Cognitive Structure and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Decision to Talk to the PLO
| Published date | 01 December 2011 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0047117811404580 |
| Author | Guy Ziv |
| Date | 01 December 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International Relations
25(4) 426 –454
© The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0047117811404580
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Article
Cognitive Structure and
Foreign Policy Change:
Israel’s Decision to Talk
to the PLO
Guy Ziv
American University, Washington, DC
Abstract
Rationalist explanations of foreign policy change are underdetermined because they overlook the
decision-makers themselves. Insight from cognitive psychology shows that individuals’ cognitive
structures provide a useful lens through which to understand why some people are more likely
than others to change their core beliefs. Two related cognitive variables – cognitive openness
and cognitive complexity – hold promise for enhancing extant explanations of foreign policy
change. This article assesses the cognitive structure of the three leaders who dominated Israeli
decision-making in the decade leading up to Israel’s dramatic policy change vis-à-vis the PLO
in 1993: Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. The article demonstrates that Peres,
who is found to be the most cognitively open and complex, was quicker to embrace a dialogue
with the PLO than Rabin, while Shamir, who is found to hold the lowest levels of openness and
complexity, rejected this move altogether. Peres, and to a lesser extent Rabin, proved to be more
sensitive to international, regional and domestic changes than Shamir. This case illustrates that
systemic-structural and domestic political factors are necessary, but insufficient, conditions for
foreign policy change. The levels of decision-makers’ cognitive openness and complexity are key
to determining the likelihood that they will change their beliefs on a core policy issue that can,
in turn, lead to foreign policy change. This article thus contributes to our understanding of both
foreign policy change and the process leading up to the historic 1993 agreement between Israel
and the PLO.
Keywords
cognitive psychology, foreign policy change, foreign policy decision-making, Israel, Oslo Accords,
PLO, Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, Yitzhak Shamir
Corresponding author:
Guy Ziv, School of International Service, American University, 4400 Massachusetts Avenue, NW,
Washington DC 20016-8071, USA
Email: ziv@american.edu
404580IREXXX10.1177/0047117811404580International RelationsZiv
Ziv 427
Why do some policymakers change their core beliefs and, in turn, pursue dramatically
different foreign policies, while others adhere rigidly to their long-held positions? Purely
rationalist accounts of foreign policy change tend to focus on geopolitical or domestic
political factors, downplaying the importance of the policymakers themselves. Over the
last decade, a growing number of scholars have posed an important challenge to tradi-
tional theories of international relations by emphasizing the importance of leaders in
affecting political outcomes including major foreign policy changes.1
Cognitive psychologists have shown that individuals’ cognitive structures provide a
lens through which it is possible to explain why some people are more likely than others
to change their core beliefs. Two related variables in particular – cognitive openness and
cognitive complexity – hold promise for enhancing extant explanations of foreign policy
change. Building on the burgeoning literature on the role of cognitive psychology in the
study of foreign policy change, I argue that decision-makers’ cognitive structure plays a
key role in determining their propensity to pursue an alternative foreign policy. I demon-
strate that, while systemic-structural and domestic political factors shape the circum-
stances that facilitate a major foreign policy change, it is decision-makers’ cognitive
structure that determines the likelihood that they will pursue such a change.
For a number of reasons, the road to the first Oslo agreement reached between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993 – the Declaration of Principles
(DOP) – is an appropriate case in which to assess the relative importance of geopolitical,
domestic political, and psychological factors in explaining foreign policy change. First,
it represents one of Israel’s most dramatic foreign policy changes since its establishment.
Second, it is an event that followed major international and regional changes that took
place during the premiership of Yitzhak Shamir, who opposed negotiations with the
PLO. Yitzhak Rabin, who replaced Shamir, eventually opted to support talks with the
PLO. That the geopolitical changes took place under Rabin’s predecessor allows us to
control for systemic-structural factors. Third, the cognitive structural approach enables
us to draw a distinction not only between Shamir and Rabin, but also between the two
Labor Party leaders – Rabin and Shimon Peres – who, while reaching the same conclu-
sion, did so five years apart. Most accounts of Oslo ignore the critical role played by
Peres in securing Rabin’s endorsement of the Oslo negotiations.2 Had it not been for
Peres’s and Rabin’s change of heart – and Peres’s determination – the agreement would
not have come about. This article thus not only demonstrates the theoretical utility of
incorporating insights from cognitive psychology into an improved explanation of for-
eign policy change, it also contributes to our understanding of the process leading up to
the historic 1993 agreement.
Discourse analysis of these leaders’ speeches, published interviews, and memoirs,
coupled with personal interviews with political elites that I have conducted, presents us
with a portrait of each leader’s levels of cognitive openness and complexity, enabling us,
in turn, to draw useful comparisons.3 Peres is found to be the most cognitively open and
complex of the three leaders examined here. Not surprisingly, he was quicker and more
eager to embrace a dialogue with the PLO than Rabin. Shamir is found to hold the lowest
levels of openness and complexity. He resisted any change in Israel’s approach toward
the Palestinians. Indeed, Shamir is often quoted as having famously said that ‘the Arabs
are the same Arabs, and the sea is the same sea’.4
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