COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND GOVERNMENT WAGE REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS*
| Author | M. G. Levenbach |
| Published date | 01 October 1953 |
| Date | 01 October 1953 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1953.tb02135.x |
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND GOVERN-
MENT WAGE REGULATION IN THE
NETHERLANDS
*
I.
Historical
Introduction
1.
Before the Second World War wage-bing
in
Holland
waa
a
matter of free bargaining between employers
and
workers. Broadly
speaking, the wage level was determined by historical growth and
by the bargaining strength of the parties. About a quarter of the
workers were protected by collective agreements, which in Holland
are
contracts, binding and enforceable
at
law. But the wage level8
fixed by collective bargaining influenced the labour relations
of
many non-organised employers and workers who were not legally
bound by any collective agreement. An Act of
1987
opened
up the
possibility of issuing ministerial decrees extending the terms of collec-
tive agreements
to
employers and
workers
in
the trade or industry
who were not bound as
a
result
of
voluntary membership in the
contracting organisations. Until the
war
this statute was
only
applied in a few cases. Apart from this Act, government influence
on
wages was contlned to civil servants and other public employees,
to public work contracts and to certain measures concerning agricul-
tural wages. But on the whole the system of wage-fixing remained
a
free
system and the outcome of negotiations was more or less
haphazard.
About two-fifths of the workers were members of trade unions.
The mutual relations between the workers’ arganisations and those
of the employers were steadily improving. Tbough in some trades
bitter feuds still occurred, good and stable relations had grown up
in
many others.
At
the top levels the organisations had many con-
tacts. These were mostly
ad
hoe,
but more
or
less regular joint
consultations had developed
on
social matters of a general nature,
especially in the field of social insurance.
By virtue of an
Act
of
1923
a government agency was formed
for the prevention and settlement
of
trade disputes, and four Con-
ciliators were appointed for this purpose. They were not civil
servants, but acted
on
a
part-time basis and mainly in a voluntary
capacity. They had
no
compulsory but only persuasive powers,
i.e.,
the power to mediate and conciliate, and the success of their
work depended
on
sound common sense and personal prestige.
Strikes and lock-outs in Holland were reduced to moderate
dimensions, both in numbers and in extent.
*
A
Special University
of
London
Lecture
in
Lawe delivered
at
the London
School
of
Economics and Political Science
on
Febrnary
26,
1953.
455
454
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
16
2.
When the German occupation of the Netherlands began in
May,
1940,
the enemy introduced an absolute price-stop and wage-
stop; everything was rigidly frozen; and strikes were prohibited
under threat of heavy penalties. Of
course
very soon exceptions
to the wage-stop had to be granted.
It
would have been logical to
form a special wage-board for administering these exceptions
;
but
this might have meant that the Germans would have put in some of
their puppets. The power to grant exemptions from the waye-stop
and subsequently the entire task
of
fixing and controlling wages
was therefore entrusted to the only officials who had in the past been
able
to
gain extensive and intimate experience
in
these matters and
who
at
the same time enjoyed the confidence of employers and
workers,
zliz.,
the Government Conciliators assembled as a board.
This system worked fairly satisfactorily-insofar as anything was
able to work satisfactorily during the occupation. But
it
did not
last long. After
two
years the Germans replaced
it
by a scheme
entirely modelled on the pattern of Nazi legislation, and managed
by one
af
their creatures. This system was merely
a
fatpde with
nothing behind
it,
and it is valueless to dwell upon this phase
of
the
development now.
The Germans also tried to remodel the trade unions according
to their aims
;
this led to a veritable exodus of officers as well
as
of
the rank and file. After some time the oppressors put one of the
quislings, to whom they had already entrusted part of the trade
unions, in charge of the whole combined trade union movement.
But the employers refused
to
recognise him as a real represen-
tative
of
the Dutch workpeople. Because
of
this loyalty of the
employers to the democracy of the workers’ organisations-a thing
quite incomprehensible to the Germans-the employers’ organisa-
tions were disbanded. These events had far-reaching consequences.
The leaders of both sides, employers and labour, joined forces to
resist the common enemy whose brutality in harnessing Dutcb
economic life to German war purposes grew every day. Frequent
secret meetings and consultations fostered a spirit of mutual under-
standing. Very soon these went beyond
a
discussibn of day to day
events, and extended to the preparation for close collaboration
during the extremely difficult times to
be
expected after the libera-
tion aboui which, knowing our allies, we never had any doubt.
8.
As
a result of these developments, immediately after
V.E.
Day all the important central organisations of employers in
industry, trade and agriculture, together with the central trade
union organisations, created a permanent institution for co-opera-
tion. This was called the Foundation
of
Labour and it merits the
fame it has, within a very short time, acquired at home
as
well as
far outside our boundaries. The aim of this body is “to ensure
good
permanent social relations in Dutch industrial life on a basis
of joint co-operation between employers and workers.”
To
trans-
late this into British terms: it was as if a permanent joint body
for
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