Civil death: An examination of ex-felon disenfranchisement and reintegration
| Author | Bryan Lee Miller,Joseph F Spillane |
| Published date | 01 October 2012 |
| Date | 01 October 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1177/1462474512452513 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Punishment & Society
14(4) 402–428
!The Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/1462474512452513
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Article
Civil death: An
examination of ex-felon
disenfranchisement and
reintegration
Bryan Lee Miller
Georgia Southern University, USA
Joseph F Spillane
University of Florida, USA
Abstract
In the state of Florida, when someone is found guilty of a felony crime they forfeit the
right to vote, serve on a jury, and run for elected office. These civil rights are lost
regardless of whether they are sentenced to incarceration, probation, or released into
the community. The process to regain these civil rights can be difficult, time consuming,
and impossible for some. Research on prisoner reentry suggests that the loss of these
civil rights constitutes a barrier to full citizenship that may impede the process of
community reintegration. This research employs 54 semi-structured interviews with
ex-felons who have lost the right to vote to better understand the meaning former
offenders attribute to the loss of their civil rights and to assess the impact this may
have on staying out of trouble. Findings from this study suggest that for a significant
number of ex-offenders the loss of voting rights poses an obstacle to successful
reintegration.
Keywords
disenfranchisement, ex-felon, reentry, reintegration, voting
Corresponding author:
Bryan Lee Miller, PhD, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Georgia Southern University, 2219
Carroll Building, PO Box 8101, Statesboro, GA 30460-8101, USA.
Email: bryanmiller@georgiasouthern.edu
Introduction
The United States is unique among democratic nations in how it handles the right
to vote for those convicted of criminal offenses. The United States is distinguished
by both the scope of criminal disenfranchisement laws and the scale of their appli-
cation (Ewald and Rottinghaus, 2009). Internationally, several studies perceive a
move toward ‘reenfranchising’ prisoners (Ewald and Rottinghaus, 2009; Ispahani,
2006; Uggen and Inderbitzin, 2009). Uggen et al. (2009) noted that 40 of 105
nations surveyed allowed prisoners to vote while incarcerated, while 65 nations
have some form of disenfranchisement provisions. In the United States, only two
states (Maine and Vermont) allow current prisoners to vote, while the majority of
states prohibit offenders from voting while incarcerated or while under probation,
or forms of community supervision like parole. Florida is one of 13 states that
disenfranchise either all or some former offenders even after the completion of their
sentences (Uggen and Inderbitzin, 2009). The United States disenfranchises more
non-institutionalized offenders than any other democratic country (Ispahani,
2006).
1
The massive scale of criminal disenfranchisement has brought with it a large,
growing, and extremely valuable literature exploring the electoral, philosophical,
and legal dimensions of the issue. From a political perspective, particularly after
the close presidential elections of 2000 and 2004, a growing number of people
became concerned about the electoral consequences of disenfranchisement policies.
Manza and Uggen (2006) have examined these impacts, and their findings suggest
that both of these presidential elections, along with a number of congressional and
state elections, would have been decided differently had felons (or ex-felons) been
permitted to vote. Manza et al. (2004) noted the growing discourse on the disen-
franchisement of criminals and evaluated public opinion finding that 80 percent of
the public favor granting civil liberties for ex-felons. Beyond the electoral conse-
quences, political scientists have argued that voting is a mechanism for expressing
fundamental ideas of social belonging and civic participation (Rahn et al., 1999).
Criminal disenfranchisement raises many philosophical questions over the
meaning of citizenship in a modern democratic nation, and the conflicting perspec-
tives of the qualified franchise and universal suffrage. Lippke (2001: 575) notes:
that there are some moderately persuasive arguments for disenfranchising serious
offenders for certain periods of time. Yet these argument do not support disenfran-
chising all serious offenders; nor do they necessarily support disenfranchising serious
offenders for periods of time that coincide with the duration of the other sanctions
appropriately visited upon them.
Other assessments have reached similar conclusions regarding the incompatibil-
ity of blanket civic exclusions for criminal offenders (Kalt, 2004; Schall, 2006).
Much valuable work examines the duration of disenfranchisement and its dis-
proportionate effect on minorities (Burch, 2007; Dugree-Pearson, 2002; Goldman,
2004; Harvey, 1994; Keller, 2006; Wheelock, 2005). Hull (2006) evaluated the effect
Miller and Spillane 403
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