Class voting or economic voting? Electoral support for chavismo (1998–2015)
| Published date | 01 June 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121992671 |
| Author | Robert Bonifácio,João Carlos Amoroso Botelho |
| Date | 01 June 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Original Research Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512121992671
International Political Science Review
2023, Vol. 44(3) 334 –353
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512121992671
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Class voting or economic voting?
Electoral support for chavismo
(1998–2015)
Robert Bonifácio and João Carlos Amoroso Botelho
Federal University of Goiás, Brazil
Abstract
This article analyses electoral support for chavismo in Venezuela from 1998 to 2015, comprising five
presidential elections (1998, 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2013) and the legislative election of 2015. Drawing on
a comprehensive historical series, the findings contradict an influential body of literature on Venezuelan
politics and show that economic voting prevailed during the analysed period. In relation to class voting, the
analysis does not find a monotonic vote, in which the poor supported Hugo Chávez and his allies, whereas
the rich rejected them, at each election. The direction of associations between these classes and voting for
chavismo varied over the investigated period. The findings have important implications for Latin American
politics, showing the relevance of economic factors for the left turn in regional politics and helping explain
the recent losses of leftist parties in presidential elections.
Keywords
Electoral behaviour, Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, left turn, Latin America
Introduction
During approximately two decades of chavismo supremacy in Venezuela, much has been written
to explain the electoral support given to Hugo Chávez and his political allies since his first elec-
tion as president in 1998. A common explanation relies on class voting, according to which the
poor are more likely to vote for chavismo, whereas the rich are more likely to vote against it.
Drawing on a comprehensive historical data series, this article contradicts this claim and shows
that voters’ assessment of the national economy plays a more important role as an explanatory
factor of the vote for chavismo over the analysed period. At the regional level, this finding rein-
forces the relevance of economic factors for the left turn in Latin America and helps explain the
recent difficulties of leftist presidents trying to hold office in the region. The article uses opinion
poll data to analyse five presidential elections (1998, 2000, 2006, 2012, and 2013) and one legis-
lative election (2015) in Venezuela1.
Corresponding author:
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais, Federal University of Goiás, Campus II, Goiânia, Goiás
74001-970, Brazil.
Email: joaocarlosbotelho@hotmail.com
992671IPS0010.1177/0192512121992671International Political Science ReviewBonifácio and Botelho
research-article2021
Original Research Article
Bonifácio and Botelho 335
Although class voting manifestations have been observed in Venezuela throughout the analysed
period, this was not a monotonic vote, in which the poor voted for chavismo, whereas the rich
rejected it, at each election. As expected by class voting theory, the lower and upper classes, respec-
tively, supported and rejected chavista candidates in the 2006 and 2012 elections. On the other
hand, in contrast to theoretical projections, these classes showed positive chances of voting for
chavismo in 1998, 2000, and 2013, and negative chances of doing so in 2015, when opposition
parties secured their main electoral victory since Chávez’s rise to power2.
Economic voting is the most noticeable and sustainable trend in all rounds of data to explain the
electoral support given to chavismo. It means that voters have rewarded or punished elected offi-
cials based on the country’s economic performance. Those who exhibited a positive perception of
the national economy supported Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, at the polls. This find-
ing helps explain the difficulties faced by Maduro in holding office amid the deteriorating econ-
omy in Venezuela and waves of demonstrations demanding his resignation.
Before presenting the statistical tests that led to the findings, it is necessary to contextualize the
chavista period and to interrogate theories of electoral behaviour and the left turn in Latin America.
The next section focuses on the political context in Venezuela since Chávez’s rise to power. The
third and fourth sections present theoretical discussions of class voting and economic voting, asso-
ciate them with the Venezuelan and the Latin American contexts and lead to the development of
specific propositions. Following an explanation of the methodological procedures, the data col-
lected are analysed. The article ends with some conclusions about the findings and expands on the
implications for politics across Latin America.
Overview of the political–electoral dispute under chavismo
Hugo Chávez, a military officer with no prior experience of electoral politics, was president of
Venezuela from 1999 to 2013, winning four consecutive elections (1998, 2000, 2006, and 2012).
During this period, he adopted a personalistic form of governing and built a political structure rooted
in loyalty to him. Chávez died in office of cancer in 2013 and was replaced by Nicolás Maduro, who
was vice-president at the time and won the presidential election that year. The article refers to chav-
ismo as the political group in power, whether under the leadership of Chávez or Maduro.
This historical section encompasses the period from the first presidential election won by
Chávez in 1998 to 2015, when the opposition parties came together in a coalition called Mesa de
la Unidad Democrática (MUD) and secured the majority of seats in the national assembly for the
first time since the inaugural election for this unicameral legislature held in 2000. Thus, a divided
government was established.
This had already happened to some extent during Chávez’s first year as president in 1999. At
that time, the traditional parties Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política
Electoral Independiente (COPEI) and new opposition forces had the majority of seats in the then
lower house of the legislature. The division between the executive and legislature had its origin in
the separate holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively in November and
December 1998 (Molina, 2002). Chávez came from behind in the presidential run, which was ini-
tially led by a former Miss Universe.
Once in power, Chávez called a referendum on the formation of a constituent assembly to
draft a new constitution and obtained a favourable result. He secured victories in the constituent
elections and in the referendum on the draft constitution, also in 1999. The constituent assem-
bly decided to terminate the activities performed by deputies and senators elected in 1998 and
appointed a provisional commission to carry out legislative duties until the general election in
July 2000.
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