Comments on Cases
| Published date | 01 January 1975 |
| Date | 01 January 1975 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201837503900106 |
| Subject Matter | Judicial Committee of the Privy Council |
Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council
Comments
on
Cases
THE
LIMITS OF SELF-DEFENCE
D.PP
v. Walker
THE difference between the respective consequences of self-defence
and provocation are such that an accused will always rely on self-
defence if he considers it apractical possibility, for the success of a plea of
self-defence leads to an outright acquittal, whereas the success of a plea of
provocation leads merely to the reduction of the crime from murder to
manslaughter. If, however, a case were to arise in the future, in which the
defendant relied on provocation but failed to rely on self-defence, it would
none the less be the duty of the trial judge to give careful consideration to
that defence and to leave it to the jury, if in fact such a defence could be
inferred from the evidence. Indeed, after so doing, the judge must also
instruct the jury that, if they reject self-defence, they may still find man-
slaughter on the ground of provocation: see Bullard v. The Queen (1957,
A.
C.
635);
d.
R. v. Porritt (1961, 1
WLR.
1372).
In
D.PP
v. Walker(1973, 1WL.R. 1090), the accused was charged
with the murder of his wife by stabbing her. There was no doubt that he
stabbed her and that she died of her wounds. At his trial, the accused ran
the defences of automatism, provocation and diminished responsibility. He
was convicted of manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility.
The
accused did not give evidence, but made an unsworn statement from
the dock. He said that he and his wife had had an argument in their car
about the wife's association with another man, that the wife had left the
car and that, when he tried forcibly to bring her back, she had seized his
testicles, with the result that he felt severe pain and thought he was
about to faint. He had seized a knife which was in the car and had struck
her and remembered no more. On appealto the Court of Appeal in Jamaica,
he argued that this statement had raised the issue of whether he had acted
in self-defence and that the trial judge was therefore bound to consider
that defence and leave it to the jury, even though it had not been explicitly
raised as a defence.
That
court accepted the submission that the evidence
raised the issue of self-defence, quashed the conviction and ordered a
newtrial.
The
courtgranted special leave to appealto the Judicial Committee,
however, on the ground that a point of law of exceptional public importance
was involved.
The
Board eventually allowed the appeal and restored the
conviction.
It was held in Walkers case (supra) that the trial judge was entirely
right in deciding not toleave self-defence to the jury.
That
defence had never
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