Cohen on Nozick: Wilt Chamberlain's Alleged Threat to Freedom
| Published date | 01 November 1981 |
| Date | 01 November 1981 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.1981.tb00053.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Cohen
on
Nozick:
WiZt
C~~e~~ui~~s
AZZeged
Threat
to
Freedom
19
COHEN
ON
NOZICK:
WILT
CHAMBERLAIN'S
ALLEGED
THREAT
TO
FREEDOM
DAVID
GORDON
G,
A.
Cohen's 'Robert Nozick and
Wilt
Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve
Liberty' is the most important Marxist criticism of Nozick. (1) Cohen's aim 'is
only indirectly a critique of Nozick's defense
of
capitalism. its immediate aim
is to refute Nozick's major argument against a rival of capitalism, socialism'
(p.5). In order to refute Nozick, Cohen rightly maintains that
it
is not enough
to demonstrate that socialism is just. 'But: even
if
his (Nozick's) definition
of justice is wrong
.
.
.
he still has a claim against socialism, namely that
however just
it
may be
it
is incompatible with liberty
.
.
It
must also be
proved that he has not shown that
it
is opposed to liberty' (pp.5-6).
I
do not
think that Cohen has succeeded in demonstrat:ing that Nozick's
Wilt
Chamberlain
example depends upon the principle: '(1) whatever arises from a just situation
by just steps is itself just', and what Nozick believes is a corollary of (1):
'(2)
Whatever arises
from
a just situation
as
a result of fully voluntary trans-
actions on the part of all legitimately conc:erned persons
is
itself just' (p.7).
Cohen rejects
(2)
on the grounds that persons may voluntarily enter into trans-
actions failing to realize what their outcome is likely to be.
If
they did be-
come aware of the results of their intended actions, then they might reject with
considerable vehemence the results of their voluntary but uninformed actions.
Cohen is particularly concerned with someone's coming to have immensely
more power than others as the result of voluntary acts: what
if
everyone's giving
Wilt
Chamberlain a quarter enhances hispower over everyone else?
this allegedly dire result, Cohen proposes the following principle:
'(3)
Whatever
arises from a just situation as a result of fully voluntary transactions which
all transagents would still haveagreed
to
if
they had known what the results
of
so
transacting were to be is itself just' (p.9).
As
Cohen correctly points out,
the power of
-
this principle to support capitalism
is
extremely weak;
if
even one
socialist disapproves of the non-egalitarian outcome of some transaction to which
he has been a party, those engaged in the transaction in question cannot appeal
to
(3)
to support a claim that
it
is
just.
But why is this a problem?
As
(3)
is presented,
it
simply states a suffi-
cient condition for a transaction to be just:.
It
does
-
not say that a
transar-
tion that doesn't meet the conditions of
(3)
is unjust: a supporter of
(2)
could
(and
no
doubt would) fully accept
(3).
For
(3)
to have any effect as a criti-
cism of Nozick,
it
must be taken to be a necessary condition of justice.
But then
it
is obviously much too restrictive. Few
if
any transfers
would be considered just
if
(3)
is a necessary condition. Anyone who had in
any way at all
misjudged the outcome
of
a situation could by
(3)
castigate the
occasion
for
his misfortune as unjust.
Is
it,
as taking
(3)
as a necessary con-
dition would have
it,
really unjust
if
1
lend money to someone who proceeds to
make a killing in the market? Had
I
known of the outcome,
1
might very well
disapprove, since had
I
invested in the way he did,
I
would have made the killing
myself. By
(3),
my wishing
I
hadn't loaned the money makes my having done
so
unjust. But this is surely wrong. Cohen believes that stronger principles than
(3)
may be valid, but he fails to supply any, while continuing to think that
Nozick's
(2)
is
too strong. Perhaps Cohen's failure to supply a plausible prin-
ciple should induce us to examine his criticism of
(2)
more closely.
sactions may result in someone's attaining inordinate power.
To
circumvent
His
main point seems to be, as previously suggested, that voluntary tran-
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