Commissioned Book Review: S Fleming, Leviathan on a Leash: A Political Theory of State Responsibility
| Published date | 01 May 2022 |
| Date | 01 May 2022 |
| DOI | 10.1177/14789299211021513 |
| Author | Juliane Liebsch |
| Subject Matter | Commissioned Book Review |
Political Studies Review
2022, Vol. 20(2) NP23 –NP24
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
Commissioned Book Review
1021513PSW0010.1177/14789299211021513Political Studies ReviewCommissioned Book Review
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Commissioned Book Review
Leviathan on a Leash: A Political Theory of
State Responsibility by S Fleming. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. 224pp.,
£30.00, ISBN 9780691206462 (hardcover)
In search for answers on how to deal with con-
temporary global challenges like climate
change, global poverty and pandemics like
COVID-19, there is a growing interest in state
responsibility from a normative perspective.
Thus, Sean Fleming’s recently published book
Leviathan on a Leash: A Political Theory of
State Responsibility that sets out to develop and
discuss the concept is very welcome.
In the book, Fleming reconstructs and
develops a Hobbesian theory of state responsi-
bility. It is based on Hobbes’ writings on the
state but diverts from Hobbes in some crucial
points to be able to speak of state responsibility
at all. Very briefly, this Hobbesian theory can
be summarized as follows: A state can be said
to bear responsibility because it is a (fictional)
person that is represented by its government,
who acts in its name; the government in turn is
authorized by subjects, who will bear the costs
and burdens of the state’s responsibilities.
Each of these three entities is necessary to
properly conceptualize state responsibility
according to Fleming. The state cannot be
taken out of this ‘complex triad of relations
between the state, its government, and its sub-
jects’ (p. 2), since it then would be unclear why
responsibilities should extend beyond the life-
times of both governments and subjects.
Fleming argues against two rivalling contem-
porary theories of state responsibility – the agen-
tial theory and the functional theory – as each
neglects one entity. The functional theory – prom-
inent in International Law – takes the subjects out
of the equation and only considers the relation
between the state and its representatives. Thus, it
has a blind eye towards legitimation of the repre-
sentatives and the distribution of the burdens of
state responsibilities to subjects.
The agential theory – dominant in
International Relations, political theory and
philosophy – in turn neglects the representa-
tives of the state and only focusses on the rela-
tion between subjects and the state. This results
in the counterfactual view that the state can act
on its own and thus obscures the role of state
representatives.
Fleming does not only lay open this often-
unnoticed theoretical divide between different
fields, but his theory may also be able to bridge
this divide.
Fleming works out the details of this theory
by means of three ‘Fundamental Questions’:
‘How can actions be attributed to the entity?
[. . .] How can the entity be identified over
time? [. . .] How can the entity discharge its
responsibilities?’ (p. 6). According to Fleming,
any complete theory of responsibility must
answer these questions. These questions fit
very smoothly to the three relations between
the entities of Fleming’s theory.
While these questions are undoubtedly
important in debates on state responsibility –
one might even agree with Fleming that they
are ‘perennial questions in ethics and law’
(p. 7) – it is also clear that these specific ques-
tions were selected among many to fit the
structure of the theory rather than covering all
aspects that a theory of responsibility needs to
take into account.
Another question that needs to be answered
in a theory of responsibility is, for example, the
question of authority or to whom states are
responsible. Fleming neglects this question even
though it is especially important for responsibil-
ity in the international realm, since ‘there is no
higher authority that can compel states to fulfill
their responsibilities’ (p. 68) as Fleming summa-
rizes Hobbes. While, as Fleming convincingly
explains (pp. 68–69), a theory of state responsi-
bility does not need to be abandoned because of
this, further elaboration on this subject would
have benefited the theory overall, especially
since his Hobbesian theory necessarily diverts
from Hobbes’ theory on this point.
After having laid out this theory, what is
Fleming’s take on state responsibility as a
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