Commentary on Benjamin Banta: Thinking through Practices that ‘Work’ in a Rapidly Changing World
| Published date | 01 November 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12754 |
| Author | Mary Kaldor |
| Date | 01 November 2019 |
Commentary on Benjamin Banta: Thinking
through Practices that ‘Work’in a Rapidly
Changing World
Mary Kaldor
London School of Economics and Political Science
It is fascinating to observe the lengths to which even the
most sympathetic critics of the new war argument will go
to reinstate Clausewitzean theory in its entirety. Clausewtiz’s
On War has an iconic status for those who study military
strategy much like the Bible for Christians or Marx’sDas
Capital for socialists.
As a matter of fact, I am a fan and avid reader of Clausewitz.
I agree that war is fundamentally about the use of violence
for political purposes. I agree that war is rational, at least in an
instrumental sense. I find the concept of the ‘wondrous trinity’
of reason, chance and passion that comes together in war
compelling. I also apply the methodology of Clausewitz,
namely the idea that it is possible to identify an inner logic
(absolute war) through abstract reasoning even though real
war departs from this logic for a number of reasons –political
calculation, everyday obstacles, as well as chance and passion.
My basic argument, as Benjamin Banta explains, is that the
inner logic of ‘new wars’is different from the inner logic of
‘old wars’. Clausewitz was the theorist of ‘old wars’typically
European wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
For him, war was essentially a contest of wills; he defined
war as an ‘act of violence designed to compel our opponent
to fulfil our will’(Clausewitz, 1968, p. 5). From this definition,
he deduced his fundamental thesis that war tends to the
extreme as politicians try to impose their will, generals try to
disarm their enemies, and passion and hatred are unleashed
among the population. For Clausewitz, as Banta stresses, war
was about fighting and battle was the decisive encounter.
In contrast, I define war as ‘an act of violence undertaken
by two or more armed groups framed in political terms’.
According to this definition, war could be a contest of wills
or it could what I call a mutual enterprise or social condi-
tion, in which armed groups gain more violence itself in
both political and economic terms than from winning or los-
ing. In such wars, fighting in the sense of direct clashes
between armed groups is rather rare and most violence is
directed against civilians. Such wars, which I describe as
‘new wars’, tend to persistence and spread rather than
extremes. Of course real wars depart from this ideal-typical
model, and it is possible to identify extremist tendencies as
a consequence of popular anger or outside interference for
example. As Banta agrees, the distinction between old and
new wars is thus a conceptual rather than empirical distinc-
tion. It is a way of interpreting war different from the pre-
vailing conception that derives from Clausewitz. It may be
that the new war lens applies to wars of the past or that
the old war lens might turn out to be more relevant again
in the future. The advantage of the ‘new war’lens for under-
standing contemporary conflict is that it provides an alterna-
tive way of informing policy; in particular, as Banta stresses,
I argue for a human security approach.
Benjamin Banta more or less accurately sets out my argu-
ment but puts forward the proposition that contemporary
wars would be better analysed in terms of Clausewitz’s origi-
nal inner logic. He suggests that tendencies for persistence
and spread can be incorporated into the original logic, pre-
sumably as a way in which real war departs from absolute
war. He claims that he agrees with the human security
approach and this is possible under his formulation but
clearly his main aim is to restore a role for military war-fight-
ing. He implies, drawing on an essay by my former philoso-
phy tutor Elizabeth Anscombe, that it is my pacifist
convictions that get in the way of clear thinking. He sug-
gests that I want to reject the idea that war can only be
ended by victory or defeat. I do, of course, reject this idea
but my argument is broader than that; rather it is about the
way that ‘old war’thinking informs a range of policy instru-
ments in ways that are counter-productive in new war con-
texts. In other words, it is not about the military versus
other instruments, rather it is about the different ways in
which military, political or economic instruments are used.
If war is understood not as a contest of wills but as, say, a
social condition or mutual enterprise, then military interven-
tion of one side will not lead to victory or defeat but merely
perpetuate the new war social condition. Looked at from an
A Response to ‘The New War Thesis and Clausewitz:
A Reconciliation’, Benjamin Banta*
*Banta, B (2019), ‘The New War Thesis and Clausewitz: A Reconciliation’,
Global Policy 10 (4). First published online: 5 August 2019, https://doi.
org/10.1111/1758-5899.12722
©2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Global Policy (2019) 10:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12754
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 4 . November 2019
740
Response Article
To continue reading
Request your trial