Committal for Contempt
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300524 |
| Published date | 01 October 1999 |
| Date | 01 October 1999 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
TheJournal of
Criminal
Law
counsel agreed with the court that a prior indication of a lenient sen-
tence by the judge did
not
deprive the court of jurisdiction on a refer-
ence by the Attorney-General, although it was argued that the judge's
prior indication of leniency was a factor that the Court of Appeal should
take into account
when
considering the reference. In that case, the court
increased the sentence imposed by the trial judge, but counsel in the
present case sought to show that that decision was per incuriam, because
the authorities upon the effect of a judge's prior indication of leniency to
come were
not
cited to the court in that case. In the present case, the
court held that there was no justification, either under the Criminal
Justice Act 1988 or on principle, for the suggestion that an early indica-
tion of leniency could deprive the court of the jurisdiction which Parlia-
ment
has conferred on it to consider the reference. In so deciding,
however, the court accepted that a judge's prior indication of his inten-
tions was a 'factor' which the court should take into account
when
considering the reference. Rose U added, however, that
if
a judge's
promise of leniency were to deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear
a reference under s 36, the whole purpose of the procedure under the
1988 Act would be frustrated. Anyone who pleads guilty must be aware
that if, in consequence, he receives a lenient sentence, that sentence is,
like any other, susceptible to reference to the Court of Appeal by the
Attorney-General. He must know, therefore, that there is always a risk
that he will lose the benefit of the leniency which his plea has brought
him. In the present case, the Court of Appeal, while refusing to be bound
by
what
the recorder had unwisely said at the pretrial hearing,
none
the
less paid attention to what he had said about mitigating circumstances
arising
out
of double jeopardy and other circumstances, and, regarding
these statements as 'factors' to be considered and, in consequence of that
consideration, instead of imposing a sentence of four years' immediate
imprisonment which the earlier authorities indicated, imposed a
sentence of two years' immediate imprisonment.
Committal for Contempt
In
re Mand others (Minors) [1999] 2 All ER 56
After the breakdown of a marriage, the father had difficultyin maintain-
ing contact with the children and at a contact hearing, the judge, being
of the opinion that the mother had determined to prevent that contact
and had imposed
her
views on the children, made a contact order. He
made a further order endorsed with a penal notice, and on further
review
he
thought that the mother might have been in breach of that
order. Yet another order was drawn, by the court, on its own motion,
although the father had
'not
applied for the mother's committal for
contempt. The judge's order called on the mother to show cause why
she should
not
be committed for contempt for failing to hand over the
children for contact with the father and therefore to be liable for
committal for breach of the earlier order. The mother applied for the last
438
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