Climate clashes? Weather variability, land pressure, and organized violence in Kenya, 1989–2004
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343311425842 |
| Date | 01 January 2012 |
| Published date | 01 January 2012 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Climate clashes? Weather variability,
land pressure, and organized violence
in Kenya, 1989–2004
Ole Magnus Theisen
Norwegian University of Science and Technology & Centre for the Study of Civil War, PRIO
Abstract
The evidence of coming climate change has generated catastrophe-like statements of a future where a warmer, wetter,
and wilder climate leads to a surge in migrant streams and gives rise to new wars. Although highly popular in policy
circles, few of these claims are based on systematic evidence. Using a most-likely case design on Kenya 1989–2004,
with new geographically disaggregated data on armed conflicts below the common civil conflict level, this study finds
that climatic factors do influence the risk of conflicts and violent events. The effect is opposite to what should be
expected from much of the international relations literature; rather, it supports the observations made by recent
anthropological studies. Years with below average rainfall tend to have a peaceful effect on the following year and
less robustly so for the current year as well. Little support is found for the notion that scarcity of farmland fuels vio-
lence in itself or in election years. More densely populated areas – not areas with a low land per capita ratio – run a
higher risk of conflict. Election years systematically see more violence, however. The findings therefore support the
notion that large-scale intergroup violence is driven by calculation and political gain rather than desperate scrambles
for scarce land, pasture, and water resources.
Keywords
climate change, elections, Kenya, land, resource scarcity, violence
Introduction
There is one issue I want to raise, general to all. Water.
Water for livestock, water for people. They go into con-
flict because water is not available. If we had water we
could start sorting out the conflict. A lot of fighting is
over water availability. (Elder from the Jie group in
Uganda, cited in Mkutu, 2008: 14)
The threat from climate change is serious ... more fre-
quent drought and crop failures breed hunger and con-
flict. (Obama, 2009)
The two statements above, one from a person of a mar-
ginalized group, the other from arguably the most pow-
erful person in the world, both posit a clear link between
resource scarcity and conflict. They also fit nicely into
the popular narrative on sub-Saharan Africa as a despe-
rately poor continent without sufficient food, water, or
livelihoods for its growing population. In a nightmarish
account of Africa, Kaplan (1994) pointed to high rates of
population growth and allegedly unsustainable resource
utilization as two main factors behind the development
failure of several African states. This so-called ‘crisis-nar-
rative’ (Roe, 1995) has also been used to explain why
civil or intergroup violence breaks out and why civil vio-
lence is more prevalent in less developed countries. Add
to this the recent debate on the future consequences of
climate change, and this neo-Malthusian explanation
should be as relevant as ever. For instance, a recent report
by Safeworld (2009: i) argues that in the 2009 drought
in East Africa:
Corresponding author:
ole.magnus.theisen@svt.ntnu.no
Journal of Peace Research
49(1) 81–96
ªThe Author(s) 2012
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343311425842
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There seemed a clear correlation between the scarcity of
natural resources resulting from the drought, and vio-
lent conflict. In the context of growing awareness and
concern about global warming, this inevitably prompts
the question as to whether Kenya’s prolonged drought
was a consequence of climate change – and to what
extent therefore climate change will lead to an increase
in violent resource-based conflicts.
Several scholars also attribute intergroup violence in
Kenya to scarce renewable resources. Dietz (1987) and
Mkutu (2008) claim a strong link between drought and
pastoral violence, whereas Kahl (2006) suggests that vio-
lence in the central parts of Kenya in election periods is
heavily influenced by competition over scarce farmland.
However, the link between scarce resources and conflict
is contested in general (Peluso & Watts, 2001; de Soysa,
2002), as well as in the particular case of Kenya (Witsen-
burg & Adano, 2009).
In the following I will first demonstrate why Kenya is
a critical case in analyzing the potential links between
scarce renewable resources and violent conflict. There-
after, I review the existing research on resource scarcity
and armed conflict in general and on Kenya in particular.
Subsequently, I outline my research design before I pres-
ent and discuss my findings. My findings indicate that
relatively dry years tend to have a peaceful effect on the
following year. Little support is found for the notion that
scarcity of farmland fuels violence in itself or in election
years, but an election by itself increases risk. More den-
sely populated areas run a higher risk of conflict, but this
is not due to pressure on cropland; rather, it is likely to be
driven by other mechanisms that put densely populated
areas at risk.
Why study Kenya?
In a region where four out of five neighboring countries
have experienced some of the longest and bloodiest civil
conflicts in Africa, Kenya’s civil peace offers at first
glance a peaceful contrast. Except for the brief violence
associated with the failed 1982 coup attempt and the
irredentist Shifta war in the North-Eastern Province
immediately following independence, Kenya’s post-
independence period has been free of insurgent move-
ments. However, the country has seen several quite
bloody episodes of interethnic conflicts and state repres-
sion, the latter mostly taking the form of groups support-
ing the incumbent attacking civilians suspected of
supporting the opposition. The lack of a large-scale civil
war in Kenya eliminates the possibility that interethnic
violence is simply a spillover from a civil war, for instance
as a power-struggle along ethnic lines within a rebel
movement. Other factors not directly related to civil war
dynamics are likely to be at center stage. Of course, this
does not mean that civil conflict dynamics are absent,
since conflicts in its neighboring countries are frequently
seen as influencing violence in Kenya (Mkutu, 2008).
This lack of an insurgent movement is the first reason for
using Kenya as a suitable case when studying the links
between scarce resources and conflict.
Kenya’s sluggish economic growth has been partly
blamed on its population growth rate and the lack of
available farmland to occupy the growing population
(Markakis, 1998: 95). Whereas the economically most
productive regions were peaceful until 1991, the north-
ern and eastern districts have seen persistent intergroup
conflicts since the pre-colonial era (Kimenyi & Ndung’u,
2005). Most of the time this has taken the form of one
group fighting another with the occasional involvement
of state forces.
1
With the announcement of multi-party
elections upcoming in 1992, this pattern changed as
interethnic violence flared up in Bungoma and Trans-
Nzoia districts in late 1991. Unrest spread across Rift
Valley Province as prominent politicians within the
regime incited, trained, and paid KANU supporters to
attack opposition supporters and claim the land as theirs
(Roessler, 2005). The violence subsided slowly from
1993 to 1995, only to resurface on a smaller scale on the
coast before the 1997 elections. While the 2002 elections
were calm, the period leading up to and immediately fol-
lowing the 2007 elections saw renewed bloodshed in
central parts of Kenya. Politicized land conflicts, alleg-
edly over disputed land-resettlement schemes in Mt
Elgon district, led to the formation of the Sabaot Land
Defense Force, which committed several atrocities in the
2006–08 period (Simiyu, 2008). Thus, it has been
argued that much interethnic violence is driven partly
by land scarcity, as Kenya’s economy and growing pop-
ulation is highly dependent on agricultural produce.
The violence in Kenya’s drylands is also frequently
explained as stemming from conflicts over other scarce
resources, such as pasture and water sources, an explana-
tion refueled by the debate on climate changes. Several
anthropologists and economists claim a strong link
between drought and conflict (e.g. Burke et al., 2009;
1
In the notable cases of the 1980 Bulla Kartasi Estate massacre
(Garissa) and the 1984 Wagalla massacre in which several hundred
Degodia Somalis are said to have been slain on Moi’s order, and
the violence associated with the de-facto annexation of the Ilemi tri-
angle (now Kibish division in Turkana) in 1988, the state was the
main agent of the violence and killed a large number of civilians.
82 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 49(1)
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