Cicero's Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective
| Author | Jeannette Money,George Tsebelis |
| Published date | 01 January 1992 |
| DOI | 10.1177/019251219201300103 |
| Date | 01 January 1992 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
25-
Cicero’s
Puzzle:
Upper
House
Power
in
Comparative
Perspective
JEANNETTE
MONEY
AND
GEORGE
TSEBELIS
ABSTRACT.
This
paper
analyzes
the
legislative
influence
of
upper
houses
in
bicameral
legislatures.
We
note
the
existence
of
two
separate
analytical
traditions,
one
focusing
on
upper
house
expertise,
the
other
on
upper
house
power.
We
hypothesize
that
because
legislative
analyses
of
unitary
systems
focus
primarily
on
the
"efficient"
aspects
of
upper
house
input,
they
tend
to
emphasize
senatorial
expertise.
On
the
other
hand,
because
legislative
analyses
of federal
systems
acknowledge
the
"political"
dimensions
of upper
house
power,
they
focus
on
senatorial
power.
We
reunite
the
two
analytical
traditions
and
provide
a
unique
model
of
upper
house
political
power
in
both
federal
and
unitary
systems.
For
those
states
using
a
navette,
or
shuttle,
system,
we
model
senatorial
power
as
a
function of
the
institutional
features
of
the
system:
stopping
rules,
where
a
bill
is
introduced,
and
the
number
of
shuttles
between
houses
are
systematically
related
to
upper
house
power.
Potestas
in
populo,
auctoritas
in
Senatu.
--C IC ERO ~
The
distinction
[between
authority
and
power]
is
still
appropriate
today ... moderation,
quality
of
work,
tenacity,
the
sense
of
conciliation,
independence
from
the
political
balance
of forces,
are
highly
valued
traits
[of
upper
houses].
The
moral
authority
of
upper
houses
is
often
the
inverse
of
an
excessive
extension
of
their
powers.
-MASTIAS
AND
GRANGt2
Bicameralism
is
a
common
institutional
feature
of
many
modern
legislatures.
However,
unlike
unicameral
systems
where
the
locus
of
decision
making
is
well
defined,
in
bicameral
legislatures
the
power
of
each
house
to
influence
legislation
is
less
clear.
In
this
paper,
we
propose
an
answer
to
what
we
label
&dquo;Cicero’s
puzzle&dquo;:
why
does
the
upper
house
have
&dquo;authority&dquo;
even
when
the
lower
house
is
granted
26
the
power
of
decision?
In
contemporary
terminology,
we
model
the
balance
of
power
between
the
two
houses.
However,
rather
than
resorting
to
factors
such
as
moderation,
independence,
considered
opinion
or
constructive
criticism,
as
the
second
epigraph
suggests,
we
offer
an
institutional
answer:
the
power
of
the
upper
house
is
a
function
of
the
institutional
features
of
the
political
system.
In
bicameral
legislatures,
the
interaction
between
the
two
houses
is
crucial
to
understanding
legislative
outcomes.
Examination
of
the
legislative
process
in
only
one
house
ignores
strategic
aspects
of
legislation
generated
by
the
existence
of
the
second
house.
Consider
the
following,
not
so
hypothetical,
example:
Members
of
Parliament
of
the
popularly
elected
house
can
vote
in
favor
of
a
particularly
popular
measure
which
they
disapprove,
knowing
that
the
non-directly
elected
second
house
will
vote
it
down;
if
mutual
agreement
is
required,
the
legislation
will
be
aborted.
In
this
case,
observation
of voting
patterns
in
the
lower
house
alone
would
be
completely
misleading.
There
are
few
comparative
analyses
of
the
relative
power
of
houses
in
bicameral
legislatures.3
One
reason
for
the
paucity
of cross-national
studies
is
the
contemporary
division
between
the
United
States
and
European
analyses
of
upper
houses.
Second
houses
in
federal
political
systems,
such
as
in
the
United
States,
are
generally
regarded
as
legitimate
and
powerful,
whereas
in
the
predominantly
unitary
political
systems
of Europe,
second
houses
are
viewed
as
weak
and
redundant.
This
dichotomy
is
widely
acknowledged.
Roskin
(1986:
9)
claims
that
&dquo;two
chambers
are
necessary
in
federal
systems
to
represent
the
component
parts,
but
they
are
often
extra
baggage
in
unitary
systems.&dquo;
Similarly,
Trivelli
(1975:
33-34),
remarks
that
&dquo;the
idea
of
protecting
difFerent
interests
in
unitary
systems
has
tended
to
decline.
In
federal
systems,
on
the
other
hand,
the
legitimacy
of
second
houses
remains
strong....No
one
contests
that,
in
federal
legislatures,
there
are
two
distinct
forces,
each
of
which
should
be
represented;
on
the
one
hand,
the
population
of
the
entire
country,
and
on
the
other,
more
or
less
autonomous
political
units
which
together
form
the
federation.&dquo;
The
main
source
of
this
cleavage
in
the
literature
arises
from
the
contemporary
role
allocated
to
second
houses
in
unitary
and
federal
political
systems.
Initially,
upper
houses
in
both
types
of
political
systems
fulfilled
similar
roles:
&dquo;political,&dquo;
or
the
representation
of
specific
interests,
and
&dquo;efficient,&dquo;
or
the
improvement
and
continuity
of
legislation.4
In
unitary
systems,
as
the
source
of
legitimacy
of
upper
house
power
-
the
representation
of
landed,
commercial
and
industrial
wealth
-
declined,
the
existence
of
an
upper
house
was
questioned.
In
some
cases,
upper
houses
were
dissolved
permanently
as
in
Denmark
and
Sweden.
Others
saw
their
institutional
power
curtailed
as
in
the
United
Kingdom
and
France.
Legislative
analyses
in
these
countries
tend
to
be
couched
in
terms
of
Mastias
and
Grange’s
perspective:
the
upper
house
plays
an
eflicient
role
and
relies
on
the
special
wisdom
and
expertise
of
its
members.
Influence
is
independent
of,
or
even
inversely
proportional
to,
the
upper
house’s
institutional
power. In
federal
systems,
in
contrast,
the
legitimacy
of
the
upper
house
-
representing
territorial
interests
-
has
remained
strong.
As
a
result,
legislative
studies
emphasize
the
&dquo;political&dquo;
role
of
the
upper
house
and
analyze
the
relative
power
of
the
two
houses.
The
US
system
of
conference
committees,
for
example,
has
received
considerable
attention.’
We
argue
that
upper
houses
in
both
unitary
and
federal
political
systems
continue
to
play
both
political
and
efficient
roles,
and
that
a
single
model
is
applicable.
Because
the
&dquo;navette
system&dquo;
(English:
&dquo;shuttle&dquo;),
in
conjunction
with
various
stopping
rules,
is
the
most
frequently
employed
system
of
resolving
disagreements,
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