Climate change, rainfall, and social conflict in Africa
| Published date | 01 January 2012 |
| Author | Idean Salehyan,Cullen S Hendrix |
| Date | 01 January 2012 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343311426165 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Climate change, rainfall, and
social conflict in Africa
Cullen S Hendrix
Department of Government, College of William & Mary
Idean Salehyan
Department of Political Science, University of North Texas
Abstract
Much of the debate over the security implications of climate change revolves around whether changing weather
patterns will lead to future conflict. This article addresses whether deviations from normal rainfall patterns affect
the propensity for individuals and groups to engage in disruptive activities such as demonstrations, riots, strikes,
communal conflict, and anti-government violence. In contrast to much of the environmental security literature,
it uses a much broader definition of conflict that includes, but is not limited to, organized rebellion. Using a new
database of over 6,000 instances of social conflict over 20 years – the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)
– it examines the effect of deviations from normal rainfall patterns on various types of conflict. The results indicate
that rainfall variability has a significant effect on both large-scale and smaller-scale instances of political conflict. Rain-
fall correlates with civil war and insurgency, although wetter years are more likely to suffer from violent events.
Extreme deviations in rainfall – particularly dry and wet years – are associated positively with all types of political
conflict, though the relationship is strongest with respect to violent events, which are more responsive to abundant
than scarce rainfall. By looking at a broader spectrum of social conflict, rather than limiting the analysis to civil war,
we demonstrate a robust relationship between environmental shocks and unrest.
Keywords
Africa, conflict, environment, protest, rainfall, rioting
While water is essential for human consumption,
agriculture, and industry, a significant share of the
world’s poor lacks access to clean water, irrigation,
sanitation facilities, and hydroelectric capacity. This is
especially true in sub-Saharan Africa, where according
to the United Nations World Water Development
Report (UNESCO, 2009), 340 million people lack
access to clean drinking water, 4% of annual renewable
flows are stored (compared with 70–90% in developed
countries), and less than 5% of cultivated areas are
equipped for irrigation. Thus, many countries depend
directly on rainfall for crops, livestock, and human
consumption, meaning variable access to a critical
resource. Flooding and droughts can destroy livelihoods,
undermine macroeconomic growth, and place strains on
government revenues.
The IPCC warns: ‘Climate change and variability are
likely to impose additional pressures on water availabil-
ity, water accessibility and water demand in Africa’
(Boko et al., 2007: 435). Erratic rainfall, longer dry
periods, and more intense rainfall events are expected
to place increased pressure on African agriculture and
economies. While some areas of Africa are expected to
become drier, others – such as East Africa – are projected
Corresponding author:
chendrix@wm.edu
Journal of Peace Research
49(1) 35–50
ªThe Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343311426165
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ESEARCH
journal of
to become wetter as the climate changes. Most
importantly, traditional planting and harvest cycles are
likely to be disrupted.
In this article, we examine the relationship between
rainfall, water, and sociopolitical unrest in Africa. We are
interested in how deviations from normal rainfall
patterns – which are linked to droughts and floods –
affect political behavior and the propensity of individuals
and groups to engage in disruptive activities such as
demonstrations, riots, strikes, communal conflict, and
anti-government violence. Does the weather influence
political disturbances and social conflict? If so, what
forms of conflict are most likely? This topic is pressing
as the process of global climate change accelerates,
potentially making rainfall more unpredictable and
severe weather events more common (IPCC, 2007: 49).
Possible links between climate change and conflict
have gained considerable attention, including at the
United Nations General Assembly (UN, 2009). Some
have blamed climatic conditions for particular civil wars,
such as Darfur (Faris, 2009). While we eschew simple,
direct casual pathways from water resources to civil war
and avoid mono-causal explanations for political vio-
lence, we argue that water shocks may lead to social con-
flict via their effects on resource competition, poor
macroeconomic outcomes, and reduced state capacity.
However, in contrast to many other studies, we do not
necessarily expect full-blown civil wars to emerge from
water scarcity.
1
Launching an insurgency entails signifi-
cant start-up costs, planning, and organizational capac-
ity. Moreover, governments must be unable or
unwilling to accommodate or repress opposition groups
for armed rebellions to emerge. However, grievances and
competition over water resources can generate significant
social conflict in ways that do not require the level of
organization and funding needed for sustaining an
insurgency.
Using a new database of over 6,000 instances of social
conflict in Africa – the Social Conflict in Africa Database
(SCAD)–weexaminetheeffectofdeviationsfrom
normal rainfall patterns on various types of conflict.
Using data on 47 countries from 1990 to 2008, we find
that rainfall shocks have a significant effect on both
large-scale and smaller-scale instances of political con-
flict. We find that rainfall correlates with civil conflict
and insurgency, although wetter years are more likely
to suffer from violent events. Extreme deviations in
rainfall – particularly dry and wet years – are associated
with all types of social conflict (violent and nonviolent,
government-targeted and non/government-targeted),
though the relationship is strongest with respect to
violent events, which are more responsive to abundant
rather than scarce rainfall.
In the next section, we develop a theory of how
rainfall and water resources affect political stability, and
we present our hypotheses. We then describe SCAD,
operationalizations of key variables, and our methods.
Following this we discuss our results. In the final section,
we offer some concluding remarks on the implications of
the findings for theories of violent social mobilization.
Rainfall deviations and conflict
The last decade has seen interest in the relationship
between natural resources and conflict. One body of
literature argues that the abundance of natural resources –
particularly minerals and oil – can lead to political
violence (Bannon & Collier, 1999; de Soysa, 2002;
Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Ross, 2004; Humphreys,
2005; Lujala, 2009). Such resources can be looted to
fund rebel organizations, resources can lead to friction
over their allocation, and dependence on primary
commodities can weaken state capacity (Hendrix,
2010). Others scholars have argued that the scarcity
of vital resources – particularly water and food – can
lead to conflict (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1996;
Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Maxwell & Reuveny,
2000; Homer-Dixon, 2001; see Le Billon, 2001 for
a review of both literatures). Resource scarcity is argued
to generate grievances and fuel conflict over their distribu-
tion. These literatures do not necessarily contradict
each other, as the former focuses on the availability of
lucrative commodities such as gemstones and oil while
the latter focuses on basic needs.
With growing concern over the human implications
of climate change, many scholars have undertaken quan-
titative tests of links between environmental scarcity,
natural disasters, and civil war. Researchers have tended
to look at land and water resources to determine whether
or not there is a direct link between scarcity and war
(Hauge & Ellingsen, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 2001;
Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004; Hendrix & Glaser,
2007; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007; Theisen, 2008; Koubi
et al., 2012). Yet, there is hardly a consensus about causal
relationships, and findings have been weak and inconsis-
tent (Salehyan, 2008). In a related body of work, studies
1
Others have also noted that human security problems and other
forms of unrest, short of international and civil war, may result
from environmental factors and resource scarcity (see Barnett &
Adger, 2007; Wolf, 1998).
36 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 49(1)
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