Coalition Bargaining, Interest Representation and Government Responsiveness
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1983.tb01359.x |
| Author | Michael Laver |
| Published date | 01 December 1983 |
| Date | 01 December 1983 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Political
Studies
(1983),
XXXI,
6501655
Coalition Bargaining, Interest
Representation
and
Government
Responsiveness*
MICHAEL
LAVER
University College, Galway
In a recent article in this journal,
J.
A. Chandler attempts to attack pro-
portional representation on its own ground.’ He asserts that, despite its claims
to do
so,
PR
promotes neither representative nor responsive government. As is
typical with arguments against
PR,
the case rests upon supposed deficiencies
of
coalition government.
The Legislative Representation
of
Discrete Issues
When Chandler argues that ‘in many cases a single-party government can
represent the policy interests
of
electors more efficiently than
a
coalition’,2 it is
important to note he is not talking about the translation of votes cast into seats
gained. His argument is that, when no party gains a majority of votes,
a
single
party legislative majority serves the policy interests
of
electors better than a
legislature which accurately reflects the balance of votes cast. This counter-
intuitive proposition needs to be closely inspected.
Unfortunately,
a
number of quite separate issues are bundled together in the
construction
of
Chandler’s argument. The first confusion concerns the
distinction between issues which he inaccurately labels ‘zero-sum conflicts’
and those which have an ‘all-or-nothing’ or ‘lumpy’ q~ality.~ Zero-sum
conflicts allow no compromise
by definition.
If one side gains ground, another
must have
lost
equal ground. All-or-nothing issues need not be zero-sum.
Both
sides may prefer one
of
two discrete outcomes. If they do not, it is the zero-
sum, rather than the all-or-nothing, character of the issue which is important.
An all-or-nothing issue is only a special case of the range
of
policy problems
which admit
a
discrete number of solutions.
For
such issues compromise
between
solutions is impossible, but compromise over
which
solution is
mutually most acceptable is possible if the issue is not zero-sum in character.
When a discrete issue has only two conceivable outcomes, the argument is
*
Thanks are due to Peter
Morriss
for his helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to this
I
J.
A.
Chandler, ‘The Plurality Vote: A Reappraisal’,
Political Studies,
XXX
(1982), 87-94.
2
Chandler, ‘The Plurality Vote’, p.
90.
3
Chandler, ‘The Plurality Vote’,
p.
89.
journal’s referees
for
their several constructive suggestions.
0032-32 17/83/O4/0650-06/$03
.OO
0
1983
Political Studies
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