Combatant socialization and norms of restraint: Examining officer training at the US Military Academy and Army ROTC
| Author | Andrew Bell |
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211010861 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Combatant socialization and norms
of restraint: Examining officer training at
the US Military Academy and Army ROTC
Andrew Bell
Department of International Studies, Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Indiana
University Bloomington; Research Fellow, Modern War Institute, US Military Academy
Abstract
Can armed groups socialize combatants to norms of restraint – in essence, train soldiers to adopt norms of
international humanitarian law on the battlefield? How can social scientists accurately measure such socialization?
Despite being the central focus of organizational and ideational theories of conflict, studies to date have not engaged
in systematic, survey-based examination of this central socialization mechanism theorized to influence military
conduct.
This study advances scholarly understanding by providing the first comparative, survey-based examination of
combatant socialization to norms of restraint, using surveys and interviews with US Army cadets at the US Military
Academy (USMA), Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and active duty Army combatants. Additionally,
to better understand ‘restraint’ from combatants’ perspective, this study introduces the concept of the ‘combatant’s
trilemma’ under which combatants conceptualize civilian protection as part of a costly trade-off with the values of
military advantage and force protection.
Survey results hold both positive and negative implications for socialization to law of war norms: military
socialization can shift combatants’ preferences for battlefield conduct. However, intensive norm socialization may
be required to shift combatants’ preferences from force protection to civilian protection norms. Study findings hold
significant implications for understanding violence against civilians in conflict and for policies to disseminate civilian
protection norms in armed groups worldwide.
Keywords
armed groups, conflict, ethics, international humanitarian law, law, law of war, military culture, military training,
norms, socialization, surveys, US military, violence against civilians
Introduction
From 1965 to 1973, the US Army fought a grueling
counterinsurgency in Vietnam in which US forces killed
hundreds of thousands of civilians, committed systema-
tic human rights violations, and razed entire population
centers (Turse, 2013: 12–13). Four decades later, the US
Army fought a similarly resilient insurgency in Iraq; in
this conflict, however, US forces inflicted much lower
levels of violence against civilians, exhibiting greater
adherence to international legal norms of civilian immu-
nity. Observers have attributed this variation in part to
the post-Vietnam adoption of ‘norms of restraint’ in the
US military, a process theorized to shape US combatants’
preferences toward greater sensitivity for civilians (Kahl,
2007). Indeed, this emphasis on combatant socialization
now underlies much emerging policy analysis and aca-
demic theorizing on armed groups and conflict behavior
(Terry & McQuinn, 2018; Hoover Green, 2018; Wood,
2009).
Can armed groups socialize combatants to norms of
restraint – in essence, train soldiers to ‘behave better’
Corresponding author:
bellam@iu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(2) 180–196
ªThe Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/00223433211010861
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toward civilians? How can social scientists accurately
measure such socialization?Despitebeingthecentral
focus of emerging organizational, cultural, and idea-
tional theories of conflict, studies have to date not
engaged in systematic, survey-based examination of the
central socialization mechanism theorized to influence
military conduct: the shifting of combatants’ internal
preferences regarding violence and civilians. This gap
inhibits our ability to accurately theorize socialization
processes and, ultimately, their impact on combatant
behavior.
In this article, I advance our understanding of civilian
victimization and restraint by examining the process of
norm socialization and the transmission of norms of
restraint to military combatants.
1
As I show, combatant
socialization to norms of restraint is possible – intensive
military training can shift combatants’ preferences for
battlefield conduct. However, in focusing on armed
group conduct, current conflict studies incompletely
conceptualize combatants’ perspectives and the norm
socialization process, potentially suggesting overly opti-
mistic accounts of norm socialization and restraint. The
findings from this research produce significant implica-
tions for both the study of conflict and for policy efforts
to disseminate civilian protection norms in military orga-
nizations worldwide.
This article makes two primary contributions. The
first is empirical: I provide one of the first known
survey-based examinations of combatant training in
norms of restraint, shedding light on the micro-level
combatant socialization processes underlying organiza-
tional and ideational theories of civilian victimization.
To do so, I conduct comparative, cross-cohort surveys
and interviews of over 1,000 US Army cadets and civil-
ian students at the US Military Academy (USMA), US
Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and 12
civilian universities, as well as interviews with 72 US
Army combatants.
2
Such data provide the first systema-
tic empirical evidence indicating that military socializa-
tion processes can shift combatant preferences toward
norms of restraint.
The second contribution is theoretical: I add to exist-
ing theories by endogenizing the concept of restraint
from the combatant’s perspective. Highlighting the nor-
mative framework that I label the ‘combatant’s tri-
lemma’, I show that combatants, explicitly or
implicitly, conceptualize restraint as part of a costly
trade-off with other vital, competing goals, balancing
civilian protection with the values of military advantage,
and, more significantly, force protection.
3
Survey results show that scholars should give analyti-
cal attention to the dynamic normative balance inherent
in combatant socialization to norms of restraint. Indeed,
only under a concept of ‘costly’ restraint – in which
combatants shift risk from civilians to their comrades
and to themselves – can scholars assess with validity this
norm socialization process.
This study thus contributes to our understanding of
norms, law, and conflict by providing micro-level data
on the operationalization and transmission of norms of
restraint in military organizations. Such issues are not
merely theoretical: governments and international orga-
nizations expend billions of dollars annually to instill
humanitarian law norms in security sector reform efforts
around the world (Harborne, 2014). Global policies to
limit violence against civilians can thus be made more
effective with greater understanding of combatant per-
spectives and socialization to norms of restraint.
This article proceeds in seven sections. Section two
reviews existing theories regarding armed group organi-
zations and conduct toward civilians, and section three
develops propositions on norm socialization and the
combatant’s trilemma. Section four introduces the
USMA-ROTC comparative case study, and section five
examines USMA-ROTC survey data. Section six dis-
cusses survey results. Finally, section seven explores the
theoretical implications of this research and outlines
areas for future research.
Existing theories of violence and restraint
in conflict
Why do armed groups engage in counter-civilian violence
or restraint? While predominant rationalist explanations
highlight costs and incentives faced by con flict actors
(Downes, 2008; Fazal, 2018; Jo, 2015; Kalyvas, 2006;
1
Space constraints restrict this examination primarily to survey
research, limiting direct exploration of socialization dynamics.
Cadet interviews, referenced briefly later in the article, are
examined more extensively in follow-up work.
2
The survey sample comprises cadets (officer trainees), most of
whom have no prior combat experience, potentially limiting
generalizability regarding ‘opportunistic’ violence. See Manekin
(2013, 2020) and Wood & Toppelberg (2017).
3
I use the term ‘combatant’ broadly to designate an armed force
member who is not a ‘civilian’ and who is authorized to engage in
the use of force and be targeted under law of armed conflict (LOAC).
See US Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Department of
Defense, 2016: 99–105).
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