Co-Developing the FSX Fighter: The Domestic Calculus of International Co-Operation
| DOI | 10.1177/002070209204700204 |
| Author | Debora Spar |
| Date | 01 June 1992 |
| Published date | 01 June 1992 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
DEBORA
SPAR
Co-developing
the
FSX
fighter:
The
domestic calculus
of
international
co-operation
THE
PUZZLE
OF
THE
FSX
In
November i988
the
United
States
and
Japan
formally
agreed
to
co-operate
in
the
development
and
production
of
a
new
breed
of
aircraft,
a
sophisticated
fighter
dubbed
the
FSX
(Fighter
Sup-
port
Experimental). Under the
memorandum
of
understanding
that
was
signed,
the
two
sides
were
to
collaborate
on
all
aspects
of
the
aircraft's
development,
sharing
the
revenues,
the
risks,
and
virtually
all
of
the
technology.
Barring
technical
difficulties,
the
agreement
provided
for
the 'co-development'
of
Japan's
next
gen-
eration
of
fighter
aircraft,
with
production
to
commence
in
1997.
In
many
respects,
the
FSX
agreement
was
a
classic
case
of
co-operation
for
mutual
gain.
The
agreement
promised
to
strengthen
an
alliance
that
both
sides
deemed
critical,
to
enhance
the
security
of
the
Pacific
region,
and
to
provide
both
countries
with
cutting-edge
technology. In
addition,
co-develop-
ment
was
attractive
because
it
was,
to
a
large
extent,
merely
an
extension
of
a
co-operative
relationship
that
had
existed
since
the
end
of
World War
II.'
The
specific
decision
to
co-operate
on
the
FSX
is
not, there-
Assistant
Professor,
Graduate
School
of
Business
Administration, Harvard
University,
Boston,
Massachusetts.
i
Soon
after
the
United
States
dismantled
Japan's
aircraft
industry,
American
firms
began
transferring
technology
to
Japan
and
entering
into
technical
partnerships
with
Japanese
firms.
For
a
description of
some
of
these
early
arrangements,
see
David
C.
Mowery,
Alliance
Politics
and
Economics:
Multinational
Joint
Ventures
in
Commercial Aircraft
(Cambridge
MA:
Ballinger
1987),
esp.
52-6.
International
Journal
XLVIl
spring
1992
266
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
fore,
particularly
surprising
from
a
theoretical point
of
view.
On
the
contrary,
it
might
be
seen
as
entirely
consistent with
the
expectations
of
either
conventional
realist or
liberal
theory.
A
realist,
for
instance,
could
argue
that
military
co-operation
between
the United
States
and
Japan
is
explained
by
their
mutual
desire
to
reduce the
threat
of
a
Soviet
attack.
By
the
same
token,
a
liberal
could
explain
the
decision
in
terms of an
insti-
tutionalized relationship,
a
desire for
mutual
gain,
and
a
reduc-
tion
of
transaction
costs.
In
either
case,
co-operation
on
the
FSX
does
not
pose
a
puzzle.
What
is
entirely puzzling,
however,
is
how
close
the
final
agreement
came
to
being
scuttled. Repeatedly,
various
groups
in
Japan
and
the
United
States
tried
to veto
the
co-development
option
and
replace it
with
a
unilateral
policy. Voicing
their
claims
largely
in
terms
of
national
pride
and
economic
competi-
tiveness,
these
groups
vehemently opposed co-development
and,
in
a
series
of
incidents described
below,
nearly
gained
sufficient
strength
to
topple the
programme.
In
the
end, the
co-operative
option
prevailed,
but
we
are
left
with
two
distinct
questions.
Why
was
the
co-operative
solution
very
nearly
overturned? And
how
did
it
finally
survive?
This
chapter
will
suggest
that
both
questions
can
be
addressed
by
focusing
on
the decision-making
process
and,
in
particular,
on
the
way
in
which
the
situation
was
framed
by
those
involved.
Either
realism
or
liberal institutionalism
can
explain
why
the
decision
to
co-operate
was
in
the
interests,
of
both
par-
ties,
but
neither
can
adequately,
explain
why
this
decision
was
still
so
difficult
to
make.
Standard
theories
of
interest
group
behaviour
and
public
policy
can
help
to
explain
how
co-opera-
tion
was
hampered
by
domestic
battles,
but
they
are
not
wholly
satisfactory
in
explaining
how
relevant
actors perceived
their
interests,
and
why
they
ultimately
accepted the
decision
to
co-
operate.
I
will
argue
that
some
of
the
observations
provided
by
pros-
pect
theory
help
to
fill
these
explanatory
gaps
in
the
story
of
the
Fsx.
More
specifically,
it
appears
that
domestic
groups
chose
to
To continue reading
Request your trial