successfully obtaining concessions. Movements that use nonviolence are twice as likely to
see concessions in any given year compared to those that just make demands but do not use nonviolence or violence. The
effect of nonviolence is slightly larger than that of violence, which is also associated an increased chance of concession.
Keywords
nonviolence, secession, self-determination, tactics
Introduction
Disputes over self-determination (SD) have led to many
long running, destructive civil wars. From South Sudan
to Sri Lanka to the former Yugoslavia, movements
seeking greater self-rule have employed violence to
achieve their aims. Not surprisingly, much of the scho-
larly work on self-determination centres on violent seces-
sionism. Moreover, the most comprehensive study
comparing violence to nonviolence (Chenoweth & Ste-
phan, 2011) shows that mass nonviolent campaigns are
generally more effective than civil war, but not in seces-
sionist or ethnic disputes (Manekin & Mitts, 2021).
Indeed, mass nonviolence is rarely used in SD disputes,
including disputes with and without secessionist aims
(Cunningham, 2013). This characterization of SD
movements as inherently or necessarily violent, however,
is largely the product of how we have con ceptualized
nonviolence and success in quantitative studies of these
conflict processes. In this article, I advance a broader
view of both the use of ‘nonviolent’ tactics and how
we should evaluate their ‘success.’ In doing so, I examine
the question of when and how nonviolence can be effec-
tive in SD disputes, where mass nonviolent mobilization
is uncommon.
In contrast to mass movements for regime change,
nonviolent resistance among self- determination move-
ments is usually smaller scale and more sporadically
employed. While only about 4% of SD movements use
mass nonviolence,
1
nearly 75% use smaller-scale nonvio-
lent tactics, approximately the same percentage that use
Corresponding author:
kgcunnin@umd.edu
1
Mass nonviolent campaigns are events with at least 1000 participants
and constitute a continuous push for some aim. Nonviolent tactics are
planned events of disobedience and disruption, but do not need to
include large nos. of people nor occur in the context of a continuous
‘campaign’ (Sharp 1973). For example, we see sit-ins and protests
used outside the context of mass campaigns.
Journal of Peace Research
2023, Vol. 60(1) 124–140
ªThe Author(s) 2023
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433221145961
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violence against the state at low levels.
2
For example, the
Berber movement in Algeria employed a general strike in
2003, Turkish Cypriots used small scale protests in the
1980s, as did the Rohingya in Myanmar in the 1990s.
While protests can be quite large and can develop into
mass campaigns, many acts of nonviolence have limited
participants and occur more sporadically.
Secession, the creation of a new legally recognized
state, is often used to measure ‘success’ in studies of the
efficacy of different tactics.
3
However, secession alone is
an insufficient measure of success in the context of self-
determination and secessionist struggles.
4
While mass
campaigns often mobilize for radical aims (regime
change being the most common), the goals of SD dis-
putes are typically more circumscribed. Only about 35%
of SD disputes ever experience a period of unified
demands for independence, while the vast majority make
diverse claims over their status within the state (such as
for greater taxation power or a regional parliament). The
‘successes’ of SD movements mirror this trend. Few
movements achieve secession, but many of them succeed
in gaining concessions that improve their status within
their host state and afford them greater autonomy (Cun-
ningham, 2014). The successes that SD movements
achieve are a diverse set of accommodations, spanning
cultural accommodation to substantial political reforms.
This article focuses on SD politics for three reasons.
First, these disputes are an area in which the use of
nonviolence has been underestimated and (to a large
extent) previously unmeasured. Second, these disputes
are present in over 75 countries and constitute a persis-
tent challenge for states.
5
Finally, SD disputes provide
somewhat of a ‘hard case’ for evaluating the effect of
nonviolence in contrast to other tactics. SD claims go
to the heart of the issue of sovereignty.
6
These disputes
have the potential to fundamentally undermine existing
states, which Butt (2018) argues creates the strongest
incentives for states to vigorously repress and fight off
SD challengers (see also Walter, 2009).
The central question in this study is under what con-
ditions are different tactics effective in SD disputes?
Starting with a reconceptualization of both nonviolence
and success in SD politics, I build on existing work on
nonviolent tactics and social movements more broadly to
argue that small scale nonviolence (for example, sit-ins,
boycotts and hunger strikes) can be effective for SD
movements to gain concessions from the state.
7
When
SD movements use nonviolence, this enables them to
more successfully frame their claims as broader human
rights issues, rather than as fundamental rights to
national self-determination. This framing helps the
movements to elicit international solidarity and pressure.
This pressure on their host state can lead to concessions
to the movement (i.e. success) by altering the relative
costs of repressing or accommodating the movement.
8
This mechanism of international solidarity and pressure
can substitute for mass mobilization in SD movements
that generally have mass participation deficits (as they
often represent small and bounded populations). The
argument advanced here offers an alternative, but com-
plementary, pathway for effective nonviolence compared
to existing studies rooted in mass participation (Sharp,
1973; DeNardo, 1985; Ackerman & Duvall, 2001;
Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).
I examine this argument using data on the extent to
which SD movements employ different tactics over
time, including the use of violence and nonviolence
in these disputes, as well as conventional political
action. To capture the success of movements employing
different tactics, I use data on concessions made to these
movements over the issue of self-determination (includ-
ing a wide range of accommodation related to the status
of the group). By focusing on autonomy-related policy
concessions (the key issue in these disputes), I can
examine the efficacy of different tactics despite the fact
that the vast majority of SD movements never achieve
secession, thus offering a more thorough examination of
tactical efficacy in these disputes. I find that violence is
2
About 44% of self-determination movements engage in civil war
(Uppsala Conflict Data Program), while about 75% of disputes
include some use of violence against the state (including attacks
within and outside the civil war context).
3
Chenoweth & Stephan (2011) focus on campaigns with maximal
goals.
4
A similar debate has occurred in the literature on terrorism (see
Thomas, 2014). See also Abrams (2006) on the failure of terrorism
to achieve policy aims.
5
Others suggest an even higher no. of affected countries (see
Sambanis, Germann & Scha
¨del, 2018).
6
Movement leaders and members make decisions wit h an eye to
success. If they are accurate in their assessment of state responses to
tactics, we run the risk that we will only see nonviolence when it is
sure to work (i.e. a selection problem). Yet, state responses appear
stochastic enough that we can assume there are significant
mismatches between what movements think will happen and what
occurs in many instances. I return to this point in the analysis.
7
See Hallward Masullo, & Mouly (2017) on the need to expand our
conceptualization of nonviolence.
8
This is akin to the ‘boomerang effect’ that Keck & Sikkink (1998)
suggest is the mechanism through which transnational advocacy
networks apply pressure on governments.
Cunningham 125
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